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From: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>
To: Dave P Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	Kristina Martsenko <Kristina.Martsenko@arm.com>
Cc: "linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org" 
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	Christoffer Dall <Christoffer.Dall@arm.com>,
	Marc Zyngier <Marc.Zyngier@arm.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <Catalin.Marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <Will.Deacon@arm.com>,
	Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>,
	Ramana Radhakrishnan <Ramana.Radhakrishnan@arm.com>,
	"kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu" <kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Mark Rutland <Mark.Rutland@arm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 5/5] arm64/kvm: control accessibility of ptrauth key registers
Date: Fri, 15 Feb 2019 10:27:44 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <0c22684d-3101-f90c-83d8-d649bb1c799e@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190213175428.GR32634@e103592.cambridge.arm.com>

Hi,

On 2/13/19 11:24 PM, Dave P Martin wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 13, 2019 at 05:35:46PM +0000, Kristina Martsenko wrote:
>> On 28/01/2019 06:58, Amit Daniel Kachhap wrote:
>>> According to userspace settings, ptrauth key registers are conditionally
>>> present in guest system register list based on user specified flag
>>> KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>
>>> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
>>> Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
>>> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
>>> Cc: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
>>> Cc: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
>>> Cc: Ramana Radhakrishnan <ramana.radhakrishnan@arm.com>
>>> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
>>> ---
>>>   Documentation/arm64/pointer-authentication.txt |  3 ++
>>>   arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c                      | 42 +++++++++++++++++++-------
>>>   2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>>>
> 
> [...]
> 
>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
> 
> [...]
> 
>>> @@ -2487,18 +2493,22 @@ static int walk_one_sys_reg(const struct sys_reg_desc *rd,
>>>   }
>>>   
>>>   /* Assumed ordered tables, see kvm_sys_reg_table_init. */
>>> -static int walk_sys_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 __user *uind)
>>> +static int walk_sys_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 __user *uind,
>>> +			const struct sys_reg_desc *desc, unsigned int len)
>>>   {
>>>   	const struct sys_reg_desc *i1, *i2, *end1, *end2;
>>>   	unsigned int total = 0;
>>>   	size_t num;
>>>   	int err;
>>>   
>>> +	if (desc == ptrauth_reg_descs && !kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_allowed(vcpu))
>>> +		return total;
>>> +
>>>   	/* We check for duplicates here, to allow arch-specific overrides. */
>>>   	i1 = get_target_table(vcpu->arch.target, true, &num);
>>>   	end1 = i1 + num;
>>> -	i2 = sys_reg_descs;
>>> -	end2 = sys_reg_descs + ARRAY_SIZE(sys_reg_descs);
>>> +	i2 = desc;
>>> +	end2 = desc + len;
>>>   
>>>   	BUG_ON(i1 == end1 || i2 == end2);
>>>   
>>> @@ -2526,7 +2536,10 @@ unsigned long kvm_arm_num_sys_reg_descs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>>   {
>>>   	return ARRAY_SIZE(invariant_sys_regs)
>>>   		+ num_demux_regs()
>>> -		+ walk_sys_regs(vcpu, (u64 __user *)NULL);
>>> +		+ walk_sys_regs(vcpu, (u64 __user *)NULL, sys_reg_descs,
>>> +				ARRAY_SIZE(sys_reg_descs))
>>> +		+ walk_sys_regs(vcpu, (u64 __user *)NULL, ptrauth_reg_descs,
>>> +				ARRAY_SIZE(ptrauth_reg_descs));
>>>   }
>>>   
>>>   int kvm_arm_copy_sys_reg_indices(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 __user *uindices)
>>> @@ -2541,7 +2554,12 @@ int kvm_arm_copy_sys_reg_indices(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 __user *uindices)
>>>   		uindices++;
>>>   	}
>>>   
>>> -	err = walk_sys_regs(vcpu, uindices);
>>> +	err = walk_sys_regs(vcpu, uindices, sys_reg_descs, ARRAY_SIZE(sys_reg_descs));
>>> +	if (err < 0)
>>> +		return err;
>>> +	uindices += err;
>>> +
>>> +	err = walk_sys_regs(vcpu, uindices, ptrauth_reg_descs, ARRAY_SIZE(ptrauth_reg_descs));
>>>   	if (err < 0)
>>>   		return err;
>>>   	uindices += err;
>>> @@ -2575,6 +2593,7 @@ void kvm_sys_reg_table_init(void)
>>>   	BUG_ON(check_sysreg_table(cp15_regs, ARRAY_SIZE(cp15_regs)));
>>>   	BUG_ON(check_sysreg_table(cp15_64_regs, ARRAY_SIZE(cp15_64_regs)));
>>>   	BUG_ON(check_sysreg_table(invariant_sys_regs, ARRAY_SIZE(invariant_sys_regs)));
>>> +	BUG_ON(check_sysreg_table(ptrauth_reg_descs, ARRAY_SIZE(ptrauth_reg_descs)));
>>>   
>>>   	/* We abuse the reset function to overwrite the table itself. */
>>>   	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(invariant_sys_regs); i++)
>>> @@ -2616,6 +2635,7 @@ void kvm_reset_sys_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>>   
>>>   	/* Generic chip reset first (so target could override). */
>>>   	reset_sys_reg_descs(vcpu, sys_reg_descs, ARRAY_SIZE(sys_reg_descs));
>>> +	reset_sys_reg_descs(vcpu, ptrauth_reg_descs, ARRAY_SIZE(ptrauth_reg_descs));
>>>   
>>>   	table = get_target_table(vcpu->arch.target, true, &num);
>>>   	reset_sys_reg_descs(vcpu, table, num);
>>
>> This isn't very scalable, since we'd need to duplicate all the above
>> code every time we add new system registers that are conditionally
>> accessible.
> 
> Agreed, putting feature-specific checks in walk_sys_regs() is probably
> best avoided.  Over time we would likely accumulate a fair number of
> these checks.
> 
>> It seems that the SVE patches [1] solved this problem by adding a
>> check_present() callback into struct sys_reg_desc. It probably makes
>> sense to rebase onto that patch and just implement the callback for the
>> ptrauth key registers as well.
>>
>> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/1547757219-19439-13-git-send-email-Dave.Martin@arm.com/
> 
> Note, I'm currently refactoring this so that enumeration through
> KVM_GET_REG_LIST can be disabled independently of access to the
> register.  This may not be the best approach, but for SVE I have a
> feature-specific ID register to handle too (ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1), which
> needs to be hidden from the enumeration but still accessible with
> read-as-zero behaviour.
> 
> This changes the API a bit: I move to a .restrictions() callback which
> returns flags to say what is disabled, and this callback is used in the
> common code so that you don't have repeat your "feature present" check
> in every accessor, as is currently the case.
> 
> I'm aiming to post a respun series in the next day or two.  The code
> may of course change again after it gets reviewed...
> 
> 
> Basing on [1] is probably a reasonable starting point, though.

Thanks Kristina and Dave for this pointer. I will rebase my next 
iteration based on it.

Thanks,
Amit
> 
> Cheers
> ---Dave
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2019-02-15  4:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-01-28  6:58 [PATCH v5 0/6] Add ARMv8.3 pointer authentication for kvm guest Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-01-28  6:58 ` [PATCH v5 1/5] arm64: Add utilities to save restore pointer authentication keys Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-01-31 16:20   ` James Morse
2019-02-13 17:32     ` Kristina Martsenko
2019-02-14 10:53       ` Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-01-28  6:58 ` [PATCH v5 2/5] arm64/kvm: preserve host HCR_EL2/MDCR_EL2 value Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-01-31 16:22   ` James Morse
2019-02-14  9:49     ` Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-02-13 17:34   ` Kristina Martsenko
2019-02-14 11:03     ` Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-02-15 15:50       ` Kristina Martsenko
2019-01-28  6:58 ` [PATCH v5 3/5] arm64/kvm: context-switch ptrauth registers Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-01-28 14:25   ` Julien Thierry
2019-01-31 16:25   ` [PATCH v5 3/5] arm64/kvm: context-switch ptrauth register James Morse
2019-02-13 17:35     ` Kristina Martsenko
2019-02-15  4:00       ` Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-02-14 10:16     ` Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-02-13 17:34   ` [PATCH v5 3/5] arm64/kvm: context-switch ptrauth registers Kristina Martsenko
2019-02-14 11:06     ` Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-01-28  6:58 ` [PATCH v5 4/5] arm64/kvm: add a userspace option to enable pointer authentication Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-01-28 14:35   ` Julien Thierry
2019-01-31 16:27   ` James Morse
2019-02-14 10:47     ` Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-02-13 17:35   ` Kristina Martsenko
2019-02-15  4:49     ` Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-01-28  6:58 ` [PATCH v5 5/5] arm64/kvm: control accessibility of ptrauth key registers Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-02-13 17:35   ` Kristina Martsenko
2019-02-13 17:54     ` Dave P Martin
2019-02-15  4:57       ` Amit Daniel Kachhap [this message]
2019-01-28  6:58 ` [kvmtool PATCH v5 6/6] arm/kvm: arm64: Add a vcpu feature for pointer authentication Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-01-28 14:56   ` Julien Thierry

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