From: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>
To: Dave P Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
Kristina Martsenko <Kristina.Martsenko@arm.com>
Cc: "linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
Christoffer Dall <Christoffer.Dall@arm.com>,
Marc Zyngier <Marc.Zyngier@arm.com>,
Catalin Marinas <Catalin.Marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <Will.Deacon@arm.com>,
Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>,
Ramana Radhakrishnan <Ramana.Radhakrishnan@arm.com>,
"kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu" <kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Mark Rutland <Mark.Rutland@arm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 5/5] arm64/kvm: control accessibility of ptrauth key registers
Date: Fri, 15 Feb 2019 10:27:44 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <0c22684d-3101-f90c-83d8-d649bb1c799e@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190213175428.GR32634@e103592.cambridge.arm.com>
Hi,
On 2/13/19 11:24 PM, Dave P Martin wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 13, 2019 at 05:35:46PM +0000, Kristina Martsenko wrote:
>> On 28/01/2019 06:58, Amit Daniel Kachhap wrote:
>>> According to userspace settings, ptrauth key registers are conditionally
>>> present in guest system register list based on user specified flag
>>> KVM_ARM_VCPU_PTRAUTH.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>
>>> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
>>> Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
>>> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
>>> Cc: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>
>>> Cc: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
>>> Cc: Ramana Radhakrishnan <ramana.radhakrishnan@arm.com>
>>> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
>>> ---
>>> Documentation/arm64/pointer-authentication.txt | 3 ++
>>> arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++-------
>>> 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>>>
>
> [...]
>
>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
>
> [...]
>
>>> @@ -2487,18 +2493,22 @@ static int walk_one_sys_reg(const struct sys_reg_desc *rd,
>>> }
>>>
>>> /* Assumed ordered tables, see kvm_sys_reg_table_init. */
>>> -static int walk_sys_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 __user *uind)
>>> +static int walk_sys_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 __user *uind,
>>> + const struct sys_reg_desc *desc, unsigned int len)
>>> {
>>> const struct sys_reg_desc *i1, *i2, *end1, *end2;
>>> unsigned int total = 0;
>>> size_t num;
>>> int err;
>>>
>>> + if (desc == ptrauth_reg_descs && !kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_allowed(vcpu))
>>> + return total;
>>> +
>>> /* We check for duplicates here, to allow arch-specific overrides. */
>>> i1 = get_target_table(vcpu->arch.target, true, &num);
>>> end1 = i1 + num;
>>> - i2 = sys_reg_descs;
>>> - end2 = sys_reg_descs + ARRAY_SIZE(sys_reg_descs);
>>> + i2 = desc;
>>> + end2 = desc + len;
>>>
>>> BUG_ON(i1 == end1 || i2 == end2);
>>>
>>> @@ -2526,7 +2536,10 @@ unsigned long kvm_arm_num_sys_reg_descs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>> {
>>> return ARRAY_SIZE(invariant_sys_regs)
>>> + num_demux_regs()
>>> - + walk_sys_regs(vcpu, (u64 __user *)NULL);
>>> + + walk_sys_regs(vcpu, (u64 __user *)NULL, sys_reg_descs,
>>> + ARRAY_SIZE(sys_reg_descs))
>>> + + walk_sys_regs(vcpu, (u64 __user *)NULL, ptrauth_reg_descs,
>>> + ARRAY_SIZE(ptrauth_reg_descs));
>>> }
>>>
>>> int kvm_arm_copy_sys_reg_indices(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 __user *uindices)
>>> @@ -2541,7 +2554,12 @@ int kvm_arm_copy_sys_reg_indices(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 __user *uindices)
>>> uindices++;
>>> }
>>>
>>> - err = walk_sys_regs(vcpu, uindices);
>>> + err = walk_sys_regs(vcpu, uindices, sys_reg_descs, ARRAY_SIZE(sys_reg_descs));
>>> + if (err < 0)
>>> + return err;
>>> + uindices += err;
>>> +
>>> + err = walk_sys_regs(vcpu, uindices, ptrauth_reg_descs, ARRAY_SIZE(ptrauth_reg_descs));
>>> if (err < 0)
>>> return err;
>>> uindices += err;
>>> @@ -2575,6 +2593,7 @@ void kvm_sys_reg_table_init(void)
>>> BUG_ON(check_sysreg_table(cp15_regs, ARRAY_SIZE(cp15_regs)));
>>> BUG_ON(check_sysreg_table(cp15_64_regs, ARRAY_SIZE(cp15_64_regs)));
>>> BUG_ON(check_sysreg_table(invariant_sys_regs, ARRAY_SIZE(invariant_sys_regs)));
>>> + BUG_ON(check_sysreg_table(ptrauth_reg_descs, ARRAY_SIZE(ptrauth_reg_descs)));
>>>
>>> /* We abuse the reset function to overwrite the table itself. */
>>> for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(invariant_sys_regs); i++)
>>> @@ -2616,6 +2635,7 @@ void kvm_reset_sys_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>>
>>> /* Generic chip reset first (so target could override). */
>>> reset_sys_reg_descs(vcpu, sys_reg_descs, ARRAY_SIZE(sys_reg_descs));
>>> + reset_sys_reg_descs(vcpu, ptrauth_reg_descs, ARRAY_SIZE(ptrauth_reg_descs));
>>>
>>> table = get_target_table(vcpu->arch.target, true, &num);
>>> reset_sys_reg_descs(vcpu, table, num);
>>
>> This isn't very scalable, since we'd need to duplicate all the above
>> code every time we add new system registers that are conditionally
>> accessible.
>
> Agreed, putting feature-specific checks in walk_sys_regs() is probably
> best avoided. Over time we would likely accumulate a fair number of
> these checks.
>
>> It seems that the SVE patches [1] solved this problem by adding a
>> check_present() callback into struct sys_reg_desc. It probably makes
>> sense to rebase onto that patch and just implement the callback for the
>> ptrauth key registers as well.
>>
>> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/1547757219-19439-13-git-send-email-Dave.Martin@arm.com/
>
> Note, I'm currently refactoring this so that enumeration through
> KVM_GET_REG_LIST can be disabled independently of access to the
> register. This may not be the best approach, but for SVE I have a
> feature-specific ID register to handle too (ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1), which
> needs to be hidden from the enumeration but still accessible with
> read-as-zero behaviour.
>
> This changes the API a bit: I move to a .restrictions() callback which
> returns flags to say what is disabled, and this callback is used in the
> common code so that you don't have repeat your "feature present" check
> in every accessor, as is currently the case.
>
> I'm aiming to post a respun series in the next day or two. The code
> may of course change again after it gets reviewed...
>
>
> Basing on [1] is probably a reasonable starting point, though.
Thanks Kristina and Dave for this pointer. I will rebase my next
iteration based on it.
Thanks,
Amit
>
> Cheers
> ---Dave
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-02-15 4:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-01-28 6:58 [PATCH v5 0/6] Add ARMv8.3 pointer authentication for kvm guest Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-01-28 6:58 ` [PATCH v5 1/5] arm64: Add utilities to save restore pointer authentication keys Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-01-31 16:20 ` James Morse
2019-02-13 17:32 ` Kristina Martsenko
2019-02-14 10:53 ` Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-01-28 6:58 ` [PATCH v5 2/5] arm64/kvm: preserve host HCR_EL2/MDCR_EL2 value Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-01-31 16:22 ` James Morse
2019-02-14 9:49 ` Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-02-13 17:34 ` Kristina Martsenko
2019-02-14 11:03 ` Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-02-15 15:50 ` Kristina Martsenko
2019-01-28 6:58 ` [PATCH v5 3/5] arm64/kvm: context-switch ptrauth registers Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-01-28 14:25 ` Julien Thierry
2019-01-31 16:25 ` [PATCH v5 3/5] arm64/kvm: context-switch ptrauth register James Morse
2019-02-13 17:35 ` Kristina Martsenko
2019-02-15 4:00 ` Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-02-14 10:16 ` Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-02-13 17:34 ` [PATCH v5 3/5] arm64/kvm: context-switch ptrauth registers Kristina Martsenko
2019-02-14 11:06 ` Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-01-28 6:58 ` [PATCH v5 4/5] arm64/kvm: add a userspace option to enable pointer authentication Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-01-28 14:35 ` Julien Thierry
2019-01-31 16:27 ` James Morse
2019-02-14 10:47 ` Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-02-13 17:35 ` Kristina Martsenko
2019-02-15 4:49 ` Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-01-28 6:58 ` [PATCH v5 5/5] arm64/kvm: control accessibility of ptrauth key registers Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-02-13 17:35 ` Kristina Martsenko
2019-02-13 17:54 ` Dave P Martin
2019-02-15 4:57 ` Amit Daniel Kachhap [this message]
2019-01-28 6:58 ` [kvmtool PATCH v5 6/6] arm/kvm: arm64: Add a vcpu feature for pointer authentication Amit Daniel Kachhap
2019-01-28 14:56 ` Julien Thierry
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