From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 14/20] SELinux: drop load_mutex in security_load_policy
Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2008 01:42:16 +0900 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1215448942-17581-15-git-send-email-jmorris@namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1215448942-17581-1-git-send-email-jmorris@namei.org>
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
We used to protect against races of policy load in security_load_policy
by using the load_mutex. Since then we have added a new mutex,
sel_mutex, in sel_write_load() which is always held across all calls to
security_load_policy we are covered and can safely just drop this one.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 14 +-------------
1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index f26a8ca..543fd0f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -71,7 +71,6 @@ int selinux_policycap_openperm;
extern const struct selinux_class_perm selinux_class_perm;
static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(load_mutex);
static struct sidtab sidtab;
struct policydb policydb;
@@ -1453,17 +1452,13 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
int rc = 0;
struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
- mutex_lock(&load_mutex);
-
if (!ss_initialized) {
avtab_cache_init();
if (policydb_read(&policydb, fp)) {
- mutex_unlock(&load_mutex);
avtab_cache_destroy();
return -EINVAL;
}
if (policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab)) {
- mutex_unlock(&load_mutex);
policydb_destroy(&policydb);
avtab_cache_destroy();
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1472,7 +1467,6 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
if (validate_classes(&policydb)) {
printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: the definition of a class is incorrect\n");
- mutex_unlock(&load_mutex);
sidtab_destroy(&sidtab);
policydb_destroy(&policydb);
avtab_cache_destroy();
@@ -1482,7 +1476,6 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers;
ss_initialized = 1;
seqno = ++latest_granting;
- mutex_unlock(&load_mutex);
selinux_complete_init();
avc_ss_reset(seqno);
selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
@@ -1495,13 +1488,10 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids");
#endif
- if (policydb_read(&newpolicydb, fp)) {
- mutex_unlock(&load_mutex);
+ if (policydb_read(&newpolicydb, fp))
return -EINVAL;
- }
if (sidtab_init(&newsidtab)) {
- mutex_unlock(&load_mutex);
policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb);
return -ENOMEM;
}
@@ -1549,7 +1539,6 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
seqno = ++latest_granting;
policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers;
write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
- mutex_unlock(&load_mutex);
/* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
policydb_destroy(&oldpolicydb);
@@ -1563,7 +1552,6 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
return 0;
err:
- mutex_unlock(&load_mutex);
sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb);
return rc;
--
1.5.5.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-07-07 16:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-07-07 16:42 SELinux patches for 2.6.26 James Morris
2008-07-07 16:42 ` [PATCH 01/20] selinux: support deferred mapping of contexts James Morris
2008-07-07 16:42 ` [PATCH 02/20] SELinux: fix sleeping allocation in security_context_to_sid James Morris
2008-07-07 16:42 ` [PATCH 03/20] SELinux: keep the code clean formating and syntax James Morris
2008-07-07 16:42 ` [PATCH 04/20] SELinux: reorder inode_security_struct to increase objs/slab on 64bit James Morris
2008-07-07 16:42 ` [PATCH 05/20] SELinux: remove inherit field from inode_security_struct James Morris
2008-07-07 16:42 ` [PATCH 06/20] Security: split proc ptrace checking into read vs. attach James Morris
2008-07-07 16:42 ` [PATCH 07/20] SELinux: enable processes with mac_admin to get the raw inode contexts James Morris
2008-07-07 16:42 ` [PATCH 08/20] selinux: simplify ioctl checking James Morris
2008-07-07 16:42 ` [PATCH 09/20] selinux: fix endianness bug in network node address handling James Morris
2008-07-07 16:42 ` [PATCH 10/20] SELinux: open code policy_rwlock James Morris
2008-07-07 16:42 ` [PATCH 11/20] SELinux: open code load_mutex James Morris
2008-07-07 16:42 ` [PATCH 12/20] SELinux: open code sidtab lock James Morris
2008-07-07 16:42 ` [PATCH 13/20] SELinux: fix off by 1 reference of class_to_string in context_struct_compute_av James Morris
2008-07-07 16:42 ` James Morris [this message]
2008-07-07 16:42 ` [PATCH 15/20] selinux: change handling of invalid classes (Was: Re: 2.6.26-rc5-mm1 selinux whine) James Morris
2008-07-07 16:42 ` [PATCH 16/20] SELinux: more user friendly unknown handling printk James Morris
2008-07-07 16:42 ` [PATCH 17/20] SELinux: remove unused and shadowed addrlen variable James Morris
2008-07-07 16:42 ` [PATCH 18/20] SELinux: use do_each_thread as a proper do/while block James Morris
2008-07-07 16:42 ` [PATCH 19/20] security: fix return of void-valued expressions James Morris
2008-07-07 16:42 ` [PATCH 20/20] SELinux: allow fstype unknown to policy to use xattrs if present James Morris
2008-07-07 18:23 ` SELinux patches for 2.6.26 Theodore Tso
2008-07-07 22:49 ` James Morris
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