From: Haizhi Xu <hxu02@ecs.syr.edu>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: 2.4.18-14smp sys_call_table not found by the LKM loader
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2002 23:23:16 -0400 (EDT) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1035256996.3db4c4a484a23@webmail.ecs.syr.edu> (raw)
Hi, Friends:
I use linux kernel 2.4.18-14smp. I am trying a kernel module with a reference to
sys_call_table as:
extern void *sys_call_table[];
However, when loading the module into the kernel, the loader reports:
unresolved symbol sys_call_table
I read the following and related messages. My question is:
Is it true that I can NOT reference sys_call_table[] from a kernel loadable
module in 2.4.18-14smp or higher version kernels? Then if I need to intercept
system calls, how should I do it?
Thanks a lot for answers.
Hai
Re: Two fixes for 2.4.19-pre5-ac3
Erik Tews (erik.tews@gmx.net)
Mon, 8 Apr 2002 01:31:22 +0200
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* In reply to: Alan Cox: "Re: Two fixes for 2.4.19-pre5-ac3"
On Sun, Apr 07, 2002 at 06:42:05PM +0100, Alan Cox wrote:
> > And, unless this is reversed the OpenAFS kernel module won't load (it
> > needs sys_call_table.):
>
> Correct. There was agreement a very long time ago that code should not patch
> the syscall table (for one its not safe). AFS probably needs fixing so the
> AFS syscall hook is exported portably and nicely in the syscall code.
I am really not an expert on kernel-programming but I remember that
there was a security-hole in the ptrace-code with which one a local user
could gain root access. And there was a little kernel-modul with a
wrapper-function for the ptrace-syscall that made traces only possible
if the user who was calling this syscall was root. So if I understand
right if we don't export the syscall-table it is impossible to write
such syscall-wrapper-functions and it requires to recompile the kernel
and reboot the machiene to fix such an security-hole.
So wouldn't it be better to export the syscall-table and just write into
the documentation that it is not a good idea to manipulate syscalls or
write a compiler-makro that gives out a warning when such a module is
beeing compiled.
next reply other threads:[~2002-10-22 3:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2002-10-22 3:23 Haizhi Xu [this message]
2002-10-22 3:31 ` Brad Hards
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