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From: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>
To: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: mlangsdo@redhat.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com,
	marc.zyngier@arm.com, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
	julien.thierry@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Andre.Przywara@arm.com,
	Dave.Martin@arm.com, shankerd@codeaurora.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 00/10] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries
Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2019 20:35:12 +0100 (CET)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1128468323.249298.1551468912168@email.ionos.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190227010544.597579-1-jeremy.linton@arm.com>

Hi Jeremy,

> Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com> hat am 27. Februar 2019 um 02:05 geschrieben:
> 
> 
> Arm64 machines should be displaying a human readable
> vulnerability status to speculative execution attacks in
> /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities 
> 
> This series enables that behavior by providing the expected
> functions. Those functions expose the cpu errata and feature
> states, as well as whether firmware is responding appropriately
> to display the overall machine status. This means that in a
> heterogeneous machine we will only claim the machine is mitigated
> or safe if we are confident all booted cores are safe or
> mitigated.
> 

here are the results for Raspberry Pi 3 B:

l1tf:Not affected
meltdown:Not affected
spec_store_bypass:Not affected
spectre_v1:Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization
spectre_v2:Not affected

Tested-by: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>

      parent reply	other threads:[~2019-03-01 19:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-02-27  1:05 Jeremy Linton
2019-02-27  1:05 ` [PATCH v5 01/10] arm64: Provide a command line to disable spectre_v2 mitigation Jeremy Linton
2019-02-28 18:14   ` Suzuki K Poulose
2019-02-28 18:21     ` Catalin Marinas
2019-02-28 18:25       ` Suzuki K Poulose
2019-03-01  6:54   ` Andre Przywara
2019-02-27  1:05 ` [PATCH v5 02/10] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v1 Jeremy Linton
2019-02-28 18:29   ` Suzuki K Poulose
2019-03-01  6:54   ` Andre Przywara
2019-02-27  1:05 ` [PATCH v5 03/10] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown Jeremy Linton
2019-02-28 18:33   ` Suzuki K Poulose
2019-03-01  7:11   ` Andre Przywara
2019-03-01 16:12     ` Jeremy Linton
2019-03-01 16:20       ` Catalin Marinas
2019-03-01 16:53         ` Jeremy Linton
2019-03-01 17:15           ` Catalin Marinas
2019-03-01 17:30           ` Andre Przywara
2019-02-27  1:05 ` [PATCH v5 04/10] arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof Jeremy Linton
2019-03-01  6:57   ` Andre Przywara
2019-02-27  1:05 ` [PATCH v5 05/10] arm64: Use firmware to detect CPUs that are not affected by Spectre-v2 Jeremy Linton
2019-03-01  6:58   ` Andre Przywara
2019-02-27  1:05 ` [PATCH v5 06/10] arm64: Always enable spectrev2 vulnerability detection Jeremy Linton
2019-03-01  6:58   ` Andre Przywara
2019-02-27  1:05 ` [PATCH v5 07/10] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre v2 Jeremy Linton
2019-03-01  6:59   ` Andre Przywara
2019-02-27  1:05 ` [PATCH v5 08/10] arm64: Always enable ssb vulnerability detection Jeremy Linton
2019-03-01  7:02   ` Andre Przywara
2019-03-01 16:16     ` Jeremy Linton
2019-02-27  1:05 ` [PATCH v5 09/10] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass Jeremy Linton
2019-03-01  7:02   ` Andre Przywara
2019-03-01 16:41     ` Jeremy Linton
2019-02-27  1:05 ` [PATCH v5 10/10] arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support Jeremy Linton
2019-03-01  7:03   ` Andre Przywara
2019-02-28 12:01 ` [PATCH v5 00/10] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries Catalin Marinas
2019-03-01 19:35 ` Stefan Wahren [this message]

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