Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/1] xen-netback: process malformed sk_buff correctly to avoid BUG_ON()

[Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com>]

Below is the sample kernel module used to reproduce the issue on purpose with
"vif1.0" hard coded:

#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/netdevice.h>

static int __init test_skb_init(void)
{
	struct sk_buff *skb;
	struct skb_shared_info *si;
	struct net_device *dev;

	dev = dev_get_by_name(&init_net, "vif1.0");
	if (!dev) {
		pr_alert("failed to get net_device\n");
		return 0;
	}

	skb = alloc_skb(2000, GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOWARN);
	if (!skb) {
		pr_alert("failed to allocate sk_buff\n");
		return 0;
	}

	si = skb_shinfo(skb);

	skb_reserve(skb, NET_SKB_PAD + NET_IP_ALIGN);

	skb->dev = dev;
	skb->len = 386;
	skb->data_len = 352;
	
	skb->mac_len = 14;
	skb->pkt_type = 3;
	skb->protocol = 8;
	skb->transport_header = 98;
	skb->network_header = 78;
	skb->mac_header = 64;

	skb->tail = 98;
	skb->end = 384;
	
	pr_alert("skb->data = 0x%016llx\n", (u64) skb->data);
	
	dev->netdev_ops->ndo_start_xmit(skb, dev);

	return 0;
}

static void __exit test_skb_exit(void)
{
}

MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
module_init(test_skb_init);
module_exit(test_skb_exit);

Dongli Zhang



On 03/28/2018 07:42 AM, Dongli Zhang wrote:
> The "BUG_ON(!frag_iter)" in function xenvif_rx_next_chunk() is triggered if
> the received sk_buff is malformed, that is, when the sk_buff has pattern
> (skb->data_len && !skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags). Below is a sample call
> stack:
> 
> [  438.652658] ------------[ cut here ]------------
> [  438.652660] kernel BUG at drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c:325!
> [  438.652714] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
> [  438.652813] CPU: 0 PID: 2492 Comm: vif1.0-q0-guest Tainted: G           O     4.16.0-rc6+ #1
> [  438.652896] RIP: e030:xenvif_rx_skb+0x3c2/0x5e0 [xen_netback]
> [  438.652926] RSP: e02b:ffffc90040877dc8 EFLAGS: 00010246
> [  438.652956] RAX: 0000000000000160 RBX: 0000000000000022 RCX: 0000000000000001
> [  438.652993] RDX: ffffc900402890d0 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffc90040889000
> [  438.653029] RBP: ffff88002b460040 R08: ffffc90040877de0 R09: 0100000000000000
> [  438.653065] R10: 0000000000007ff0 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffffc90040889000
> [  438.653100] R13: ffffffff80000000 R14: 0000000000000022 R15: 0000000080000000
> [  438.653149] FS:  00007f15603778c0(0000) GS:ffff880030400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> [  438.653188] CS:  e033 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> [  438.653219] CR2: 0000000001832a08 CR3: 0000000029c12000 CR4: 0000000000042660
> [  438.653262] Call Trace:
> [  438.653284]  ? xen_hypercall_event_channel_op+0xa/0x20
> [  438.653313]  xenvif_rx_action+0x41/0x80 [xen_netback]
> [  438.653341]  xenvif_kthread_guest_rx+0xb2/0x2a8 [xen_netback]
> [  438.653374]  ? __schedule+0x352/0x700
> [  438.653398]  ? wait_woken+0x80/0x80
> [  438.653421]  kthread+0xf3/0x130
> [  438.653442]  ? xenvif_rx_action+0x80/0x80 [xen_netback]
> [  438.653470]  ? kthread_destroy_worker+0x40/0x40
> [  438.653497]  ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
> 
> The issue is hit by xen-netback when there is bug with other networking
> interface (e.g., dom0 physical NIC), who has generated and forwarded
> malformed sk_buff to dom0 vifX.Y. It is possible to reproduce the issue on
> purpose with below sample code in a kernel module:
> 
> skb->dev = dev; // dev of vifX.Y
> skb->len = 386;
> skb->data_len = 352;
> skb->tail = 98;
> skb->end = 384;
> dev->netdev_ops->ndo_start_xmit(skb, dev);
> 
> This patch stops processing sk_buff immediately if it is detected as
> malformed, that is, pkt->frag_iter is NULL but there is still remaining
> pkt->remaining_len.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com>
> ---
>  drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c | 8 ++++++++
>  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c
> index b1cf7c6..289cc82 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/rx.c
> @@ -369,6 +369,14 @@ static void xenvif_rx_data_slot(struct xenvif_queue *queue,
>  		offset += len;
>  		pkt->remaining_len -= len;
>  
> +		if (unlikely(!pkt->frag_iter && pkt->remaining_len)) {
> +			pkt->remaining_len = 0;
> +			pkt->extra_count = 0;
> +			pr_err_ratelimited("malformed sk_buff at %s\n",
> +					   queue->name);
> +			break;
> +		}
> +
>  	} while (offset < XEN_PAGE_SIZE && pkt->remaining_len > 0);
>  
>  	if (pkt->remaining_len > 0)
>