> bpf: Add user memory access kfuncs for linux_binprm > > When security_bprm_check runs, the arg and env strings for the exec have > been copied into bprm->mm. The new address space has not been associated > yet with a task_struct until exec_mmap(), so existing BPF user memory > helpers can only read from the calling task's old address space. > > This patch adds bpf_copy_from_user_bprm() and > bpf_copy_from_user_bprm_str() kfuncs. Both use the mm_struct provided by > struct linux_binprm. This isn't a bug, but could the opener be reworded to avoid "This patch adds"? Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst asks for imperative mood ("Add bpf_copy_from_user_bprm() ..."). > Register these kfuncs on both MMU and NOMMU systems. On NOMMU systems, > exec arguments are staged in bprm->page[] rather than mapped in bprm->mm, > so the kfuncs return -EOPNOTSUPP. > > bpf_copy_from_user_bprm() has similar semantics as > bpf_copy_from_user_task(). bpf_copy_from_user_bprm_str() copies one > NUL-terminated string and returns its size including the NUL terminator. > It accepts BPF_F_PAD_ZEROS to clear unused destination bytes on success. > > This patch registers both kfuncs with KF_SLEEPABLE because accessing the > remote address space can fault. This allows BPF LSM programs attached to > security_bprm_check to read arguments beginning at bprm->p and reject an > exec based on its command-line arguments. Same for "This patch registers" here -- would "Register both kfuncs with KF_SLEEPABLE ..." fit better? > Signed-off-by: Anastasios Papagiannis --- AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug. See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/32375104040