From: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: criu@openvz.org, Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] proc: don't show nonexistent capabilities
Date: Wed, 3 Oct 2012 00:30:32 +0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1349209832-279922-1-git-send-email-avagin@openvz.org> (raw)
Without this patch it is really hard to interpret a bounding set,
if CAP_LAST_CAP is unknown for a current kernel.
Non-existant capabilities can not be deleted from a bounding set
with help of prctl.
E.g.: Here are two examples without/with this patch.
CapBnd: ffffffe0fdecffff
CapBnd: 00000000fdecffff
I suggest to hide non-existent capabilities. Here is two reasons.
* It's logically and easier for using.
* It helps to checkpoint-restore capabilities of tasks, because tasks
can be restored on another kernel, where CAP_LAST_CAP is bigger.
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
---
include/linux/capability.h | 3 ++-
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index d10b7ed..1642778 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -420,7 +420,8 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
#else /* HAND-CODED capability initializers */
# define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }})
-# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }})
+# define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, \
+ CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LAST_CAP + 1) - 1 } })
# define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \
| CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \
CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } })
--
1.7.1
next reply other threads:[~2012-10-02 20:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-10-02 20:30 Andrew Vagin [this message]
2012-10-03 16:24 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2012-10-04 21:42 ` Andrey Wagin
2012-10-05 14:05 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2012-10-05 15:54 ` Andrew G. Morgan
2012-10-05 16:46 ` Serge Hallyn
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