From: john.johansen@canonical.com
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 03/12] AppArmor contexts attach profiles and state to tasks, files, etc. when a direct profile reference is not sufficient.
Date: Fri, 19 Feb 2010 01:36:19 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1266572188-26529-4-git-send-email-john.johansen@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1266572188-26529-1-git-send-email-john.johansen@canonical.com>
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
security/apparmor/context.c | 195 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/apparmor/include/context.h | 142 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 337 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/apparmor/context.c
create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/context.h
diff --git a/security/apparmor/context.c b/security/apparmor/context.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c2901af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/context.c
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor functions used to manipulate object security
+ * contexts.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+struct aa_task_cxt *aa_alloc_task_context(gfp_t flags)
+{
+ return kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_task_cxt), flags);
+}
+
+void aa_free_task_context(struct aa_task_cxt *cxt)
+{
+ if (cxt) {
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->profile);
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
+
+ kzfree(cxt);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dup_task_context - duplicate a task context, incrementing reference counts
+ * @new: a blank task context
+ * @old: the task context to copy
+ */
+void aa_dup_task_context(struct aa_task_cxt *new, const struct aa_task_cxt *old)
+{
+ *new = *old;
+ aa_get_profile(new->profile);
+ aa_get_profile(new->previous);
+ aa_get_profile(new->onexec);
+}
+
+/**
+ * replace_cxt - replace a context profile
+ * @cxt: task context
+ * @profile: profile to replace cxt group
+ *
+ * Replace context grouping profile reference with @profile
+ */
+static void replace_group(struct aa_task_cxt *cxt, struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+ if (cxt->profile == profile)
+ return;
+
+ BUG_ON(!profile);
+ if (unconfined(profile) || (cxt->profile->ns != profile->ns)) {
+ /* if switching to unconfined or a different profile namespace
+ * clear out context state
+ */
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
+ cxt->previous = NULL;
+ cxt->onexec = NULL;
+ cxt->token = 0;
+ }
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->profile);
+ cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(profile);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_replace_current_profiles - replace the current tasks profiles
+ * @sys: new system profile
+ *
+ * Returns: error on failure
+ */
+int aa_replace_current_profiles(struct aa_profile *sys)
+{
+ struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
+ struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ cxt = new->security;
+ replace_group(cxt, sys);
+ /* todo add user group */
+
+ commit_creds(new);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_set_current_onexec - set the tasks change_profile to happen onexec
+ * @sys: system profile to set at exec
+ *
+ * Returns: error on failure
+ */
+int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_profile *sys)
+{
+ struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
+ struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ cxt = new->security;
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
+ cxt->onexec = aa_get_profile(sys);
+
+ commit_creds(new);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_set_current_hat - set the current tasks hat
+ * @profile: profile to set as the current hat
+ * @token: token value that must be specified to change from the hat
+ *
+ * Do switch of tasks hat. If the task is currently in a hat
+ * validate the token to match.
+ *
+ * Returns: error on failure
+ */
+int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_profile *profile, u64 token)
+{
+ struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
+ struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ cxt = new->security;
+ if (!cxt->previous) {
+ cxt->previous = cxt->profile;
+ cxt->token = token;
+ } else if (cxt->token == token) {
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->profile);
+ } else {
+ /* previous_profile && cxt->token != token */
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(aa_newest_version(profile));
+ /* clear exec on switching context */
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
+ cxt->onexec = NULL;
+
+ commit_creds(new);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_restore_previous_profile - exit from hat context restoring the profile
+ * @token: the token that must be matched to exit hat context
+ *
+ * Attempt to return out of a hat to the previous profile. The token
+ * must match the stored token value.
+ *
+ * Returns: error of failure
+ */
+int aa_restore_previous_profile(u64 token)
+{
+ struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
+ struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ cxt = new->security;
+ if (cxt->token != token) {
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ /* ignore restores when there is no saved profile */
+ if (!cxt->previous) {
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->profile);
+ cxt->profile = aa_newest_version(cxt->previous);
+ if (unlikely(cxt->profile != cxt->previous)) {
+ aa_get_profile(cxt->profile);
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
+ }
+ /* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */
+ cxt->previous = NULL;
+ cxt->token = 0;
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
+ cxt->onexec = NULL;
+
+ commit_creds(new);
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/context.h b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8b53cf1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor contexts used to associate "labels" to objects.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_CONTEXT_H
+#define __AA_CONTEXT_H
+
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+
+#include "policy.h"
+
+/* struct aa_file_cxt - the AppArmor context the file was opened in
+ * @profile: the profile the file was opened under
+ * @perms: the permission the file was opened with
+ */
+struct aa_file_cxt {
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ u16 allowed;
+};
+
+static inline struct aa_file_cxt *aa_alloc_file_context(gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ return kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_file_cxt), gfp);
+}
+
+static inline void aa_free_file_context(struct aa_file_cxt *cxt)
+{
+ aa_put_profile(cxt->profile);
+ kzfree(cxt);
+}
+
+/**
+ * struct aa_task_cxt - primary label for confined tasks
+ * @profile: the current profile
+ * @exec: profile to transition to on next exec
+ * @previous: profile the task may return to
+ * @token: magic value the task must know for returning to @previous_profile
+ *
+ * Contains the task's current profile (which could change due to
+ * change_hat). Plus the hat_magic needed during change_hat.
+ *
+ * TODO: make so a task can be confined by a stack of contexts
+ */
+struct aa_task_cxt {
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ struct aa_profile *onexec;
+ struct aa_profile *previous;
+ u64 token;
+};
+
+struct aa_task_cxt *aa_alloc_task_context(gfp_t flags);
+void aa_free_task_context(struct aa_task_cxt *cxt);
+void aa_dup_task_context(struct aa_task_cxt *new,
+ const struct aa_task_cxt *old);
+int aa_replace_current_profiles(struct aa_profile *sys);
+int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_profile *sys);
+int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_profile *profile, u64 token);
+int aa_restore_previous_profile(u64 cookie);
+
+/**
+ * __aa_task_is_confined - determine if @task has any confinement
+ * @task: task to check confinement of
+ *
+ * If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section
+ */
+static inline bool __aa_task_is_confined(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = __task_cred(task)->security;
+
+ BUG_ON(!cxt);
+ if (unconfined(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile)))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_cred_profile - obtain cred's profiles
+ * @cred: cred to obtain profiles from
+ *
+ * Returns: system confining profile
+ *
+ * does NOT increment reference count
+ */
+static inline struct aa_profile *aa_cred_profile(const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred->security;
+ BUG_ON(!cxt);
+ return aa_newest_version(cxt->profile);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __aa_current_profile - find the current tasks confining profile
+ *
+ * Returns: up to date confining profile or NULL if task is unconfined
+ *
+ * This fn will not update the tasks cred to the most up to date version
+ * of the profile so it is safe to call when inside of locks.
+ */
+static inline struct aa_profile *__aa_current_profile(void)
+{
+ return aa_cred_profile(current_cred());
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_current_profile - find the current tasks confining profile and do updates
+ *
+ * Returns: up to date confinging profile or NULL if task is unconfined
+ *
+ * This fn will update the tasks cred structure if the profile has been
+ * replaced. Not safe to call inside locks
+ */
+static inline struct aa_profile *aa_current_profile(void)
+{
+ const struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cred()->security;
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ BUG_ON(!cxt);
+
+ profile = aa_newest_version(cxt->profile);
+ /*
+ * Whether or not replacement succeeds, use newest profile so
+ * there is no need to update it after replacement.
+ */
+ if (unlikely((cxt->profile != profile)))
+ aa_replace_current_profiles(profile);
+
+ return profile;
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_CONTEXT_H */
--
1.6.6.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2010-02-19 9:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2010-02-19 9:36 [AppArmor #4 0/12] AppArmor security module john.johansen
2010-02-19 9:36 ` [PATCH 01/12] Miscellaneous functions and defines needed by AppArmor, including the base path resolution routines john.johansen
2010-02-19 11:03 ` Al Viro
2010-02-20 12:17 ` John Johansen
2010-02-20 17:25 ` John Johansen
2010-02-20 19:10 ` John Johansen
2010-02-20 12:24 ` John Johansen
2010-02-19 9:36 ` [PATCH 02/12] Update kenel audit range comments to show AppArmor's registered range of 1500-1599. This range used to be reserved for LSPP but LSPP uses the SELinux range and the range was given to AppArmor. Patch is not in mainline -- pending AppArmor code submission to lkml john.johansen
2010-02-19 9:36 ` john.johansen [this message]
2010-02-19 9:36 ` [PATCH 04/12] The basic routines and defines for AppArmor policy. AppArmor policy is defined by a few basic components. profiles - the basic unit of confinement contain all the information to enforce policy on a task john.johansen
2010-02-19 9:36 ` [PATCH 05/12] A basic dfa matching engine based off the dfa engine in the Dragon Book. It uses simple row comb compression with a check field john.johansen
2010-02-19 9:36 ` [PATCH 06/12] AppArmor policy is loaded in a platform independent flattened binary stream. Verify and unpack the data converting it to the internal format needed for enforcement john.johansen
2010-02-19 9:36 ` [PATCH 07/12] AppArmor /proc/<pid>/attr/* and apparmorfs interfaces to userspace john.johansen
2010-02-19 9:36 ` [PATCH 08/12] AppArmor: file enforcement routines john.johansen
2010-02-19 9:36 ` [PATCH 09/12] AppArmor ipc, rlimit, network and capability routines john.johansen
2010-02-19 9:36 ` [PATCH 10/12] AppArmor routines for controlling domain transitions john.johansen
2010-02-19 9:36 ` [PATCH 11/12] AppArmor hooks to interface with the LSM, module parameters and initialization john.johansen
2010-02-22 22:14 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-02-23 7:58 ` John Johansen
2010-02-19 9:36 ` [PATCH 12/12] Kconfig and Makefiles to enable configuration and building of AppArmor john.johansen
2010-02-22 22:16 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-02-23 7:45 ` John Johansen
2010-03-03 7:50 ` Kees Cook
2010-02-23 1:59 ` [AppArmor #4 0/12] AppArmor security module Tetsuo Handa
2010-02-23 8:38 ` John Johansen
2010-02-23 8:31 ` Tetsuo Handa
2010-02-23 9:17 ` John Johansen
2010-02-26 3:22 ` Tetsuo Handa
2010-02-26 6:31 ` Tetsuo Handa
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