[PATCH v2] sctp: better integer overflow check in sctp_auth_create_key()

[Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>]

The check from commit 30c2235c is incomplete and cannot prevent
cases like key_len = 0x80000000 (INT_MAX + 1).  In that case, the
left-hand side of the check (INT_MAX - key_len), which is unsigned,
becomes 0xffffffff (UINT_MAX) and bypasses the check.

However this shouldn't be a security issue.  The function is called
from the following two code paths:

 1) setsockopt()

 2) sctp_auth_asoc_set_secret()

In case (1), sca_keylength is never going to exceed 65535 since it's
bounded by a u16 from the user API.  As such, the key length will
never overflow.

In case (2), sca_keylength is computed based on the user key (1 short)
and 2 * key_vector (3 shorts) for a total of 7 * USHRT_MAX, which still
will not overflow.

In other words, this overflow check is not really necessary.  Just
make it more correct.

Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
---
 net/sctp/auth.c |    2 +-
 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/sctp/auth.c b/net/sctp/auth.c
index 865e68f..bf81204 100644
--- a/net/sctp/auth.c
+++ b/net/sctp/auth.c
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ static struct sctp_auth_bytes *sctp_auth_create_key(__u32 key_len, gfp_t gfp)
 	struct sctp_auth_bytes *key;
 
 	/* Verify that we are not going to overflow INT_MAX */
-	if ((INT_MAX - key_len) < sizeof(struct sctp_auth_bytes))
+	if (key_len > (INT_MAX - sizeof(struct sctp_auth_bytes)))
 		return NULL;
 
 	/* Allocate the shared key */
-- 
1.7.5.4