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From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	pjones@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, dhowells@redhat.com,
	jwboyer@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] binfmt_elf: Verify signature of signed elf binary
Date: Mon, 21 Jan 2013 13:44:53 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1358793893.2406.143.camel@falcor1.watson.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130121154501.GA27617@redhat.com>

On Mon, 2013-01-21 at 10:45 -0500, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 20, 2013 at 12:20:00PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Thu, 2013-01-17 at 12:36 -0500, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > > On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 11:32:45AM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > 
> > > [..]
> > > > > > At this point, why would you want yet another method for signing files?
> > > > > 
> > > > > Are you saying that append signature instead of putting them in a section
> > > > > or are you saying that just use IMA.
> > > > > 
> > > > > - For the first, I am fine with appending too if that works better. So
> > > > >   what's wrong with current implementation. Just because we append the
> > > > >   signatures in case of modules, we should follow the same thing for
> > > > >   executables too?
> > > > 
> > > > No, I was saying that if this patch set were to be upstreamed, then the
> > > > signature verification, at least for ELF modules and ELF executables,
> > > > should be the same.  The patch would then be a lot smaller.
> > > 
> > > I don't think that patch is lot smaller. Initially I had written code
> > > where signatures were appended. Parsing the signature is little different
> > > from module. In case of modules, whole file is already in memory and
> > > in case of executables, we are reading selected portions of file in
> > > buffer. 
> > 
> > Have you looked at the original kernel module signature verification
> > code as posted by David?  It did something similar, but was not
> > upstreamed.
> 
> I have. I think keeping code in a section makes stripping of section
> easy. Anyway, these sections are not loaded in memory at file exec
> time so it should be fine.
> 
> So appending signature is easy and I can change the implementation to
> do it like modules.
> 
> But please give a more stronger reason that why it should be appened
> to executable then put in a section.

There are two existing upstreamed methods for verifying the integrity of
files.  One uses a file descriptor, the other is memory based, for the
specific use case, where a file descriptor is not available.  The real
question is what benefit there is to adding another method?  That
question needs to be addressed in the patch description.

thanks,

Mimi


  reply	other threads:[~2013-01-21 18:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-01-15 21:34 [PATCH 0/3] ELF executable signing and verification Vivek Goyal
2013-01-15 21:34 ` [PATCH 1/3] module: export couple of functions for use in process signature verification Vivek Goyal
2013-01-15 21:34 ` [PATCH 2/3] binfmt_elf: Verify signature of signed elf binary Vivek Goyal
2013-01-16  4:30   ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-01-16  4:55     ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-16  7:10       ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-01-16 14:00         ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-16 14:48           ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-16 15:33             ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-16 15:54               ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-16 17:24                 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-16 18:21                   ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-16 18:45                     ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-16 18:57                       ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-16 19:37                         ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-16 19:47                           ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-16 20:25                             ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-16 21:55                               ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-17  8:37                             ` Elena Reshetova
2013-01-17 14:39                     ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2013-01-17 14:35                 ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2013-01-16 16:34               ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-16 18:08                 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-16 18:28                   ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-16 19:24                     ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-16 21:53                       ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-17 14:58                         ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2013-01-17 15:06                           ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2013-01-17 15:21                             ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-17 15:18                           ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-17 16:27                             ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2013-01-17 20:33                             ` Frank Ch. Eigler
2013-01-17 20:55                               ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-17 21:46                                 ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2013-01-17 21:52                                   ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-20 16:36                                     ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-21 16:42       ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-21 18:30         ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-16 22:35   ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-16 22:51     ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-16 23:16       ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-01-17 15:37   ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-17 15:51     ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-17 16:32       ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-17 17:01         ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2013-01-17 17:03           ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2013-01-17 17:42           ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-17 17:36         ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-20 17:20           ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-21 15:45             ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-21 18:44               ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2013-01-20 16:17         ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-01-20 16:55           ` Mimi Zohar
2013-01-20 17:00             ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-01-15 21:34 ` [PATCH 3/3] binfmt_elf: Do not allow exec() if signed binary has intepreter Vivek Goyal
2013-01-15 21:37 ` [PATCH 4/3] User space utility "signelf" to sign elf executable Vivek Goyal
2013-01-15 22:27 ` [PATCH 0/3] ELF executable signing and verification richard -rw- weinberger
2013-01-15 23:15   ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-15 23:17     ` richard -rw- weinberger
2013-01-17 16:22 ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2013-01-17 17:25   ` Vivek Goyal
2013-01-22  4:22 ` Rusty Russell

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