From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753579Ab2ITBxJ (ORCPT ); Wed, 19 Sep 2012 21:53:09 -0400 Received: from out03.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.233]:58535 "EHLO out03.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753547Ab2ITBxA (ORCPT ); Wed, 19 Sep 2012 21:53:00 -0400 From: "Eric W. Biederman" To: Cc: , Serge Hallyn , Linux Containers , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Jan Kara , Dave Chinner , Al Viro , Eric Paris , David Miller , "Eric W. Biederman" Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2012 18:52:06 -0700 Message-Id: <1348105949-25454-4-git-send-email-ebiederm@xmission.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.7.5.4 In-Reply-To: <1348105949-25454-1-git-send-email-ebiederm@xmission.com> References: <871uhx1n71.fsf@xmission.com> <1348105949-25454-1-git-send-email-ebiederm@xmission.com> X-XM-SPF: eid=;;;mid=;;;hst=in02.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=98.207.153.68;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1+xSKQ/41NfhlCEmKQ768iF0v+xhHgi9g0= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 98.207.153.68 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 1.5 XMNoVowels Alpha-numberic number with no vowels * 0.1 XMSubLong Long Subject * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG * -3.0 BAYES_00 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 0 to 1% * [score: 0.0021] * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa02 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] * 0.0 T_TooManySym_01 4+ unique symbols in subject * 0.0 T_TooManySym_03 6+ unique symbols in subject * 0.0 T_TooManySym_02 5+ unique symbols in subject X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa02 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: ; X-Spam-Relay-Country: Subject: [PATCH 04/27] audit: Use current instead of NETLINK_CREDS() in audit_filter X-Spam-Flag: No X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Fri, 06 Aug 2010 16:31:04 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: "Eric W. Biederman" Get caller process uid and gid and pid values from the current task instead of the NETLINK_CB. This is simpler than passing NETLINK_CREDS from from audit_receive_msg to audit_filter_user_rules and avoid the chance of being hit by the occassional bugs in netlink uid/gid credential passing. This is a safe changes because all netlink requests are processed in the task of the sending process. Cc: Al Viro Cc: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" --- include/linux/audit.h | 2 +- kernel/audit.c | 2 +- kernel/auditfilter.c | 13 ++++++------- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index 36abf2a..9c9af0e 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ extern void audit_log_secctx(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 secid); extern int audit_update_lsm_rules(void); /* Private API (for audit.c only) */ -extern int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb); +extern int audit_filter_user(void); extern int audit_filter_type(int type); extern int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data, size_t datasz, uid_t loginuid, diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 7b7268e..fecb150 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -744,7 +744,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) if (!audit_enabled && msg_type != AUDIT_USER_AVC) return 0; - err = audit_filter_user(&NETLINK_CB(skb)); + err = audit_filter_user(); if (err == 1) { err = 0; if (msg_type == AUDIT_USER_TTY) { diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index a6c3f1a..b754f43 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -1236,8 +1236,7 @@ int audit_compare_dname_path(const char *dname, const char *path, return strncmp(p, dname, dlen); } -static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, - struct audit_krule *rule, +static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct audit_krule *rule, enum audit_state *state) { int i; @@ -1249,13 +1248,13 @@ static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_PID: - result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.pid, f->op, f->val); + result = audit_comparator(task_pid_vnr(current), f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_UID: - result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.uid, f->op, f->val); + result = audit_comparator(current_uid(), f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_GID: - result = audit_comparator(cb->creds.gid, f->op, f->val); + result = audit_comparator(current_gid(), f->op, f->val); break; case AUDIT_LOGINUID: result = audit_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(current), @@ -1287,7 +1286,7 @@ static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, return 1; } -int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb) +int audit_filter_user(void) { enum audit_state state = AUDIT_DISABLED; struct audit_entry *e; @@ -1295,7 +1294,7 @@ int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb) rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) { - if (audit_filter_user_rules(cb, &e->rule, &state)) { + if (audit_filter_user_rules(&e->rule, &state)) { if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) ret = 0; break; -- 1.7.5.4