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From: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
To: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	David Kaplan <David.Kaplan@amd.com>,
	Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 1/2] x86/entry_64: Add a separate unmitigated entry/exit path
Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2024 02:57:34 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <0402bea4-bb0a-4d67-9ae2-f534a6076861@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240919-selective-mitigation-v1-1-1846cf41895e@linux.intel.com>


On 9/19/24 17:52, Pawan Gupta wrote:
> CPU mitigations are deployed system-wide, but usually not all of the
> userspace is malicious. Yet, they suffer from the performance impact
> of the mitigations. This all or nothing approach is due to lack of a
> way for kernel to know which userspace can be trusted and which cannot.
>
> For scenarios where an admin can decide which processes to trust, an
> interface to tell the kernel to possibly skip the mitigation would be
> useful.
>
> In preparation for kernel to be able to selectively apply mitigation
> per-process add a separate kernel entry/exit path that skips the
> mitigations.
>
> Originally-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>

For the current patch, not all x86 CPU vulnerability mitigations can be 
disabled. Maybe we should list the subset of mitigations that can be 
disabled.

Cheers,
Longman


  reply	other threads:[~2024-09-20  6:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-09-19 21:52 [PATCH RFC 0/2] Selective mitigation for trusted userspace Pawan Gupta
2024-09-19 21:52 ` [PATCH RFC 1/2] x86/entry_64: Add a separate unmitigated entry/exit path Pawan Gupta
2024-09-20  6:57   ` Waiman Long [this message]
2024-09-20  7:24     ` Pawan Gupta
2024-09-19 21:52 ` [PATCH RFC 2/2] cpu/bugs: cgroup: Add a cgroup knob to bypass CPU mitigations Pawan Gupta
2024-09-20  7:05   ` Waiman Long
2024-09-20  7:54     ` Pawan Gupta
2024-09-21  7:30       ` Waiman Long
2024-09-27 15:52 ` [PATCH RFC 0/2] Selective mitigation for trusted userspace Michal Koutný
2024-09-27 22:01   ` Pawan Gupta

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