From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1757442Ab3A1Qmx (ORCPT ); Mon, 28 Jan 2013 11:42:53 -0500 Received: from cavan.codon.org.uk ([93.93.128.6]:34027 "EHLO cavan.codon.org.uk" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755553Ab3A1Qmu (ORCPT ); Mon, 28 Jan 2013 11:42:50 -0500 From: Matthew Garrett To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 00/15] Secure boot policy support Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2013 11:42:24 -0500 Message-Id: <1359391359-25783-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.0.2 X-SA-Do-Not-Run: Yes X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 2001:470:1f07:1371:6267:20ff:fec3:2318 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: matthew.garrett@nebula.com X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on cavan.codon.org.uk); SAEximRunCond expanded to false Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Secure boot makes it possible to ensure that the on-disk representation of the kernel hasn't been modified. This can be sidestepped if the in-memory representation can be trivially altered. We currently have a large number of interfaces that permit root to perform effectively arbitrary modifications to the kernel, so this patchset introduces a new capability ("CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL") that controls whether or not these features are available. The aim is for this to be useful in any other situations where kernel integrity can be assured by some other mechanism rather than special casing UEFI.