From: Tomasz Stanislawski <t.stanislaws@samsung.com>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: m.szyprowski@samsung.com, kyungmin.park@samsung.com,
r.krypa@samsung.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
casey@schaufler-ca.com,
Tomasz Stanislawski <t.stanislaws@samsung.com>
Subject: [RFC 0/5] Optimizations for memory handling in smk_write_rules_list()
Date: Thu, 13 Jun 2013 17:29:07 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1371137352-31273-1-git-send-email-t.stanislaws@samsung.com> (raw)
Hi everyone,
This patchset focuses on optimizations for memory handling done in
smk_write_rules_list(). Basically, all the patches try to avoid calling
kmalloc(). I expect that there might be some controversy about these patches.
The first patch introduces a limit for length if SMACK rules in 'long' format.
The limit was chosen to handle two long labels (SMK_LONGLABEL) plus access
flags plus two separators. Passing a longer rule is likely an error due to too
long labels or having a rule string that contains a ridiculous amount of
whitespaces. Introducing the limit helps to protect the kernel if userspace
(maybe privileged but still userspace) passed too large write(). Calling
kmalloc() for a large size wull trigger a significant number of page reclaim
actions or even OOM. Moreover, such an allocation is very likely to fail and
it should be avoided. Calling vmalloc() would be a much safer idea. Anyway,
the buffer is valid only during smk_write_rules_list() therefore allocating a
buffer on stack simplifies memory management.
The second patch simplifies memory management in smk_parse_long_rule() and
speeds up parsing.
The third patch fixes a potential memory leak in smk_write_rules_list(). I was
not able to find any reference to smack_parsed_rule after the function is
finished. Notice that smk_user_access() does not use dynamic any allocation for
smack_parsed_rule. I kindly ask you to review the patch.
The last two patches uses kmem_cache to avoid wasting memory for padding bytes
for the most frequently allocated structures in SMACK.
The patchset provides a small but observable performance improvement of SMACK
initialization phase. The results below were collected for 17K rules and 500
labels using command 'time smackctl apply'.
| Run1 | Run2 | Run3 | Run4 | Run5 | Avg | Gain [ms]
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ref | 1.177 | 1.174 | 1.177 | 1.179 | 1.171 | 1.176 | 0
patch1 | 1.165 | 1.177 | 1.178 | 1.167 | 1.175 | 1.172 | 3
patch2 | 1.145 | 1.142 | 1.140 | 1.139 | 1.137 | 1.141 | 35
patch3 | 1.117 | 1.128 | 1.126 | 1.129 | 1.124 | 1.125 | 51
patch4 | 1.097 | 1.120 | 1.119 | 1.112 | 1.120 | 1.114 | 62
patch5 | 1.092 | 1.102 | 1.090 | 1.108 | 1.091 | 1.097 | 79
Every patch introduces a tiny bit of speed improvement. Total gain is 7%.
It will increase to 15% if the patch for label hashing [1] is applied.
I hope you find this patchset useful.
Regards,
Tomasz Stanislawski
References:
[1] http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.lsm/19609
Tomasz Stanislawski (5):
security: smack: avoid kmalloc allocations while loading a rule
string
security: smack: avoid kmalloc() in smk_parse_long_rule()
security: smack: fix memleak in smk_write_rules_list()
security: smack: add kmem_cache for smack_rule allocations
security: smack: add kmem_cache for smack_master_list allocations
security/smack/smack.h | 10 ++++
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 19 ++++++-
security/smack/smackfs.c | 122 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
3 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)
--
1.7.9.5
next reply other threads:[~2013-06-13 15:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-06-13 15:29 Tomasz Stanislawski [this message]
2013-06-13 15:29 ` [RFC 1/5] security: smack: avoid kmalloc allocations while loading a rule string Tomasz Stanislawski
2013-06-15 19:32 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-06-17 11:24 ` Tomasz Stanislawski
2013-06-17 22:38 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-06-13 15:29 ` [RFC 2/5] security: smack: avoid kmalloc() in smk_parse_long_rule() Tomasz Stanislawski
2013-06-15 19:41 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-06-13 15:29 ` [RFC 3/5] security: smack: fix memleak in smk_write_rules_list() Tomasz Stanislawski
2013-06-15 19:54 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-06-13 15:29 ` [RFC 4/5] security: smack: add kmem_cache for smack_rule allocations Tomasz Stanislawski
2013-06-15 20:00 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-06-13 15:29 ` [RFC 5/5] security: smack: add kmem_cache for smack_master_list allocations Tomasz Stanislawski
2013-06-15 20:08 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-06-19 14:08 ` [PATCH] security: smack: fix memleak in smk_write_rules_list() Tomasz Stanislawski
2013-06-28 19:33 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-08-01 20:01 ` Casey Schaufler
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