mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keescook@chromium.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, hpa@zytor.com,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Subject: [PATCH 04/12] x86: Lock down IO port access when securelevel is enabled
Date: Mon,  9 Sep 2013 11:49:38 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1378741786-18430-5-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1378741786-18430-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com>

IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO register
space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary DMA, so lock
it down when securelevel is set.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 5 +++--
 drivers/char/mem.c       | 7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
index 4ddaf66..2a9ccd4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/thread_info.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/bitmap.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <asm/syscalls.h>
 
 /*
@@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsigned long num, int turn_on)
 
 	if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+	if (turn_on && (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || (get_securelevel() > 0)))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/*
@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(iopl, unsigned int, level)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	/* Trying to gain more privileges? */
 	if (level > old) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || (get_securelevel() > 0))
 			return -EPERM;
 	}
 	regs->flags = (regs->flags & ~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) | (level << 12);
diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
index f895a8c..741f536 100644
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
 #include <linux/aio.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
@@ -545,6 +546,9 @@ static ssize_t read_port(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 	unsigned long i = *ppos;
 	char __user *tmp = buf;
 
+	if (get_securelevel() > 0)
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buf, count))
 		return -EFAULT;
 	while (count-- > 0 && i < 65536) {
@@ -563,6 +567,9 @@ static ssize_t write_port(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	unsigned long i = *ppos;
 	const char __user *tmp = buf;
 
+	if (get_securelevel() > 0)
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buf, count))
 		return -EFAULT;
 	while (count-- > 0 && i < 65536) {
-- 
1.8.3.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2013-09-09 15:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-09-09 15:49 [PATCH 00/12] One more attempt at useful kernel lockdown Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 01/12] Add BSD-style securelevel support Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 16:27   ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-09 16:30     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 16:42       ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-09 16:44         ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 16:51           ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-09 16:55             ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 18:31     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 02/12] Enforce module signatures when securelevel is greater than 0 Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 03/12] PCI: Lock down BAR access when securelevel is enabled Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 15:49 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2013-09-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 05/12] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when securelevel is set Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 06/12] acpi: Limit access to custom_method if " Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 07/12] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter when " Matthew Garrett
2013-11-26 12:54   ` Josh Boyer
2013-09-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 08/12] kexec: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 09/12] uswsusp: Disable when securelevel is set Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 10/12] x86: Restrict MSR access " Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 11/12] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 15:49 ` [PATCH 12/12] Add option to automatically set securelevel when in Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 17:18 ` [PATCH 00/12] One more attempt at useful kernel lockdown Valdis.Kletnieks
2013-09-09 17:24   ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 18:25   ` David Lang
2013-09-09 18:28     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 18:40       ` David Lang
2013-09-09 18:42         ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 18:53           ` David Lang
2013-09-09 19:06             ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 19:59               ` David Lang
2013-09-09 20:06                 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 20:15                   ` David Lang
2013-09-09 20:17                     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 19:01     ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2013-09-09 19:08       ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 19:41       ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-09 19:52         ` Josh Boyer
2013-09-09 19:56           ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-09 19:58             ` Josh Boyer
2013-09-09 20:02               ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-09 20:10           ` David Lang
2013-09-09 20:13             ` Josh Boyer
2013-09-09 23:02     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-09 23:19       ` David Lang
2013-09-09 23:20         ` Kees Cook
2013-09-09 23:30           ` James Bottomley
2013-09-09 23:34             ` Kees Cook
2013-09-10  0:53         ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-10  2:44           ` David Lang
2013-09-10  2:55             ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-10  3:09               ` David Lang
2013-09-10  3:53                 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-10 17:23                   ` Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
2013-09-10 18:26                     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-09-10 18:29                       ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-10 18:51                         ` gregkh
2013-09-10 18:55                           ` Kees Cook
2013-09-10 19:17                             ` David Lang
2013-09-10 19:44                               ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-10 23:43                                 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-09-10 23:48                                   ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-10 23:55                                     ` Mimi Zohar
2013-09-10 23:58                                       ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-09-10 18:48                       ` Kees Cook
2013-09-11  9:32                       ` joeyli
2013-09-09 20:30 ` Mimi Zohar

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1378741786-18430-5-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com \
    --to=matthew.garrett@nebula.com \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®