From: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
To: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
David Kaplan <David.Kaplan@amd.com>,
Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 1/2] x86/entry_64: Add a separate unmitigated entry/exit path
Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2024 02:57:34 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <0402bea4-bb0a-4d67-9ae2-f534a6076861@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240919-selective-mitigation-v1-1-1846cf41895e@linux.intel.com>
On 9/19/24 17:52, Pawan Gupta wrote:
> CPU mitigations are deployed system-wide, but usually not all of the
> userspace is malicious. Yet, they suffer from the performance impact
> of the mitigations. This all or nothing approach is due to lack of a
> way for kernel to know which userspace can be trusted and which cannot.
>
> For scenarios where an admin can decide which processes to trust, an
> interface to tell the kernel to possibly skip the mitigation would be
> useful.
>
> In preparation for kernel to be able to selectively apply mitigation
> per-process add a separate kernel entry/exit path that skips the
> mitigations.
>
> Originally-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
For the current patch, not all x86 CPU vulnerability mitigations can be
disabled. Maybe we should list the subset of mitigations that can be
disabled.
Cheers,
Longman
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-09-20 6:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-09-19 21:52 [PATCH RFC 0/2] Selective mitigation for trusted userspace Pawan Gupta
2024-09-19 21:52 ` [PATCH RFC 1/2] x86/entry_64: Add a separate unmitigated entry/exit path Pawan Gupta
2024-09-20 6:57 ` Waiman Long [this message]
2024-09-20 7:24 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-09-19 21:52 ` [PATCH RFC 2/2] cpu/bugs: cgroup: Add a cgroup knob to bypass CPU mitigations Pawan Gupta
2024-09-20 7:05 ` Waiman Long
2024-09-20 7:54 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-09-21 7:30 ` Waiman Long
2024-09-27 15:52 ` [PATCH RFC 0/2] Selective mitigation for trusted userspace Michal Koutný
2024-09-27 22:01 ` Pawan Gupta
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