From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755495Ab3JGOiy (ORCPT ); Mon, 7 Oct 2013 10:38:54 -0400 Received: from mail-ea0-f181.google.com ([209.85.215.181]:33898 "EHLO mail-ea0-f181.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754720Ab3JGOix (ORCPT ); Mon, 7 Oct 2013 10:38:53 -0400 From: Stefan Beller To: tytso@mit.edu, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Stefan Beller Subject: [PATCH] random.c: fix a typo in comments Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 16:38:49 +0200 Message-Id: <1381156729-1814-1-git-send-email-stefanbeller@googlemail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.4.1.469.gb38b9db Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Also removes (trailing) tabs from an empty line. Signed-off-by: Stefan Beller --- drivers/char/random.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 7737b5b..a8457f2 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ static struct poolinfo { * modulo the generator polymnomial. Now, for random primitive polynomials, * this is a universal class of hash functions, meaning that the chance * of a collision is limited by the attacker's knowledge of the generator - * polynomail, so if it is chosen at random, an attacker can never force + * polynomial, so if it is chosen at random, an attacker can never force * a collision. Here, we use a fixed polynomial, but we *can* assume that * ###--> it is unknown to the processes generating the input entropy. <-### * Because of this important property, this is a good, collision-resistant @@ -1078,7 +1078,7 @@ void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes) if (!arch_get_random_long(&v)) break; - + memcpy(p, &v, chunk); p += chunk; nbytes -= chunk; -- 1.8.4.1.469.gb38b9db