From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1757338Ab2HOUgt (ORCPT ); Wed, 15 Aug 2012 16:36:49 -0400 Received: from mail.windriver.com ([147.11.1.11]:36397 "EHLO mail.windriver.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1756253Ab2HOTtO (ORCPT ); Wed, 15 Aug 2012 15:49:14 -0400 From: Paul Gortmaker To: , CC: Eric Paris , James Morris , Paul Gortmaker Subject: [v2.6.34-stable 018/165] fcaps: clear the same personality flags as suid when fcaps are used Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2012 15:46:02 -0400 Message-ID: <1345060109-9187-19-git-send-email-paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.7.12.rc2 In-Reply-To: <1345060109-9187-1-git-send-email-paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> References: <1345060109-9187-1-git-send-email-paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Eric Paris ------------------- This is a commit scheduled for the next v2.6.34 longterm release. http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/paulg/longterm-queue-2.6.34.git If you see a problem with using this for longterm, please comment. ------------------- commit d52fc5dde171f030170a6cb78034d166b13c9445 upstream. If a process increases permissions using fcaps all of the dangerous personality flags which are cleared for suid apps should also be cleared. Thus programs given priviledge with fcaps will continue to have address space randomization enabled even if the parent tried to disable it to make it easier to attack. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker --- security/commoncap.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 3927418..c325d38 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -466,6 +466,11 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) } skip: + /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */ + if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) + bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; + + /* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit */ -- 1.7.12.rc2