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Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/11] security: AppArmor - Overview
From: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
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> But AA specifically emphasizes that it controls capabilities so that
> even a uid 0 process is "confined" by it.  

a scary angle is that a compromised "confined" process can still
reconfigure all your networking to the point that it can forward and NAT
outside connections to any machine on the inside (if the machine acts a
firewall-like role where it can see outside and inside at the same time)