From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1030303AbWHRMK3 (ORCPT ); Fri, 18 Aug 2006 08:10:29 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1030308AbWHRMK2 (ORCPT ); Fri, 18 Aug 2006 08:10:28 -0400 Received: from pentafluge.infradead.org ([213.146.154.40]:23971 "EHLO pentafluge.infradead.org") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1030303AbWHRMK0 (ORCPT ); Fri, 18 Aug 2006 08:10:26 -0400 Subject: Re: [PATCH] [3/3] Support piping into commands in /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern From: Arjan van de Ven To: Andi Kleen Cc: Andrew Morton , Alan Cox , Greg KH , Andi Kleen , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org In-Reply-To: <1155902485.4494.164.camel@laptopd505.fenrus.org> References: <20060814127.183332000@suse.de> <20060814112732.684D313BD9@wotan.suse.de> <20060816084354.GF24139@kroah.com> <20060816111801.0fc5093e.ak@muc.de> <20060816111025.1ab702a1.akpm@osdl.org> <20060817094640.GA3173@muc.de> <1155814064.15195.60.camel@localhost.localdomain> <20060817223009.932f9383.akpm@osdl.org> <20060818082958.GA5862@muc.de> <1155902485.4494.164.camel@laptopd505.fenrus.org> Content-Type: text/plain Organization: Intel International BV Date: Fri, 18 Aug 2006 14:10:01 +0200 Message-Id: <1155903001.4494.166.camel@laptopd505.fenrus.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Evolution 2.2.3 (2.2.3-2.fc4) Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-SRS-Rewrite: SMTP reverse-path rewritten from by pentafluge.infradead.org See http://www.infradead.org/rpr.html Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, 2006-08-18 at 14:01 +0200, Arjan van de Ven wrote: > On Fri, 2006-08-18 at 10:29 +0200, Andi Kleen wrote: > > > But still. Is this code secure? > > > > Any auditing from third parties appreciated. > > > > I don't know of any obvious flaws (at least assuming the pipe handler > > isn't insecure code), but then I'm biased. > > one angle is... is the userspace handler trusted code by root? Or is it > allowed to be per user/user defined binary? In the later case there are > all kinds of DoS scenarios possible; in the former it's root doing that > to himself ;) so one angle that needs to be resolved is the selinux interaction, where root!=root to some degree. If "any root" can control the sysctl, then this could lead to information leaks, or worse, to a "limited root" to "full root" escalation... > -- if you want to mail me at work (you don't), use arjan (at) linux.intel.com