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From: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 02/14] allow root in container to copy namespaces
Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2011 23:30:40 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1310513452-13397-3-git-send-email-serge@hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1310513452-13397-1-git-send-email-serge@hallyn.com>

From: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>

Othewise nested containers with user namespaces won't be possible.

It's true that user namespaces are not yet fully isolated, but for
that same reason there are far worse things that root in a child
user ns can do.  Spawning a child user ns is not in itself bad.

This patch also allows setns for root in a container:
@Eric Biederman: are there gotchas in allowing setns from child
userns?

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
 kernel/fork.c    |    4 ++--
 kernel/nsproxy.c |    6 +++---
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 0276c30..01d7564 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -1475,8 +1475,8 @@ long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
 		/* hopefully this check will go away when userns support is
 		 * complete
 		 */
-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || !capable(CAP_SETUID) ||
-				!capable(CAP_SETGID))
+		if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || !nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID) ||
+				!nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))
 			return -EPERM;
 	}
 
diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c
index d6a00f3..a687405 100644
--- a/kernel/nsproxy.c
+++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
 				CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNET)))
 		return 0;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+	if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
 		err = -EPERM;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ int unshare_nsproxy_namespaces(unsigned long unshare_flags,
 			       CLONE_NEWNET)))
 		return 0;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	*new_nsp = create_new_namespaces(unshare_flags, current,
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setns, int, fd, int, nstype)
 	struct file *file;
 	int err;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	file = proc_ns_fget(fd);
-- 
1.7.4.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2011-07-12 23:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-07-12 23:30 [RFC PATCH 0/14] user namespaces: continue targetting capabilities Serge Hallyn
2011-07-12 23:30 ` [RFC PATCH 01/14] add Documentation/namespaces/user_namespace.txt Serge Hallyn
2011-07-12 23:30 ` Serge Hallyn [this message]
2011-07-12 23:30 ` [RFC PATCH 03/14] keyctl: check capabilities against key's user_ns Serge Hallyn
2011-07-12 23:30 ` [RFC PATCH 04/14] user_ns: convert fs/attr.c to targeted capabilities Serge Hallyn
2011-07-12 23:30 ` [RFC PATCH 05/14] userns: clamp down users of cap_raised Serge Hallyn
2011-07-12 23:30 ` [RFC PATCH 06/14] user namespace: make each net (net_ns) belong to a user_ns Serge Hallyn
2011-07-12 23:30 ` [RFC PATCH 07/14] user namespace: use net->user_ns for some capable calls under net/ Serge Hallyn
2011-07-12 23:30 ` [RFC PATCH 08/14] af_netlink.c: make netlink_capable userns-aware Serge Hallyn
2011-07-13  1:33   ` Eric Dumazet
2011-07-13  2:02     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-07-12 23:30 ` [RFC PATCH 09/14] user ns: convert ipv6 to targeted capabilities Serge Hallyn
2011-07-12 23:30 ` [RFC PATCH 10/14] net/core/scm.c: target capable() calls to user_ns owning the net_ns Serge Hallyn
2011-07-12 23:30 ` [RFC PATCH 11/14] userns: make some net-sysfs capable calls targeted Serge Hallyn
2011-07-12 23:30 ` [RFC PATCH 12/14] user_ns: target af_key capability check Serge Hallyn
2011-07-12 23:30 ` [RFC PATCH 13/14] userns: net: make many network capable calls targeted Serge Hallyn
2011-07-12 23:30 ` [RFC PATCH 14/14] net: pass user_ns to cap_netlink_recv() Serge Hallyn
2011-07-13 12:45 ` [RFC PATCH 01/14] add Documentation/namespaces/user_namespace.txt David Howells
2011-07-14  2:37   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-07-13 16:04 ` [RFC PATCH 03/14] keyctl: check capabilities against key's user_ns David Howells

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