From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755847Ab2DHFNZ (ORCPT ); Sun, 8 Apr 2012 01:13:25 -0400 Received: from out01.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.231]:51575 "EHLO out01.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753632Ab2DHFMb (ORCPT ); Sun, 8 Apr 2012 01:12:31 -0400 From: "\"Eric W. Beiderman" To: Cc: , , Linux Containers , Andrew Morton , Linus Torvalds , Al Viro , Cyrill Gorcunov , "Eric W. Biederman" Date: Sat, 7 Apr 2012 22:15:34 -0700 Message-Id: <1333862139-31737-38-git-send-email-ebiederm@xmission.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.7.2.5 In-Reply-To: References: X-XM-SPF: eid=;;;mid=;;;hst=in02.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=98.207.153.68;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1/Ih9BWiNR57mj/jzknwExQ6rv0xbODChc= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 98.207.153.68 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Report: * 1.1 FH_FROMEML_NOTLD E-mail address doesn't have TLD (.com, etc.) * 1.5 XMNoVowels Alpha-numberic number with no vowels * 0.1 XMSubLong Long Subject * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG * -3.0 BAYES_00 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 0 to 1% * [score: 0.0000] * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa02 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1] * 2.2 XMSubMetaSxObfu_03 Obfuscated Sexy Noun-People * 1.6 XMSubMetaSx_00 1+ Sexy Words * 0.4 UNTRUSTED_Relay Comes from a non-trusted relay X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa02 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 X-Spam-Combo: ***; X-Spam-Relay-Country: ** Subject: [PATCH 38/43] userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriate X-Spam-Flag: No X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Fri, 06 Aug 2010 16:31:04 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Eric W. Biederman Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman --- fs/proc/array.c | 10 ++++++++-- fs/proc/base.c | 16 ++++++++-------- fs/proc/inode.c | 4 ++-- fs/proc/root.c | 2 +- include/linux/pid_namespace.h | 2 +- include/linux/proc_fs.h | 4 ++-- 6 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c index 36a0a91..dc4c5a7 100644 --- a/fs/proc/array.c +++ b/fs/proc/array.c @@ -191,8 +191,14 @@ static inline void task_state(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, task_tgid_nr_ns(p, ns), pid_nr_ns(pid, ns), ppid, tpid, - cred->uid, cred->euid, cred->suid, cred->fsuid, - cred->gid, cred->egid, cred->sgid, cred->fsgid); + from_kuid_munged(user_ns, cred->uid), + from_kuid_munged(user_ns, cred->euid), + from_kuid_munged(user_ns, cred->suid), + from_kuid_munged(user_ns, cred->fsuid), + from_kgid_munged(user_ns, cred->gid), + from_kgid_munged(user_ns, cred->egid), + from_kgid_munged(user_ns, cred->sgid), + from_kgid_munged(user_ns, cred->fsgid)); task_lock(p); if (p->files) diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 2ee514c..c479049 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -1562,8 +1562,8 @@ int pid_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry, struct kstat *stat) generic_fillattr(inode, stat); rcu_read_lock(); - stat->uid = 0; - stat->gid = 0; + stat->uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID; + stat->gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID; task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID); if (task) { if (!has_pid_permissions(pid, task, 2)) { @@ -1623,8 +1623,8 @@ int pid_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd) inode->i_gid = cred->egid; rcu_read_unlock(); } else { - inode->i_uid = 0; - inode->i_gid = 0; + inode->i_uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID; + inode->i_gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID; } inode->i_mode &= ~(S_ISUID | S_ISGID); security_task_to_inode(task, inode); @@ -1811,8 +1811,8 @@ static int tid_fd_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd) inode->i_gid = cred->egid; rcu_read_unlock(); } else { - inode->i_uid = 0; - inode->i_gid = 0; + inode->i_uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID; + inode->i_gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID; } inode->i_mode &= ~(S_ISUID | S_ISGID); security_task_to_inode(task, inode); @@ -2061,8 +2061,8 @@ static int map_files_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd) inode->i_gid = cred->egid; rcu_read_unlock(); } else { - inode->i_uid = 0; - inode->i_gid = 0; + inode->i_uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID; + inode->i_gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID; } security_task_to_inode(task, inode); status = 1; diff --git a/fs/proc/inode.c b/fs/proc/inode.c index 205c922..554ecc5 100644 --- a/fs/proc/inode.c +++ b/fs/proc/inode.c @@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ static int proc_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root) struct super_block *sb = root->d_sb; struct pid_namespace *pid = sb->s_fs_info; - if (pid->pid_gid) - seq_printf(seq, ",gid=%lu", (unsigned long)pid->pid_gid); + if (!gid_eq(pid->pid_gid, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID)) + seq_printf(seq, ",gid=%u", from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, pid->pid_gid)); if (pid->hide_pid != 0) seq_printf(seq, ",hidepid=%u", pid->hide_pid); diff --git a/fs/proc/root.c b/fs/proc/root.c index 46a15d8..df4e456 100644 --- a/fs/proc/root.c +++ b/fs/proc/root.c @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static int proc_parse_options(char *options, struct pid_namespace *pid) case Opt_gid: if (match_int(&args[0], &option)) return 0; - pid->pid_gid = option; + pid->pid_gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), option); break; case Opt_hidepid: if (match_int(&args[0], &option)) diff --git a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h index b067bd8..00474b0 100644 --- a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h +++ b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ struct pid_namespace { #ifdef CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT struct bsd_acct_struct *bacct; #endif - gid_t pid_gid; + kgid_t pid_gid; int hide_pid; int reboot; /* group exit code if this pidns was rebooted */ }; diff --git a/include/linux/proc_fs.h b/include/linux/proc_fs.h index 85c5073..3fd2e87 100644 --- a/include/linux/proc_fs.h +++ b/include/linux/proc_fs.h @@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ struct proc_dir_entry { unsigned int low_ino; umode_t mode; nlink_t nlink; - uid_t uid; - gid_t gid; + kuid_t uid; + kgid_t gid; loff_t size; const struct inode_operations *proc_iops; /* -- 1.7.2.5