From: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
To: akpm@osdl.org, segooon@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.linux-foundation.org,
dhowells@redhat.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, rdunlap@xenotime.net
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 03/15] keyctl: check capabilities against key's user_ns
Date: Fri, 2 Sep 2011 19:56:28 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1314993400-6910-6-git-send-email-serge@hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1314993400-6910-1-git-send-email-serge@hallyn.com>
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
ATM, task should only be able to get his own user_ns's keys
anyway, so nsown_capable should also work, but there is no
advantage to doing that, while using key's user_ns is clearer.
changelog: jun 6:
compile fix: keyctl.c (key_user, not key has user_ns)
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
security/keys/keyctl.c | 5 +++--
1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index eca5191..fa7d420 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
ret = -EACCES;
down_write(&key->sem);
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+ if (!ns_capable(key->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
/* only the sysadmin can chown a key to some other UID */
if (uid != (uid_t) -1 && key->uid != uid)
goto error_put;
@@ -852,7 +852,8 @@ long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm)
down_write(&key->sem);
/* if we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own */
- if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || key->uid == current_fsuid()) {
+ if (ns_capable(key->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
+ key->uid == current_fsuid()) {
key->perm = perm;
ret = 0;
}
--
1.7.5.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-09-02 20:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-09-02 19:56 user namespaces v3: continue targetting capabilities Serge Hallyn
2011-09-02 19:56 ` Serge Hallyn
2011-09-02 19:56 ` Serge Hallyn
2011-09-02 23:49 ` missing [PATCH 01/15] Eric W. Biederman
2011-09-03 1:09 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-09-02 19:56 ` [PATCH 01/15] add Documentation/namespaces/user_namespace.txt (v3) Serge Hallyn
2011-09-07 22:50 ` Andrew Morton
2011-09-09 13:10 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-09-26 19:17 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-27 13:21 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-09-27 15:56 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-10-01 17:00 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-10-03 1:46 ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-10-03 19:53 ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-10-03 20:04 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-09-02 19:56 ` [PATCH 02/15] user ns: setns: move capable checks into per-ns attach helper Serge Hallyn
2011-09-04 1:51 ` Matt Helsley
2011-09-09 14:56 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-09-02 19:56 ` Serge Hallyn [this message]
2011-09-02 19:56 ` [PATCH 04/15] user_ns: convert fs/attr.c to targeted capabilities Serge Hallyn
2011-09-02 19:56 ` [PATCH 05/15] userns: clamp down users of cap_raised Serge Hallyn
2011-09-02 19:56 ` [PATCH 06/15] user namespace: make each net (net_ns) belong to a user_ns Serge Hallyn
2011-09-02 19:56 ` [PATCH 07/15] user namespace: use net->user_ns for some capable calls under net/ Serge Hallyn
2011-09-02 19:56 ` [PATCH 08/15] af_netlink.c: make netlink_capable userns-aware Serge Hallyn
2011-09-02 19:56 ` [PATCH 09/15] user ns: convert ipv6 to targeted capabilities Serge Hallyn
2011-09-02 19:56 ` [PATCH 10/15] net/core/scm.c: target capable() calls to user_ns owning the net_ns Serge Hallyn
2011-09-02 19:56 ` [PATCH 11/15] userns: make some net-sysfs capable calls targeted Serge Hallyn
2011-09-02 19:56 ` [PATCH 12/15] user_ns: target af_key capability check Serge Hallyn
2011-09-02 19:56 ` [PATCH 13/15] userns: net: make many network capable calls targeted Serge Hallyn
2011-09-02 19:56 ` [PATCH 14/15] net: pass user_ns to cap_netlink_recv() Serge Hallyn
2011-09-02 19:56 ` [PATCH 15/15] make kernel/signal.c user ns safe (v2) Serge Hallyn
2011-09-13 14:43 ` user namespaces v3: continue targetting capabilities Serge E. Hallyn
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