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Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/11] security: AppArmor - Overview
From: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
To: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>, Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>,
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Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2006 09:14:58 +0200
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> A large part of the behaviour of an application is the path names that
> it uses and what it does with them.  If an application started doing
> unexpected things with unexpected paths (e.g. exec("/bin/sh") or
> open("/etc/shadow",O_RDONLY)) then this is a sure sign that it has
> been subverted and that AppArmor need to protect it, from itself.

does apparmor at least (offer) to kill the app when this happens?
(rationale: the app is hijacked, better kill it before it goes to do
damage)