From: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
To: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>, Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>,
sedat.dilek@gmail.com,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] ipc,shm: fix race with selinux
Date: Sun, 15 Sep 2013 20:04:34 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1379300677-24188-2-git-send-email-davidlohr@hp.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1379300677-24188-1-git-send-email-davidlohr@hp.com>
Currently, we check shm security only under RCU. Since selinux
can free the security structure, through selinux_sem_free_security(),
we can run into a use-after-free condition. This bug affects both
shmctl and shmat syscalls.
The fix is obvious, make sure we hold the kern_ipc_perm.lock while
performing these security checks.
Reported-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
---
ipc/shm.c | 23 ++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ipc/shm.c b/ipc/shm.c
index 2821cdf..bc3e897 100644
--- a/ipc/shm.c
+++ b/ipc/shm.c
@@ -781,18 +781,17 @@ static int shmctl_down(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int shmid, int cmd,
shp = container_of(ipcp, struct shmid_kernel, shm_perm);
+ ipc_lock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
err = security_shm_shmctl(shp, cmd);
if (err)
- goto out_unlock1;
+ goto out_unlock0;
switch (cmd) {
case IPC_RMID:
- ipc_lock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
/* do_shm_rmid unlocks the ipc object and rcu */
do_shm_rmid(ns, ipcp);
goto out_up;
case IPC_SET:
- ipc_lock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
err = ipc_update_perm(&shmid64.shm_perm, ipcp);
if (err)
goto out_unlock0;
@@ -800,7 +799,6 @@ static int shmctl_down(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int shmid, int cmd,
break;
default:
err = -EINVAL;
- goto out_unlock1;
}
out_unlock0:
@@ -895,9 +893,12 @@ static int shmctl_nolock(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int shmid,
if (ipcperms(ns, &shp->shm_perm, S_IRUGO))
goto out_unlock;
+ ipc_lock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
err = security_shm_shmctl(shp, cmd);
- if (err)
+ if (err) {
+ ipc_unlock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
goto out_unlock;
+ }
memset(&tbuf, 0, sizeof(tbuf));
kernel_to_ipc64_perm(&shp->shm_perm, &tbuf.shm_perm);
@@ -909,6 +910,7 @@ static int shmctl_nolock(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int shmid,
tbuf.shm_lpid = shp->shm_lprid;
tbuf.shm_nattch = shp->shm_nattch;
rcu_read_unlock();
+ ipc_unlock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
if (copy_shmid_to_user(buf, &tbuf, version))
err = -EFAULT;
@@ -960,11 +962,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(shmctl, int, shmid, int, cmd, struct shmid_ds __user *, buf)
}
audit_ipc_obj(&(shp->shm_perm));
+
+ ipc_lock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
err = security_shm_shmctl(shp, cmd);
if (err)
- goto out_unlock1;
+ goto out_unlock0;
- ipc_lock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
kuid_t euid = current_euid();
err = -EPERM;
@@ -1089,11 +1092,13 @@ long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg, ulong *raddr,
if (ipcperms(ns, &shp->shm_perm, acc_mode))
goto out_unlock;
+ ipc_lock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
err = security_shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
- if (err)
+ if (err) {
+ ipc_unlock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
goto out_unlock;
+ }
- ipc_lock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
path = shp->shm_file->f_path;
path_get(&path);
shp->shm_nattch++;
--
1.7.11.7
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-09-16 3:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-09-16 3:04 [PATCH 0/4] ipc: shm and msg fixes Davidlohr Bueso
2013-09-16 3:04 ` Davidlohr Bueso [this message]
2013-09-16 9:23 ` [PATCH 1/4] ipc,shm: fix race with selinux Manfred Spraul
2013-09-16 3:04 ` [PATCH 2/4] ipc,shm: prevent race with rmid in shmat(2) Davidlohr Bueso
2013-09-27 5:45 ` Manfred Spraul
2013-09-27 23:40 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2013-09-16 3:04 ` [PATCH 3/4] ipc,msg: fix race with selinux Davidlohr Bueso
2013-09-16 3:04 ` [PATCH 4/4] ipc,msg: prevent race with rmid in msgsnd,msgrcv Davidlohr Bueso
2013-09-27 5:50 ` Manfred Spraul
2013-09-19 21:22 ` [PATCH 0/4] ipc: shm and msg fixes Davidlohr Bueso
2013-09-20 18:08 ` Eric Paris
2013-09-21 18:30 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2013-09-21 18:58 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-09-23 6:42 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2013-09-23 16:54 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-09-24 0:04 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2013-09-24 1:22 ` Linus Torvalds
2013-09-24 8:49 ` Manfred Spraul
2013-09-24 9:05 ` Manfred Spraul
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