From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753589Ab1GZS66 (ORCPT ); Tue, 26 Jul 2011 14:58:58 -0400 Received: from 50-56-35-84.static.cloud-ips.com ([50.56.35.84]:41313 "EHLO mail" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753188Ab1GZS6R (ORCPT ); Tue, 26 Jul 2011 14:58:17 -0400 From: Serge Hallyn To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, akpm@osdl.org, "Serge E. Hallyn" Subject: [PATCH 02/14] allow root in container to copy namespaces Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2011 18:58:25 +0000 Message-Id: <1311706717-7398-3-git-send-email-serge@hallyn.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.7.0.4 In-Reply-To: <1311706717-7398-1-git-send-email-serge@hallyn.com> References: <1311706717-7398-1-git-send-email-serge@hallyn.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Serge E. Hallyn Othewise nested containers with user namespaces won't be possible. It's true that user namespaces are not yet fully isolated, but for that same reason there are far worse things that root in a child user ns can do. Spawning a child user ns is not in itself bad. This patch also allows setns for root in a container: @Eric Biederman: are there gotchas in allowing setns from child userns? Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn Cc: Eric W. Biederman --- kernel/fork.c | 4 ++-- kernel/nsproxy.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 17bf7c8..22d0cf0 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -1473,8 +1473,8 @@ long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags, /* hopefully this check will go away when userns support is * complete */ - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || !capable(CAP_SETUID) || - !capable(CAP_SETGID)) + if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || !nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID) || + !nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID)) return -EPERM; } diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c index 9aeab4b..f50542d 100644 --- a/kernel/nsproxy.c +++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk) CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNET))) return 0; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { err = -EPERM; goto out; } @@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ int unshare_nsproxy_namespaces(unsigned long unshare_flags, CLONE_NEWNET))) return 0; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; *new_nsp = create_new_namespaces(unshare_flags, current, @@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setns, int, fd, int, nstype) struct file *file; int err; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; file = proc_ns_fget(fd); -- 1.7.4.1