From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932330Ab2HOUCc (ORCPT ); Wed, 15 Aug 2012 16:02:32 -0400 Received: from mail.windriver.com ([147.11.1.11]:37348 "EHLO mail.windriver.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S932106Ab2HOTwm (ORCPT ); Wed, 15 Aug 2012 15:52:42 -0400 From: Paul Gortmaker To: , CC: "Theodore Ts'o" , "H. Peter Anvin" , Paul Gortmaker Subject: [v2.6.34-stable 148/165] random: Use arch-specific RNG to initialize the entropy store Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2012 15:48:12 -0400 Message-ID: <1345060109-9187-149-git-send-email-paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.7.12.rc2 In-Reply-To: <1345060109-9187-1-git-send-email-paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> References: <1345060109-9187-1-git-send-email-paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Theodore Ts'o ------------------- This is a commit scheduled for the next v2.6.34 longterm release. http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/paulg/longterm-queue-2.6.34.git If you see a problem with using this for longterm, please comment. ------------------- commit 3e88bdff1c65145f7ba297ccec69c774afe4c785 upstream. If there is an architecture-specific random number generator (such as RDRAND for Intel architectures), use it to initialize /dev/random's entropy stores. Even in the worst case, if RDRAND is something like AES(NSA_KEY, counter++), it won't hurt, and it will definitely help against any other adversaries. Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1324589281-31931-1-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker --- drivers/char/random.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index ed86cae..4874f55 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -958,6 +958,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes); */ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r) { + int i; ktime_t now; unsigned long flags; @@ -967,6 +968,11 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r) now = ktime_get_real(); mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now)); + for (i = r->poolinfo->poolwords; i; i--) { + if (!arch_get_random_long(&flags)) + break; + mix_pool_bytes(r, &flags, sizeof(flags)); + } mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname()))); } -- 1.7.12.rc2