On 11/18/26 7:43 PM, Demi Marie Obenour wrote: > On 11/18/26 7:37 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: >> On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 06:42:15PM -0500, Demi Marie Obenour wrote: >>> On 11/18/26 9:04 AM, Rodolfo Giometti wrote: >>>> This RFC proposes a key type, "keycrypt", whose material user space can >>>> use for symmetric operations but never read: AES-256-CBC, HMAC-SHA256 >>>> and an authenticated AES-256-GCM stream, through a file descriptor that >>>> KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN returns for one key and one operation. >>> >>> I haven't looked at the API, but from a cryptographic perspective, >>> this encourages very poor practices. AES-GCM even allows userspace >>> to extract the secret authentication key. >>> >>> AES-256-CBC isn't a suitable mode on its own, unless it's combined >>> with a MAC in encrypt-then-MAC. Even then, it has a 2^64 birthday >>> bound, so it should only be used 2^48 times with a single key unless >>> the key is ephemeral. >>> >>> AES-GCM is not a suitable algorithm either. If you allow encrypting >>> with a key loaded from persistent storage, there is no way for the API >>> to ensure it is only used with a unique nonce. Nonce reuse leaks the >>> authentication key and allows forgeries. Using random nonces isn't >>> good enough either: NIST only allows 2^32 encryptions in this case, >>> and the API can't enforce that limit. >>> >>> For long-term keys, all of the following are much safer choices. >>> They have 192-bit nonces, which means that one can generate them >>> at random for each encryption without any problems. >>> >>> - XAES-256-GCM >>> - XChaCha20-Poly1305 >>> - AEGIS-256 >>> >>> AES-GCM-SIV is also okay, provided that you are fine with occasionally >>> leaking if two plaintexts are equal. This happens whenever there is >>> a nonce collision, so with probability 2^-32 after 2^32 encryptions. >> >> The exitential problem here is that KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN creates a circular >> relationship between the keyrings API and a specific key type. >> >> At hardware level I did not see any support for TPM, which narrows down >> the potential user base. >> >> The remaining potential user base is further reduced by those that use >> trusted keys; leaving out those who need to solve the assumed problem >> that only this patch set can presumebly sort out. >> >> And we don't really know at this point that cut. This is pretty much >> the break down of what is wrong here. >> >> If there is/was a problem to sort out, it should be so constrained that >> it should be as quick to describe as stepping over a nail really. >> >> These are the main topics what I would focus on. > > This whole patchset looks like a solution looking for a problem. > > The usual solution to something like this is a userspace service > like ssh-agent. Then you can do whatever key management you want. > That doesn't protect against root, but if someone can get root you > have bigger problems. Also, if you need keys stored in hardware for some reason (compliance, time-limited exfiltration), you can use a userspace library or daemon that abstracts over whatever the hardware-specific API is. -- Sincerely, Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)