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From: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
To: Sandy Harris <sandyinchina@gmail.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/8] memset() in crypto code
Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2021 14:02:32 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <03183ae9-3dd3-b0da-31e6-c186b2bfcfcc@csgroup.eu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACXcFmkO0g2YRjvfknKXr_ZnJaMg2cpvOsLq=h1ZcB=hg9NK8w@mail.gmail.com>



Le 16/11/2021 à 12:20, Sandy Harris a écrit :
> Fairly often we want to clear some memory in crypto code; it holds
> things we are done using and do not want to leave lying around where
> an enemy might discover them. Typical examples are crypto keys or
> random numbers we have generated and used for output.
> 
> The obvious way to do this is with memset(address,0,bytes) but there
> is a problem with that; because we are done using that memory, the
> compiler may optimise away the "useless" memset() call. Using
> memzero_explicit(address,bytes) instead solves the problem; that
> function is designed to resist the optimisation.
> 
> There are well over 100 memset() calls in .c files in the crypto and
> security directories. I looked at them all and found about a dozen in
> eight files that I thought should be changed to memzero_explicit().
> Here they are as patches 1 to 8 in this series.
> 
> I did read some code & think moderately carefully, but I do not know
> the code deeply & it is possible I have made some errors. I think
> false positives (making unnecessary changes) are more likely than
> false negatives (not catching necessary changes).
> 

I see no point in doing 8 separate patches that all have the same 
subject and the exact same light description.

I think it would be better to have a single patch with all the changes, 
and use the cover letter description as description for that patch.

Christophe

  reply	other threads:[~2021-11-16 13:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-11-16 11:20 Sandy Harris
2021-11-16 13:02 ` Christophe Leroy [this message]
2021-11-17  2:36   ` Sandy Harris
2021-11-16 14:41 ` Ard Biesheuvel

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