From: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
kernel-team@android.com, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] tracing: do not leak kernel addresses
Date: Thu, 26 Jul 2018 08:14:08 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <11437c3e-5131-7190-c496-7b51eb7fcc2a@android.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180725210717.3b807191@vmware.local.home>
On 07/25/2018 06:07 PM, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> On Wed, 25 Jul 2018 13:22:36 -0700
> Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com> wrote:
>
>> From: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
>>
>> Switch from 0x%lx to 0x%pK to print the kernel addresses.
>>
>> Fixes: CVE-2017-0630
> Wait!!!! This breaks perf and trace-cmd! They require this to be able
> to print various strings in trace events. This file is root read only,
> as the CVE says.
>
> NAK for this fix. Come up with something that doesn't break perf and
> trace-cmd. That will not be trivial, as the format is stored in the
> ring buffer with an address, then referenced directly. It also handles
> trace_printk() functions that simply point to the string format itself.
>
> A fix would require having a pointer be the same that is referenced
> inside the kernel as well as in this file. Maybe make the format string
> placed in a location that doesn't leak where the rest of the kernel
> exists?
>
> -- Steve
Thank you Steve, much appreciated feedback, I have asked the security
developers to keep this in mind and come up with a correct fix.
The correct fix that meets your guidelines would _not_ be suitable for
stable due to the invasiveness it sounds, only for the latest will such
a rework make sense. As such, the fix proposed in this patch is the only
one that meets the bar for stable patch simplicity, and merely(!) needs
to state that if the fix is taken, perf and trace are broken.
Posting this patch publicly on the lists, that may never be applied, may
be the limit of our responsibility for a fix to stable kernel releases,
to be optionally applied by vendors concerned with this CVE criteria?
-- Mark
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-07-26 15:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-07-25 20:22 Mark Salyzyn
2018-07-25 21:14 ` Nick Desaulniers
2018-07-26 1:07 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-07-26 15:14 ` Mark Salyzyn [this message]
2018-07-26 15:22 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-07-26 16:32 ` Nick Desaulniers
2018-07-26 16:37 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-07-26 16:59 ` Nick Desaulniers
2018-07-26 21:56 ` Nick Desaulniers
2018-07-26 15:31 ` Greg KH
2018-07-26 16:52 ` Nick Desaulniers
2018-07-26 22:15 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-07-27 12:07 ` Jordan Glover
2018-07-27 13:40 ` Jann Horn
2018-07-27 13:47 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-07-27 18:13 ` Nick Desaulniers
2018-07-27 18:31 ` Steven Rostedt
[not found] ` <CAMx4XWv3OazvURuN1XU2+5C5tNDzPuTniMn_T=XTA4P8_uwS_A@mail.gmail.com>
2018-07-27 18:47 ` Jann Horn
2018-07-27 18:58 ` Jann Horn
2018-07-27 19:54 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-07-27 20:11 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-07-27 20:21 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-07-27 20:53 ` Steven Rostedt
2018-07-27 22:05 ` Sandeep Patil
2018-07-28 0:04 ` Theodore Y. Ts'o
2018-07-30 14:35 ` Sandeep Patil
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