From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S263550AbTDGRAg (for ); Mon, 7 Apr 2003 13:00:36 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S263551AbTDGRAg (for ); Mon, 7 Apr 2003 13:00:36 -0400 Received: from node-d-1ea6.a2000.nl ([62.195.30.166]:21745 "EHLO laptop.fenrus.com") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S263550AbTDGRAe (for ); Mon, 7 Apr 2003 13:00:34 -0400 Subject: Re: [PATCH] new syscall: flink From: Arjan van de Ven To: Clayton Weaver Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org In-Reply-To: <20030407165009.13596.qmail@email.com> References: <20030407165009.13596.qmail@email.com> Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha1; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="=-+aD/1COj7MpFxMz+sqet" Organization: Message-Id: <1049735496.14054.9.camel@laptop.fenrus.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Ximian Evolution 1.2.2 (1.2.2-4) Date: 07 Apr 2003 19:11:37 +0200 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org --=-+aD/1COj7MpFxMz+sqet Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Mon, 2003-04-07 at 18:50, Clayton Weaver wrote: > The cases with potential security implications are all in the context of = flink()ing to an open fd for an inode that still corresponds to at least on= e directory entry. almost. there is of course always the case of a setuid app doing a userspace ACL like thing and only sending fd's to non-privileged apps based on some security scheme..... flink() would sort of break this thing entirely --=-+aD/1COj7MpFxMz+sqet Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name=signature.asc Content-Description: This is a digitally signed message part -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.1 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQA+kbFIxULwo51rQBIRAmvaAJ0UH7sAWqIkgHR0MvXx9E1Xhf7LRgCfdvKa xZGPOGma+NAWNwTg6YwAOvk= =KPSa -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --=-+aD/1COj7MpFxMz+sqet--