From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.hengli.com.au>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
Anton Vorontsov <cbou@mail.ru>,
Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
Subject: [PATCH 0/8] format string usage clean ups
Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2013 13:52:17 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1370551945-8444-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
Hello,
This series is a result of an audit of format string uses in the
kernel. Of two exploitable flaws, the first fix is now in the wireless
tree:
http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/linville/wireless.git/commit/?id=9538cbaab6e8b8046039b4b2eb6c9d614dc782bd
The second fix is here as patch 1 ("block: do not pass disk names as format strings"). All the rest are either interface clean ups or
preventative measures to avoid accidents in the future.
There is still more needed before we can do something like this in
the Makefile:
+# Enable format-security when it can stop the build, otherwise disable.
+KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,\
+ -Wformat -Wformat-security -Werror=format-security,\
+ -Wno-format-security)
but I think this series covers the majority of potentially sensitive
exposed infrastructure.
Thanks,
-Kees
next reply other threads:[~2013-06-06 20:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-06-06 20:52 Kees Cook [this message]
2013-06-06 20:52 ` [PATCH 1/8] block: do not pass disk names as format strings Kees Cook
2013-06-06 20:52 ` [PATCH 2/8] kobject: sanitize argument for format string Kees Cook
2013-06-06 20:52 ` [PATCH 3/8] crypto: " Kees Cook
2013-06-06 20:52 ` [PATCH 4/8] power: ensure event is not used as " Kees Cook
2013-06-07 0:39 ` Anton Vorontsov
2013-06-07 1:25 ` [PATCH] power: Add missing newlines, fix a couple of typos, add pr_fmt Joe Perches
2013-06-07 18:31 ` Kees Cook
2013-06-09 17:10 ` Anton Vorontsov
2013-06-06 20:52 ` [PATCH 5/8] device: avoid format string in dev_set_name Kees Cook
2013-06-07 23:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2013-06-06 20:52 ` [PATCH 6/8] workqueue: avoid format strings in names Kees Cook
2013-06-06 20:52 ` [PATCH 7/8] kthread: avoid parsing names as format strings Kees Cook
2013-06-06 20:52 ` [PATCH 8/8] isdn: clean up debug format string usage Kees Cook
2013-06-07 18:32 ` Kees Cook
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