mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
To: jmorris@namei.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, sfr@canb.auug.org.au,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Subject: [PATCH] seccomp: ignore secure_computing return values
Date: Mon, 16 Apr 2012 12:47:41 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1334598461-3160-1-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> (raw)

Unless an architecture selects CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER, it
is not required to respect the return value from secure_computing().

This change matches https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/4/16/14 exactly except
that it applies cleanly to security-next.  Because there is no
other difference than the alignment, I've kept Signed-off-by intact.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
---
 arch/microblaze/kernel/ptrace.c |    2 +-
 arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c       |    2 +-
 arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c    |    2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c       |    2 +-
 arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c      |    2 +-
 arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_64.c      |    2 +-
 arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace_64.c   |    2 +-
 7 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/microblaze/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/microblaze/kernel/ptrace.c
index 6eb2aa9..9e3ffc9 100644
--- a/arch/microblaze/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/microblaze/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	long ret = 0;
 
-	secure_computing(regs->r12);
+	(void)secure_computing(regs->r12);
 
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
 	    tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
index 7c24c29..4f83d73 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ static inline int audit_arch(void)
 asmlinkage void syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	/* do the secure computing check first */
-	secure_computing(regs->regs[2]);
+	(void)secure_computing(regs->regs[2]);
 
 	if (!(current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED))
 		goto out;
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c
index 8d8e028..53cebc4 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -1710,7 +1710,7 @@ long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	long ret = 0;
 
-	secure_computing(regs->gpr[0]);
+	(void)secure_computing(regs->gpr[0]);
 
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
 	    tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
index 02f300f..96e0dea 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	long ret = 0;
 
 	/* Do the secure computing check first. */
-	secure_computing(regs->gprs[2]);
+	(void)secure_computing(regs->gprs[2]);
 
 	/*
 	 * The sysc_tracesys code in entry.S stored the system
diff --git a/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c b/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c
index 9698671..cf55945 100644
--- a/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c
+++ b/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c
@@ -503,7 +503,7 @@ asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	long ret = 0;
 
-	secure_computing(regs->regs[0]);
+	(void)secure_computing(regs->regs[0]);
 
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
 	    tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
diff --git a/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_64.c b/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_64.c
index bc81e07..3d3600f 100644
--- a/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_64.c
+++ b/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_64.c
@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ asmlinkage long long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	long long ret = 0;
 
-	secure_computing(regs->regs[9]);
+	(void)secure_computing(regs->regs[9]);
 
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
 	    tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace_64.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace_64.c
index 6f97c07..6ddec1f 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace_64.c
@@ -1062,7 +1062,7 @@ asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	int ret = 0;
 
 	/* do the secure computing check first */
-	secure_computing(regs->u_regs[UREG_G1]);
+	(void)secure_computing(regs->u_regs[UREG_G1]);
 
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE))
 		ret = tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs);
-- 
1.7.5.4


             reply	other threads:[~2012-04-16 17:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-04-16 17:47 Will Drewry [this message]
2012-04-16 22:47 ` Stephen Rothwell
2012-04-16 22:57   ` Will Drewry

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1334598461-3160-1-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org \
    --to=wad@chromium.org \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=sfr@canb.auug.org.au \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®