From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B59E5C433F5 for ; Thu, 21 Apr 2022 16:50:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232466AbiDUQww (ORCPT ); Thu, 21 Apr 2022 12:52:52 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:34192 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1356775AbiDUQws (ORCPT ); Thu, 21 Apr 2022 12:52:48 -0400 Received: from smtp-relay-canonical-0.canonical.com (smtp-relay-canonical-0.canonical.com [185.125.188.120]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DE2EEAE61; Thu, 21 Apr 2022 09:49:57 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [192.168.192.153] (unknown [50.126.114.69]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by smtp-relay-canonical-0.canonical.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5275D3F212; Thu, 21 Apr 2022 16:49:51 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=canonical.com; s=20210705; t=1650559793; bh=cE0mr3ujI3By6bbSMsOYsbG0H9B5mOQfowagLjHY8uE=; h=Message-ID:Date:MIME-Version:Subject:To:Cc:References:From: In-Reply-To:Content-Type; b=VOFCPwOBYkQuJ0ehu2hFXzRHENWvA/GCeQ+0pzKigqwMpgde470YQdArfwtnpvhYS eBTHYb0ilcA1jISHq8xnCr0mcxWOcFWMy4BwodZyP3Q2IhRqYEqPpH/z6LiXfJmks5 VOLZpgGmiYGOnKySPp6JUu2QHsckGFR/Ft6OygAxNK+d+xyZ5vcvLt70QdBsaWewPH +otsB9YVXh5CJ0J6DZyUwbalEWE8HvE7kSDwtfHonuP2XGjXFO5ArDwKPZNgiIp6nI SXUZeybDizbNSR04yFGtA0ouYiZiDzp0/JTLYC0gaFlo3kXNUCUce+8Dod1ht9hiAO gHOzpD+oOxEJQ== Message-ID: <0673dfee-4968-9b72-dd4e-b5fdffac0a7d@canonical.com> Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2022 09:49:39 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/91.7.0 Subject: Re: [PATCH v35 06/29] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Content-Language: en-US To: Casey Schaufler , casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org References: <20220418145945.38797-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> <20220418145945.38797-7-casey@schaufler-ca.com> From: John Johansen Organization: Canonical In-Reply-To: <20220418145945.38797-7-casey@schaufler-ca.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 4/18/22 07:59, Casey Schaufler wrote: > Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match > to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the > lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook. > > Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the > lsmblob instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmblob_init() > fills the blob with the value of the old secid, ensuring that > it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of > the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(), > will be converted to use the blob structure later in the series. > At the point the use of lsmblob_init() is dropped. > > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler > Acked-by: Paul Moore Reviewed-by: John Johansen > Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com > --- > include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- > kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++++-- > kernel/auditsc.c | 16 +++++++++++----- > security/security.c | 5 +++-- > 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index 3666eddad59a..ee5d14dac65f 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -1955,7 +1955,7 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) > int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, > struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules); > int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule); > -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, > +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op, > struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules); > void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules); > > @@ -1972,7 +1972,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) > return 0; > } > > -static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, > +static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, > + u32 field, u32 op, > struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules) > { > return 0; > diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c > index de75bd6ad866..15cd4fe35e9c 100644 > --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c > +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c > @@ -1337,6 +1337,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) > > for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) { > struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; > + struct lsmblob blob; > pid_t pid; > u32 sid; > > @@ -1369,8 +1370,9 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) > case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: > if (f->lsm_str) { > security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid); > - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, > - f->type, f->op, > + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); > + result = security_audit_rule_match( > + &blob, f->type, f->op, > &f->lsm_rules); > } > break; > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c > index d272b5cf18a8..a9d5bfa37cb3 100644 > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c > @@ -468,6 +468,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, > const struct cred *cred; > int i, need_sid = 1; > u32 sid; > + struct lsmblob blob; > unsigned int sessionid; > > if (ctx && rule->prio <= ctx->prio) > @@ -678,8 +679,10 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, > security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid); > need_sid = 0; > } > - result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, > - f->op, &f->lsm_rules); > + lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); > + result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob, > + f->type, f->op, > + &f->lsm_rules); > } > break; > case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: > @@ -692,15 +695,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, > if (f->lsm_str) { > /* Find files that match */ > if (name) { > + lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid); > result = security_audit_rule_match( > - name->osid, > + &blob, > f->type, > f->op, > &f->lsm_rules); > } else if (ctx) { > list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { > + lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid); > if (security_audit_rule_match( > - n->osid, f->type, f->op, > + &blob, f->type, f->op, > &f->lsm_rules)) { > ++result; > break; > @@ -710,7 +715,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, > /* Find ipc objects that match */ > if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC) > break; > - if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid, > + lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid); > + if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob, > f->type, f->op, > &f->lsm_rules)) > ++result; > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 9e0139b0d346..ced1c76a380f 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -2703,7 +2703,7 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules) > } > } > > -int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, > +int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op, > struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules) > { > struct security_hook_list *hp; > @@ -2714,7 +2714,8 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, > continue; > if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL) > continue; > - rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, > + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot], > + field, op, > &lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]); > if (rc) > return rc;