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From: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
To: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org, seanjc@google.com,
	pbonzini@redhat.com, len.brown@intel.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
	rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com, reinette.chatre@intel.com,
	dan.j.williams@intel.com, peterz@infradead.org,
	ak@linux.intel.com, kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com,
	sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com,
	isaku.yamahata@intel.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
	Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com, rdunlap@infradead.org, Jason@zx2c4.com,
	juri.lelli@redhat.com, mark.rutland@arm.com, frederic@kernel.org,
	yuehaibing@huawei.com, dongli.zhang@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 02/22] cc_platform: Add new attribute to prevent ACPI CPU hotplug
Date: Wed, 3 Aug 2022 11:40:54 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <041f2d03-c32f-c578-f714-5b01bb8bc46b@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5ebd7c3cfb3ab9d77a2577c4864befcffe5359d4.camel@intel.com>


On 2022/6/27 13:05, Kai Huang wrote:
> On Fri, 2022-06-24 at 11:57 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
>> On 6/22/22 04:15, Kai Huang wrote:
>>> Platforms with confidential computing technology may not support ACPI
>>> CPU hotplug when such technology is enabled by the BIOS.  Examples
>>> include Intel platforms which support Intel Trust Domain Extensions
>>> (TDX).
>>>
>>> If the kernel ever receives ACPI CPU hotplug event, it is likely a BIOS
>>> bug.  For ACPI CPU hot-add, the kernel should speak out this is a BIOS
>>> bug and reject the new CPU.  For hot-removal, for simplicity just assume
>>> the kernel cannot continue to work normally, and BUG().
>> So, the kernel is now declaring ACPI CPU hotplug and TDX to be
>> incompatible and even BUG()'ing if we see them together.  Has anyone
>> told the firmware guys about this?  Is this in a spec somewhere?  When
>> the kernel goes boom, are the firmware folks going to cry "Kernel bug!!"?
>>
>> This doesn't seem like something the kernel should be doing unilaterally.
> TDX doesn't support ACPI CPU hotplug (both hot-add and hot-removal) is an
> architectural behaviour.  The public specs doesn't explicitly say  it, but it is
> implied:
>
> 1) During platform boot MCHECK verifies all logical CPUs on all packages that
> they are TDX compatible, and it keeps some information, such as total CPU
> packages and total logical cpus at some location of SEAMRR so it can later be
> used by P-SEAMLDR and TDX module.  Please see "3.4 SEAMLDR_SEAMINFO" in the P-
> SEAMLDR spec:
>
> https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/733584
>
> 2) Also some SEAMCALLs must be called on all logical CPUs or CPU packages that
> the platform has (such as such as TDH.SYS.INIT.LP and TDH.SYS.KEY.CONFIG),
> otherwise the further step of TDX module initialization will fail.
>
> Unfortunately there's no public spec mentioning what's the behaviour of ACPI CPU
> hotplug on TDX enabled platform.  For instance, whether BIOS will ever get the
> ACPI CPU hot-plug event, or if BIOS gets the event, will it suppress it.  What I
> got from Intel internally is a non-buggy BIOS should never report such event to
> the kernel, so if kernel receives such event, it should be fair enough to treat
> it as BIOS bug.
>
> But theoretically, the BIOS isn't in TDX's TCB, and can be from 3rd party..
>
> Also, I was told "CPU hot-plug is a system feature, not a CPU feature or Intel
> architecture feature", so Intel doesn't have an architectural specification for
> CPU hot-plug.
>
> At the meantime, I am pushing Intel internally to add some statements regarding
> to the TDX and CPU hotplug interaction to the BIOS write guide and make it
> public.  I guess this is the best thing we can do.
>
> Regarding to the code change, I agree the BUG() isn't good.  I used it because:
> 1) this basically on a theoretical problem and shouldn't happen in practice; 2)
> because there's no architectural specification regarding to the behaviour of TDX
> when CPU hot-removal, so I just used BUG() in assumption that TDX isn't safe to
> use anymore.

host kernel is also not in TDX's TCB either, what would happen if kernel 
doesn't
do anything in case of buggy BIOS? How does TDX handle the case to 
enforce the
secure of TDs?


>
> But Rafael doesn't like current code change either. I think maybe we can just
> disable CPU hotplug code when TDX is enabled by BIOS (something like below):
>
> --- a/drivers/acpi/acpi_processor.c
> +++ b/drivers/acpi/acpi_processor.c
> @@ -707,6 +707,10 @@ bool acpi_duplicate_processor_id(int proc_id)
>   void __init acpi_processor_init(void)
>   {
>          acpi_processor_check_duplicates();
> +
> +       if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_ACPI_CPU_HOTPLUG_DISABLED))
> +               return;
> +
>          acpi_scan_add_handler_with_hotplug(&processor_handler, "processor");
>          acpi_scan_add_handler(&processor_container_handler);
>   }
>
> This approach is cleaner I think, but we won't be able to report "BIOS bug" when
> ACPI CPU hotplug happens.  But to me it's OK as perhaps it's arguable to treat
> it as BIOS bug (as theoretically BIOS can be from 3rd party).
>
> What's your opinion?
>

  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-08-03  3:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 114+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-06-22 11:15 [PATCH v5 00/22] TDX host kernel support Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:15 ` [PATCH v5 01/22] x86/virt/tdx: Detect TDX during kernel boot Kai Huang
2022-06-23  5:57   ` Chao Gao
2022-06-23  9:23     ` Kai Huang
2022-08-02  2:01   ` [PATCH v5 1/22] " Wu, Binbin
2022-08-03  9:25     ` Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:15 ` [PATCH v5 02/22] cc_platform: Add new attribute to prevent ACPI CPU hotplug Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:42   ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2022-06-23  0:01     ` Kai Huang
2022-06-27  8:01       ` Igor Mammedov
2022-06-28 10:04         ` Kai Huang
2022-06-28 11:52           ` Igor Mammedov
2022-06-28 17:33           ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2022-06-28 23:41             ` Kai Huang
2022-06-24 18:57   ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-27  5:05     ` Kai Huang
2022-07-13 11:09       ` Kai Huang
2022-07-19 17:46         ` Dave Hansen
2022-07-19 23:54           ` Kai Huang
2022-08-03  3:40       ` Binbin Wu [this message]
2022-08-03  9:20         ` Kai Huang
2022-06-29  5:33   ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-06-29  9:09     ` Kai Huang
2022-08-03  3:55   ` Binbin Wu
2022-08-03  9:21     ` Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:15 ` [PATCH v5 03/22] cc_platform: Add new attribute to prevent ACPI memory hotplug Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:45   ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2022-06-23  0:08     ` Kai Huang
2022-06-28 17:55       ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2022-06-28 12:01     ` Igor Mammedov
2022-06-28 23:49       ` Kai Huang
2022-06-29  8:48         ` Igor Mammedov
2022-06-29  9:13           ` Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:16 ` [PATCH v5 04/22] x86/virt/tdx: Prevent ACPI CPU hotplug and " Kai Huang
2022-06-24  1:41   ` Chao Gao
2022-06-24 11:21     ` Kai Huang
2022-06-29  8:35       ` Yuan Yao
2022-06-29  9:17         ` Kai Huang
2022-06-29 14:22       ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-29 23:02         ` Kai Huang
2022-06-30 15:44           ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-30 22:45             ` Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:16 ` [PATCH v5 05/22] x86/virt/tdx: Prevent hot-add driver managed memory Kai Huang
2022-06-24  2:12   ` Chao Gao
2022-06-24 11:23     ` Kai Huang
2022-06-24 19:01   ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-27  5:27     ` Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:16 ` [PATCH v5 06/22] x86/virt/tdx: Add skeleton to initialize TDX on demand Kai Huang
2022-06-24  2:39   ` Chao Gao
2022-06-24 11:27     ` Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:16 ` [PATCH v5 07/22] x86/virt/tdx: Implement SEAMCALL function Kai Huang
2022-06-24 18:38   ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-27  5:23     ` Kai Huang
2022-06-27 20:58       ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-27 22:10         ` Kai Huang
2022-07-19 19:39           ` Dan Williams
2022-07-19 23:28             ` Kai Huang
2022-07-20 10:18           ` Kai Huang
2022-07-20 16:48             ` Dave Hansen
2022-07-21  1:52               ` Kai Huang
2022-07-27  0:34                 ` Kai Huang
2022-07-27  0:50                   ` Dave Hansen
2022-07-27 12:46                     ` Kai Huang
2022-08-03  2:37                 ` Kai Huang
2022-08-03 14:20                   ` Dave Hansen
2022-08-03 22:35                     ` Kai Huang
2022-08-04 10:06                       ` Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:16 ` [PATCH v5 08/22] x86/virt/tdx: Shut down TDX module in case of error Kai Huang
2022-06-24 18:50   ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-27  5:26     ` Kai Huang
2022-06-27 20:46       ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-27 22:34         ` Kai Huang
2022-06-27 22:56           ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-27 23:59             ` Kai Huang
2022-06-28  0:03               ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-28  0:11                 ` Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:16 ` [PATCH v5 09/22] x86/virt/tdx: Detect TDX module by doing module global initialization Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:16 ` [PATCH v5 10/22] x86/virt/tdx: Do logical-cpu scope TDX module initialization Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:17 ` [PATCH v5 11/22] x86/virt/tdx: Get information about TDX module and TDX-capable memory Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:17 ` [PATCH v5 12/22] x86/virt/tdx: Convert all memory regions in memblock to TDX memory Kai Huang
2022-06-24 19:40   ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-27  6:16     ` Kai Huang
2022-07-07  2:37       ` Kai Huang
2022-07-07 14:26       ` Dave Hansen
2022-07-07 14:36         ` Juergen Gross
2022-07-07 23:42           ` Kai Huang
2022-07-07 23:34         ` Kai Huang
2022-08-03  1:30           ` Kai Huang
2022-08-03 14:22             ` Dave Hansen
2022-08-03 22:14               ` Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:17 ` [PATCH v5 13/22] x86/virt/tdx: Add placeholder to construct TDMRs based on memblock Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:17 ` [PATCH v5 14/22] x86/virt/tdx: Create TDMRs to cover all memblock memory regions Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:17 ` [PATCH v5 15/22] x86/virt/tdx: Allocate and set up PAMTs for TDMRs Kai Huang
2022-06-24 20:13   ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-27 10:31     ` Kai Huang
2022-06-27 20:41       ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-27 22:50         ` Kai Huang
2022-06-27 22:57           ` Dave Hansen
2022-06-27 23:05             ` Kai Huang
2022-06-28  0:48         ` Xiaoyao Li
2022-06-28 17:03           ` Dave Hansen
2022-08-17 22:46   ` Sagi Shahar
2022-08-17 23:43     ` Huang, Kai
2022-06-22 11:17 ` [PATCH v5 16/22] x86/virt/tdx: Set up reserved areas for all TDMRs Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:17 ` [PATCH v5 17/22] x86/virt/tdx: Reserve TDX module global KeyID Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:17 ` [PATCH v5 18/22] x86/virt/tdx: Configure TDX module with TDMRs and " Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:17 ` [PATCH v5 19/22] x86/virt/tdx: Configure global KeyID on all packages Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:17 ` [PATCH v5 20/22] x86/virt/tdx: Initialize all TDMRs Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:17 ` [PATCH v5 21/22] x86/virt/tdx: Support kexec() Kai Huang
2022-06-22 11:17 ` [PATCH v5 22/22] Documentation/x86: Add documentation for TDX host support Kai Huang
2022-08-18  4:07   ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-08-18  9:33     ` Huang, Kai
2022-06-24 19:47 ` [PATCH v5 00/22] TDX host kernel support Dave Hansen
2022-06-27  4:09   ` Kai Huang

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