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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Asish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
	"Michael Roth" <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	<stable@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Sean Christopherson" <seanjc@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH] x86/sev: Don't use cc_platform_has() for early SEV-SNP calls
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2022 16:55:51 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <0c9b9a6c33ff4b8ce17a87a6c09db44d3b52bad3.1661291751.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> (raw)

When running identity mapped and depending on the kernel configuration,
it is possible that cc_platform_has() can have compiler generated code
that uses jump tables. This causes a boot failure because the jump table
uses un-mapped kernel virtual addresses, not identity mapped addresses.
This has been seen with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n.

Similar to sme_encrypt_kernel(), use an open-coded direct check for the
status of SNP rather than trying to eliminate the jump table. This
preserves any code optimization in cc_platform_has() that can be useful
post boot. It also limits the changes to SEV-specific files so that
future compiler features won't necessarily require possible build changes
just because they are not compatible with running identity mapped.

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216385
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/YqfabnTRxFSM+LoX@google.com/
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.19.x
Reported-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
index 63dc626627a0..4f84c3f11af5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
@@ -701,7 +701,13 @@ static void __init early_set_pages_state(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npage
 void __init early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
 					 unsigned int npages)
 {
-	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
+	/*
+	 * This can be invoked in early boot while running identity mapped, so
+	 * use an open coded check for SNP instead of using cc_platform_has().
+	 * This eliminates worries about jump tables or checking boot_cpu_data
+	 * in the cc_platform_has() function.
+	 */
+	if (!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
 		return;
 
 	 /*
@@ -717,7 +723,13 @@ void __init early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long padd
 void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
 					unsigned int npages)
 {
-	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
+	/*
+	 * This can be invoked in early boot while running identity mapped, so
+	 * use an open coded check for SNP instead of using cc_platform_has().
+	 * This eliminates worries about jump tables or checking boot_cpu_data
+	 * in the cc_platform_has() function.
+	 */
+	if (!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
 		return;
 
 	/* Invalidate the memory pages before they are marked shared in the RMP table. */
-- 
2.37.2


             reply	other threads:[~2022-08-23 21:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-08-23 21:55 Tom Lendacky [this message]
2022-08-24 18:43 ` Dave Hansen
2022-08-24 18:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-08-24 18:53     ` Dave Hansen

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