From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751259AbVH2QPg (ORCPT ); Mon, 29 Aug 2005 12:15:36 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1751305AbVH2QPg (ORCPT ); Mon, 29 Aug 2005 12:15:36 -0400 Received: from pat.uio.no ([129.240.130.16]:56992 "EHLO pat.uio.no") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751259AbVH2QPf convert rfc822-to-8bit (ORCPT ); Mon, 29 Aug 2005 12:15:35 -0400 Subject: Re: syscall: sys_promote From: Trond Myklebust To: Alan Cox Cc: qiyong , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhommel@gmail.com In-Reply-To: <1125318568.23946.15.camel@localhost.localdomain> References: <20050826092537.GA3416@localhost.localdomain> <20050826110226.GA5184@localhost.localdomain> <1125069558.4958.83.camel@localhost.localdomain> <4312870E.9000708@fc-cn.com> <1125318568.23946.15.camel@localhost.localdomain> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2005 09:15:09 -0700 Message-Id: <1125332109.8789.35.camel@lade.trondhjem.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Evolution 2.2.1.1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT X-UiO-Spam-info: not spam, SpamAssassin (score=-3.246, required 12, autolearn=disabled, AWL 1.75, UIO_MAIL_IS_INTERNAL -5.00) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org må den 29.08.2005 Klokka 13:29 (+0100) skreiv Alan Cox: > You can ignore the patch easily enough. Ignoring the locking doesn't > work because functionality like fork process counting, exec, and setuid > all make definite assumptions that are not safe to tamper without unless > you fix the uid locking. > > Fixing it might be useful in some obscure cases anyway - POSIX threads > might benefit from it too, providing the functionality of changing all > thread uids at once isnt triggered for sensible threaded app behaviour. The latter needs more than just locking fixes. Right now we have some potentially _very_ interesting behaviour due to the fact that large swathes of kernel code assume that a thread's privileges will not change while it is inside a syscall. This was something I started to try to address with the BSD credential patches a couple of years ago, but I never managed to finish those in time for 2.6.0. Cheers, Trond