mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: "Thiébaud Weksteen" <tweek@google.com>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>,
	Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] selinux: add basic filtering for audit trace events
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2020 08:05:44 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <02c193e4-008a-5c3d-75e8-9be7bbcb941c@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200813144914.737306-2-tweek@google.com>

On 8/13/2020 7:48 AM, Thiébaud Weksteen wrote:
> From: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
>
> This patch adds further attributes to the event. These attributes are
> helpful to understand the context of the message and can be used
> to filter the events.
>
> There are three common items. Source context, target context and tclass.
> There are also items from the outcome of operation performed.
>
> An event is similar to:
>            <...>-1309  [002] ....  6346.691689: selinux_audited:
>        requested=0x4000000 denied=0x4000000 audited=0x4000000
>        result=-13 ssid=315 tsid=61

It may not be my place to ask, but *please please please* don't
externalize secids. I understand that it's easier to type "42"
than "system_r:cupsd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023", and that it's easier for
your tools to parse and store the number. Once you start training
people that system_r:cupsd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 is secid 42 you'll
never be able to change it. The secid will start showing up in
scripts. Bad  Things  Will  Happen.

>        scontext=system_u:system_r:cupsd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
>        tcontext=system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 tclass=file
>
> With systems where many denials are occurring, it is useful to apply a
> filter. The filtering is a set of logic that is inserted with
> the filter file. Example:
>  echo "tclass==\"file\" && ssid!=42" > events/avc/selinux_audited/filter
>
> This adds that we only get tclass=file but not for ssid 42.
>
> The trace can also have extra properties. Adding the user stack
> can be done with
>    echo 1 > options/userstacktrace
>
> Now the output will be
>          runcon-1365  [003] ....  6960.955530: selinux_audited:
>      requested=0x4000000 denied=0x4000000 audited=0x4000000
>      result=-13 ssid=315 tsid=61
>      scontext=system_u:system_r:cupsd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
>      tcontext=system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 tclass=file
>           runcon-1365  [003] ....  6960.955560: <user stack trace>
>  =>  <00007f325b4ce45b>
>  =>  <00005607093efa57>
>
> Note that the ssid is the internal numeric representation of scontext
> and tsid is numeric for tcontext. They are useful for filtering.
>
> Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
> Reviewed-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
> ---
> v2 changes:
> - update changelog to include usage examples
>
>  include/trace/events/avc.h | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
>  security/selinux/avc.c     | 22 +++++++++++---------
>  2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/trace/events/avc.h b/include/trace/events/avc.h
> index 07c058a9bbcd..ac5ef2e1c2c5 100644
> --- a/include/trace/events/avc.h
> +++ b/include/trace/events/avc.h
> @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
>  /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
>  /*
> - * Author: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
> + * Authors:	Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
> + *		Peter Enderborg <Peter.Enderborg@sony.com>
>   */
>  #undef TRACE_SYSTEM
>  #define TRACE_SYSTEM avc
> @@ -12,23 +13,43 @@
>  
>  TRACE_EVENT(selinux_audited,
>  
> -	TP_PROTO(struct selinux_audit_data *sad),
> +	TP_PROTO(struct selinux_audit_data *sad,
> +		char *scontext,
> +		char *tcontext,
> +		const char *tclass
> +	),
>  
> -	TP_ARGS(sad),
> +	TP_ARGS(sad, scontext, tcontext, tclass),
>  
>  	TP_STRUCT__entry(
> -		__field(unsigned int, tclass)
> -		__field(unsigned int, audited)
> +		__field(u32, requested)
> +		__field(u32, denied)
> +		__field(u32, audited)
> +		__field(int, result)
> +		__string(scontext, scontext)
> +		__string(tcontext, tcontext)
> +		__string(tclass, tclass)
> +		__field(u32, ssid)
> +		__field(u32, tsid)
>  	),
>  
>  	TP_fast_assign(
> -		__entry->tclass = sad->tclass;
> -		__entry->audited = sad->audited;
> +		__entry->requested	= sad->requested;
> +		__entry->denied		= sad->denied;
> +		__entry->audited	= sad->audited;
> +		__entry->result		= sad->result;
> +		__entry->ssid		= sad->ssid;
> +		__entry->tsid		= sad->tsid;
> +		__assign_str(tcontext, tcontext);
> +		__assign_str(scontext, scontext);
> +		__assign_str(tclass, tclass);
>  	),
>  
> -	TP_printk("tclass=%u audited=%x",
> -		__entry->tclass,
> -		__entry->audited)
> +	TP_printk("requested=0x%x denied=0x%x audited=0x%x result=%d ssid=%u tsid=%u scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s",
> +		__entry->requested, __entry->denied, __entry->audited, __entry->result,
> +		__entry->ssid, __entry->tsid, __get_str(scontext), __get_str(tcontext),
> +		__get_str(tclass)
> +	)
>  );
>  
>  #endif
> diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
> index b0a0af778b70..7de5cc5169af 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/avc.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
> @@ -705,35 +705,39 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
>  {
>  	struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
>  	struct selinux_audit_data *sad = ad->selinux_audit_data;
> -	char *scontext;
> +	char *scontext = NULL;
> +	char *tcontext = NULL;
> +	const char *tclass = NULL;
>  	u32 scontext_len;
> +	u32 tcontext_len;
>  	int rc;
>  
> -	trace_selinux_audited(sad);
> -
>  	rc = security_sid_to_context(sad->state, sad->ssid, &scontext,
>  				     &scontext_len);
>  	if (rc)
>  		audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%d", sad->ssid);
>  	else {
>  		audit_log_format(ab, " scontext=%s", scontext);
> -		kfree(scontext);
>  	}
>  
> -	rc = security_sid_to_context(sad->state, sad->tsid, &scontext,
> -				     &scontext_len);
> +	rc = security_sid_to_context(sad->state, sad->tsid, &tcontext,
> +				     &tcontext_len);
>  	if (rc)
>  		audit_log_format(ab, " tsid=%d", sad->tsid);
>  	else {
> -		audit_log_format(ab, " tcontext=%s", scontext);
> -		kfree(scontext);
> +		audit_log_format(ab, " tcontext=%s", tcontext);
>  	}
>  
> -	audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", secclass_map[sad->tclass-1].name);
> +	tclass = secclass_map[sad->tclass-1].name;
> +	audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", tclass);
>  
>  	if (sad->denied)
>  		audit_log_format(ab, " permissive=%u", sad->result ? 0 : 1);
>  
> +	trace_selinux_audited(sad, scontext, tcontext, tclass);
> +	kfree(tcontext);
> +	kfree(scontext);
> +
>  	/* in case of invalid context report also the actual context string */
>  	rc = security_sid_to_context_inval(sad->state, sad->ssid, &scontext,
>  					   &scontext_len);

  reply	other threads:[~2020-08-13 15:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-08-13 14:48 [PATCH v2 1/2] selinux: add tracepoint on denials Thiébaud Weksteen
2020-08-13 14:48 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] selinux: add basic filtering for audit trace events Thiébaud Weksteen
2020-08-13 15:05   ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2020-08-13 15:35     ` peter enderborg
2020-08-13 15:49       ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-13 16:10         ` peter enderborg
2020-08-13 17:14         ` peter enderborg
2020-08-13 17:38           ` Steven Rostedt
2020-08-13 18:18             ` peter enderborg
2020-08-13 19:16               ` Steven Rostedt
2020-08-13 15:41 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] selinux: add tracepoint on denials Stephen Smalley
2020-08-14 13:05   ` Thiébaud Weksteen
2020-08-14 16:51     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-14 17:07       ` peter enderborg
2020-08-14 17:08         ` Stephen Smalley
2020-08-14 17:22           ` peter enderborg
2020-08-14 17:46             ` Steven Rostedt
2020-08-14 18:06               ` peter enderborg
2020-08-14 18:30                 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-08-14 18:50                   ` peter enderborg
2020-08-14 18:56                     ` Steven Rostedt
2020-08-15  7:17               ` peter enderborg
2020-08-15  8:45               ` peter enderborg

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=02c193e4-008a-5c3d-75e8-9be7bbcb941c@schaufler-ca.com \
    --to=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=eparis@parisplace.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mchehab+huawei@kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=nnk@google.com \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=peter.enderborg@sony.com \
    --cc=robh@kernel.org \
    --cc=rostedt@goodmis.org \
    --cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com \
    --cc=tweek@google.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®