Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] keys/trusted_keys: move TPM-specific fields into struct trusted_key_tpm

[Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>]

Hi Jarkko,

On 9/12/26 3:12 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 10, 2026 at 01:38:00AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
>> On Thu, Sep 03, 2026 at 04:33:05AM +0530, Srish Srinivasan wrote:
>>> The trusted_key_options struct contains TPM-specific fields (keyhandle,
>>> keyauth, blobauth_len, blobauth, pcrinfo_len, pcrinfo, pcrlock, hash,
>>> policydigest_len, policydigest, and policyhandle). This leads to the
>>> accumulation of backend-specific fields in the generic options structure.
>>>
>>> Define struct trusted_key_tpm and move the TPM-specific fields there. Store
>>> a pointer to it in the private member of struct trusted_key_options.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
>>> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
>>> ---
>>>   include/keys/trusted-type.h               |  11 --
>>>   include/keys/trusted_tpm.h                |  14 +++
>>>   security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 123 ++++++++++++----------
>>>   security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c |  50 +++++----
>>>   4 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
>>> index 9f9940482da4..3db61b57cf73 100644
>>> --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
>>> +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
>>> @@ -39,17 +39,6 @@ struct trusted_key_payload {
>>>   
>>>   struct trusted_key_options {
>>>   	uint16_t keytype;
>>> -	uint32_t keyhandle;
>>> -	unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
>>> -	uint32_t blobauth_len;
>>> -	unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
>>> -	uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
>>> -	unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
>>> -	int pcrlock;
>>> -	uint32_t hash;
>>> -	uint32_t policydigest_len;
>>> -	unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
>>> -	uint32_t policyhandle;
>>>   	void *private;
>>>   };
>>>   
>>> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
>>> index 3a0fa3bc8454..dafbd4a84ddd 100644
>>> --- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
>>> +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h
>>> @@ -6,6 +6,20 @@
>>>   
>>>   extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops;
>>>   
>>> +struct trusted_key_tpm {
>>> +	uint32_t keyhandle;
>>> +	unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
>>> +	uint32_t blobauth_len;
>>> +	unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
>>> +	uint32_t pcrinfo_len;
>>> +	unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE];
>>> +	int pcrlock;
>>> +	uint32_t hash;
>>> +	uint32_t policydigest_len;
>>> +	unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
>>> +	uint32_t policyhandle;
>>> +};
>>> +
>>>   int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>>>   		      struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>>>   		      struct trusted_key_options *options);
>>> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
>>> index 9cdfeea800a3..3ec078ca3f97 100644
>>> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
>>> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
>>> @@ -48,15 +48,17 @@ enum {
>>>   #ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG
>>>   static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
>>>   {
>>> +	struct trusted_key_tpm *private = o->private;
>>> +
>>>   	if (!trusted_debug)
>>>   		return;
>>>   
>>>   	pr_debug("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
>>> -	pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
>>> -	pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
>>> -	pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
>>> +	pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", private->keyhandle);
>>> +	pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", private->pcrlock);
>>> +	pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", private->pcrinfo_len);
>>>   	print_hex_dump_debug("pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
>>> -			     16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
>>> +			     16, 1, private->pcrinfo, private->pcrinfo_len, 0);
>>>   }
>>>   
>>>   static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
>>> @@ -626,6 +628,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
>>>   static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
>>>   		    struct trusted_key_options *o)
>>>   {
>>> +	struct trusted_key_tpm *private = o->private;
>>>   	int ret;
>>>   
>>>   	struct tpm_buf *tb __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> @@ -637,9 +640,10 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
>>>   	/* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */
>>>   	p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable;
>>>   
>>> -	ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth,
>>> +	ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth,
>>>   		       p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len,
>>> -		       o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len);
>>> +		       private->blobauth, private->pcrinfo,
>>> +		       private->pcrinfo_len);
>>>   	if (ret < 0)
>>>   		pr_info("srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
>>>   
>>> @@ -652,6 +656,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
>>>   static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
>>>   		      struct trusted_key_options *o)
>>>   {
>>> +	struct trusted_key_tpm *private = o->private;
>>>   	int ret;
>>>   
>>>   	struct tpm_buf *tb __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> @@ -660,8 +665,8 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p,
>>>   
>>>   	tpm_buf_init(tb, TPM_BUFSIZE);
>>>   
>>> -	ret = tpm_unseal(tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len,
>>> -			 o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
>>> +	ret = tpm_unseal(tb, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth, p->blob,
>>> +			 p->blob_len, private->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len);
>>>   	if (ret < 0)
>>>   		pr_info("srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
>>>   	else
>>> @@ -697,6 +702,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
>>>   static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>>>   		      struct trusted_key_options *opt)
>>>   {
>>> +	struct trusted_key_tpm *private = opt->private;
>>>   	substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
>>>   	char *p = c;
>>>   	int token;
>>> @@ -712,7 +718,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>>>   	if (tpm2 < 0)
>>>   		return tpm2;
>>>   
>>> -	opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
>>> +	private->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
>>>   
>>>   	if (!c)
>>>   		return 0;
>>> @@ -726,11 +732,11 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>>>   
>>>   		switch (token) {
>>>   		case Opt_pcrinfo:
>>> -			opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
>>> -			if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
>>> +			private->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2;
>>> +			if (private->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE)
>>>   				return -EINVAL;
>>> -			res = hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from,
>>> -				      opt->pcrinfo_len);
>>> +			res = hex2bin(private->pcrinfo, args[0].from,
>>> +				      private->pcrinfo_len);
>>>   			if (res < 0)
>>>   				return -EINVAL;
>>>   			break;
>>> @@ -739,12 +745,12 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>>>   			if (res < 0)
>>>   				return -EINVAL;
>>>   			opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype;
>>> -			opt->keyhandle = handle;
>>> +			private->keyhandle = handle;
>>>   			break;
>>>   		case Opt_keyauth:
>>>   			if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
>>>   				return -EINVAL;
>>> -			res = hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from,
>>> +			res = hex2bin(private->keyauth, args[0].from,
>>>   				      SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
>>>   			if (res < 0)
>>>   				return -EINVAL;
>>> @@ -755,21 +761,23 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>>>   			 * hex strings.  TPM 2.0 authorizations are simple
>>>   			 * passwords (although it can take a hash as well)
>>>   			 */
>>> -			opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
>>> +			private->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from);
>>>   
>>> -			if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
>>> -				res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
>>> +			if (private->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) {
>>> +				res = hex2bin(private->blobauth, args[0].from,
>>>   					      TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>>>   				if (res < 0)
>>>   					return -EINVAL;
>>>   
>>> -				opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
>>> +				private->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE;
>>>   				break;
>>>   			}
>>>   
>>> -			if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth)) {
>>> -				memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from,
>>> -				       opt->blobauth_len);
>>> +			if (tpm2 &&
>>> +			    private->blobauth_len <=
>>> +			    sizeof(private->blobauth)) {
>>> +				memcpy(private->blobauth, args[0].from,
>>> +				       private->blobauth_len);
>>>   				break;
>>>   			}
>>>   
>>> @@ -787,14 +795,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>>>   			res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock);
>>>   			if (res < 0)
>>>   				return -EINVAL;
>>> -			opt->pcrlock = lock;
>>> +			private->pcrlock = lock;
>>>   			break;
>>>   		case Opt_hash:
>>>   			if (test_bit(Opt_policydigest, &token_mask))
>>>   				return -EINVAL;
>>>   			for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) {
>>>   				if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) {
>>> -					opt->hash = i;
>>> +					private->hash = i;
>>>   					break;
>>>   				}
>>>   			}
>>> @@ -806,14 +814,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>>>   			}
>>>   			break;
>>>   		case Opt_policydigest:
>>> -			digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash];
>>> +			digest_len = hash_digest_size[private->hash];
>>>   			if (!tpm2 || strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len))
>>>   				return -EINVAL;
>>> -			res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from,
>>> +			res = hex2bin(private->policydigest, args[0].from,
>>>   				      digest_len);
>>>   			if (res < 0)
>>>   				return -EINVAL;
>>> -			opt->policydigest_len = digest_len;
>>> +			private->policydigest_len = digest_len;
>>>   			break;
>>>   		case Opt_policyhandle:
>>>   			if (!tpm2)
>>> @@ -821,7 +829,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>>>   			res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle);
>>>   			if (res < 0)
>>>   				return -EINVAL;
>>> -			opt->policyhandle = handle;
>>> +			private->policyhandle = handle;
>>>   			break;
>>>   		default:
>>>   			return -EINVAL;
>>> @@ -832,6 +840,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
>>>   
>>>   static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
>>>   {
>>> +	struct trusted_key_tpm *private;
>>>   	struct trusted_key_options *options;
>>>   	int tpm2;
>>>   
>>> @@ -844,15 +853,23 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
>>>   		/* set any non-zero defaults */
>>>   		options->keytype = SRK_keytype;
>>>   
>>> -		if (!tpm2)
>>> -			options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
>>> +		private = kzalloc_obj(*private);
>>> +		if (!private) {
>>> +			kfree_sensitive(options);
>>> +			options = NULL;
>>> +		} else {
>>> +			if (!tpm2)
>>> +				private->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
>>> +			options->private = private;
>>> +		}
>>>   	}
>>>   	return options;
>>>   }
>>>   
>>>   static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>>>   {
>>> -	struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
>>> +	struct trusted_key_options *options __free(kfree_sensitive) = NULL;
>>> +	struct trusted_key_tpm *private __free(kfree_sensitive) = NULL;
>>>   	int ret = 0;
>>>   	int tpm2;
>>>   
>>> @@ -864,15 +881,15 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>>>   	if (!options)
>>>   		return -ENOMEM;
>>>   
>>> +	private = options->private;
>>> +
>>>   	ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options);
>>>   	if (ret < 0)
>>> -		goto out;
>>> +		return ret;
>>>   	dump_options(options);
>>>   
>>> -	if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
>>> -		ret = -EINVAL;
>>> -		goto out;
>>> -	}
>>> +	if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2)
>>> +		return -EINVAL;
>>>   
>>>   	if (tpm2)
>>>   		ret = tpm2_seal_trusted(chip, p, options);
>>> @@ -880,24 +897,24 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>>>   		ret = key_seal(p, options);
>>>   	if (ret < 0) {
>>>   		pr_info("key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
>>> -		goto out;
>>> +		return ret;
>>>   	}
>>>   
>>> -	if (options->pcrlock) {
>>> -		ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
>>> +	if (private->pcrlock) {
>>> +		ret = pcrlock(private->pcrlock);
>>>   		if (ret < 0) {
>>>   			pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
>>> -			goto out;
>>> +			return ret;
>>>   		}
>>>   	}
>>> -out:
>>> -	kfree_sensitive(options);
>>> +
>>>   	return ret;
>>>   }
>>>   
>>>   static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>>>   {
>>> -	struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL;
>>> +	struct trusted_key_options *options __free(kfree_sensitive) = NULL;
>>> +	struct trusted_key_tpm *private __free(kfree_sensitive) = NULL;
>>>   	int ret = 0;
>>>   	int tpm2;
>>>   
>>> @@ -908,16 +925,15 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>>>   	options = trusted_options_alloc();
>>>   	if (!options)
>>>   		return -ENOMEM;
>>> +	private = options->private;
>>>   
>>>   	ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options);
>>>   	if (ret < 0)
>>> -		goto out;
>>> +		return ret;
>>>   	dump_options(options);
>>>   
>>> -	if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) {
>>> -		ret = -EINVAL;
>>> -		goto out;
>>> -	}
>>> +	if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2)
>>> +		return -EINVAL;
>>>   
>>>   	if (tpm2)
>>>   		ret = tpm2_unseal_trusted(chip, p, options);
>>> @@ -925,18 +941,17 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)
>>>   		ret = key_unseal(p, options);
>>>   	if (ret < 0) {
>>>   		pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
>>> -		goto out;
>>> +		return ret;
>>>   	}
>>>   
>>> -	if (options->pcrlock) {
>>> -		ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
>>> +	if (private->pcrlock) {
>>> +		ret = pcrlock(private->pcrlock);
>>>   		if (ret < 0) {
>>>   			pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
>>> -			goto out;
>>> +			return ret;
>>>   		}
>>>   	}
>>> -out:
>>> -	kfree_sensitive(options);
>>> +
>>>   	return ret;
>>>   }
>>>   
>>> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
>>> index 67225dd562a9..29da1a3328ef 100644
>>> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
>>> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
>>> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>>>   			   struct trusted_key_options *options,
>>>   			   u8 *src, u32 len)
>>>   {
>>> +	struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;
>>>   	const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE;
>>>   	u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
>>>   	u8 *work = scratch, *work1;
>>> @@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>>>   	work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid,
>>>   			       asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid));
>>>   
>>> -	if (options->blobauth_len == 0) {
>>> +	if (private->blobauth_len == 0) {
>>>   		unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool;
>>>   		/* tag 0 is emptyAuth */
>>>   		w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true);
>>> @@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>>>   		goto err;
>>>   	}
>>>   
>>> -	work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle);
>>> +	work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, private->keyhandle);
>>>   	work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len);
>>>   	work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len);
>>>   
>>> @@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>>>   			   struct trusted_key_options *options,
>>>   			   u8 **buf)
>>>   {
>>> +	struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;
>>>   	int ret;
>>>   	struct tpm2_key_context ctx;
>>>   	u8 *blob;
>>> @@ -120,7 +122,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>>>   		return -ENOMEM;
>>>   
>>>   	*buf = blob;
>>> -	options->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
>>> +	private->keyhandle = ctx.parent;
>>>   
>>>   	memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len);
>>>   	blob += ctx.priv_len;
>>> @@ -232,6 +234,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>>>   		      struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
>>>   		      struct trusted_key_options *options)
>>>   {
>>> +	struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;
>>>   	off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
>>>   	struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
>>>   	struct tpm_buf *sized __free(kfree) = NULL;
>>> @@ -240,11 +243,11 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>>>   	u32 flags;
>>>   	int rc;
>>>   
>>> -	hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(options->hash);
>>> +	hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(private->hash);
>>>   	if (hash < 0)
>>>   		return hash;
>>>   
>>> -	if (!options->keyhandle)
>>> +	if (!private->keyhandle)
>>>   		return -EINVAL;
>>>   
>>>   	rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
>>> @@ -274,18 +277,18 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>>>   
>>>   	tpm_buf_init_sized(sized, TPM_BUFSIZE);
>>>   
>>> -	rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
>>> +	rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, NULL);
>>>   	if (rc)
>>>   		goto out;
>>>   
>>>   	tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT,
>>> -				    options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>>> +				    private->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>>>   
>>>   	/* sensitive */
>>> -	tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, options->blobauth_len);
>>> +	tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, private->blobauth_len);
>>>   
>>> -	if (options->blobauth_len)
>>> -		tpm_buf_append(sized, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
>>> +	if (private->blobauth_len)
>>> +		tpm_buf_append(sized, private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len);
>>>   
>>>   	tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, payload->key_len);
>>>   	tpm_buf_append(sized, payload->key, payload->key_len);
>>> @@ -298,14 +301,15 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>>>   
>>>   	/* key properties */
>>>   	flags = 0;
>>> -	flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
>>> +	flags |= private->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
>>>   	flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT);
>>>   	tpm_buf_append_u32(sized, flags);
>>>   
>>>   	/* policy */
>>> -	tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, options->policydigest_len);
>>> -	if (options->policydigest_len)
>>> -		tpm_buf_append(sized, options->policydigest, options->policydigest_len);
>>> +	tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, private->policydigest_len);
>>> +	if (private->policydigest_len)
>>> +		tpm_buf_append(sized, private->policydigest,
>>> +			       private->policydigest_len);
>>>   
>>>   	/* public parameters */
>>>   	tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, TPM_ALG_NULL);
>>> @@ -376,6 +380,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>>>   			 u32 *blob_handle)
>>>   {
>>>   	u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL;
>>> +	struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;
>>>   	struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
>>>   	unsigned int private_len;
>>>   	unsigned int public_len;
>>> @@ -395,7 +400,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>>>   	}
>>>   
>>>   	/* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
>>> -	if (!options->keyhandle)
>>> +	if (!private->keyhandle)
>>>   		return -EINVAL;
>>>   
>>>   	/* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */
>>> @@ -439,11 +444,11 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>>>   	tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
>>>   	tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD);
>>>   
>>> -	rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL);
>>> +	rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, NULL);
>>>   	if (rc)
>>>   		return rc;
>>>   
>>> -	tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, options->keyauth,
>>> +	tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, private->keyauth,
>>>   				    TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>>>   
>>>   	tpm_buf_append(buf, blob, blob_len);
>>> @@ -483,6 +488,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>>>   			   struct trusted_key_options *options,
>>>   			   u32 blob_handle)
>>>   {
>>> +	struct trusted_key_tpm *private = options->private;
>>>   	struct tpm_header *head;
>>>   	struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
>>>   	u16 data_len;
>>> @@ -507,10 +513,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>>>   	if (rc)
>>>   		return rc;
>>>   
>>> -	if (!options->policyhandle) {
>>> +	if (!private->policyhandle) {
>>>   		tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
>>> -					    options->blobauth,
>>> -					    options->blobauth_len);
>>> +					    private->blobauth,
>>> +					    private->blobauth_len);
>>>   	} else {
>>>   		/*
>>>   		 * FIXME: The policy session was generated outside the
>>> @@ -523,9 +529,9 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
>>>   		 * could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated
>>>   		 * password.
>>>   		 */
>>> -		tpm2_buf_append_auth(buf, options->policyhandle,
>>> +		tpm2_buf_append_auth(buf, private->policyhandle,
>>>   				     NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0,
>>> -				     options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
>>> +				     private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len);
>>>   		if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
>>>   			tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT,
>>>   						    NULL, 0);
>>> -- 
>>> 2.53.0
>>>
>> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
>>
>> BR, Jarkko
>
> $ b4 shazam -s -l https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/aqHfyBdvENc9i69r@kernel.org/
> Grabbing thread from lore.kernel.org/all/aqHfyBdvENc9i69r@kernel.org/t.mbox.gz
> Checking for newer revisions
> Grabbing search results from lore.kernel.org
>    Added from v8: 2 patches
> Analyzing 8 messages in the thread
> Looking for additional code-review trailers on lore.kernel.org
> Analyzing 1 code-review messages
> Analyzing 1 code-review messages
> Will use the latest revision: v8
> You can pick other revisions using the -vN flag
> Checking attestation on all messages, may take a moment...
> ---
>    ERROR: missing [1/2]!
>    ✓ [PATCH v8 2/2] keys/trusted_keys: move TPM-specific fields into struct trusted_key_tpm
>      ✓ Signed: DKIM/ibm.com (From: ssrish@linux.ibm.com)
>      + Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260910075232.178855-3-ssrish@linux.ibm.com
>      + Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
> ---
> Total patches: 1
> ---
> WARNING: Thread incomplete!
> Applying: keys/trusted_keys: move TPM-specific fields into struct trusted_key_tpm
> Patch failed at 0001 keys/trusted_keys: move TPM-specific fields into struct trusted_key_tpm
> error: patch failed: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c:925
> error: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c: patch does not apply
> hint: Use 'git am --show-current-patch=diff' to see the failed patch
> hint: When you have resolved this problem, run "git am --continue".
> hint: If you prefer to skip this patch, run "git am --skip" instead.
> hint: To restore the original branch and stop patching, run "git am --abort".
> hint: Disable this message with "git config advice.mergeConflict false"
>
> Please send a proper version of the patch set.


Apologies, patch 1/2 was incorrectly sent with a v3 subject prefix, which
caused b4 to report the v8 series as incomplete.

I will resend the complete series as v9.


>
> BR, Jarkko


Thanks,
Srish.