From: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH] fs: fix i_writecount on shmem and friends
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 2014 16:16:38 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1393859798-1407-1-git-send-email-dh.herrmann@gmail.com> (raw)
VM_DENYWRITE currently relies on i_writecount. Unless there's an active
writable reference to an inode, VM_DENYWRITE is not allowed.
Unfortunately, alloc_file() does not increase i_writecount, therefore,
does not prevent a following VM_DENYWRITE even though the new file might
have been opened with FMODE_WRITE. However, callers of alloc_file() expect
the file object to be fully instantiated so they can call fput() on it. We
could now either fix all callers to do an get_write_access() if opened
with FMODE_WRITE, or simply fix alloc_file() to do that. I chose the
latter.
Note that this bug allows some rather subtle misbehavior. The following
sequence of calls should work just fine, but currently fails:
int p[2], orig, ro, rw;
char buf[128];
pipe(p);
sprintf(buf, "/proc/self/fd/%d", p[1]);
ro = open("/proc/self/fd/$orig", O_RDONLY);
close(p[1]);
rw = open("/proc/self/fd/$ro", O_RDWR);
The final open() cannot succeed as close(p[1]) caused an integer underflow
on i_writecount, effectively causing VM_DENYWRITE on the inode. The open
will fail with -ETXTBUSY.
It's a rather odd sequence of calls and given that open() doesn't use
alloc_file() (and thus not affected by this bug), it's rather unlikely
that this is a serious issue. But stuff like anon_inode shares a *single*
inode across a huge set of interfaces. If any of these is broken like
pipe(), it will affect all of these (ranging from dma-buf to epoll).
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
---
fs/file_table.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c
index 5fff903..e3c8dd0 100644
--- a/fs/file_table.c
+++ b/fs/file_table.c
@@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ struct file *alloc_file(struct path *path, fmode_t mode,
const struct file_operations *fop)
{
struct file *file;
+ int error;
file = get_empty_filp();
if (IS_ERR(file))
@@ -178,15 +179,23 @@ struct file *alloc_file(struct path *path, fmode_t mode,
file->f_mode = mode;
file->f_op = fop;
- /*
- * These mounts don't really matter in practice
- * for r/o bind mounts. They aren't userspace-
- * visible. We do this for consistency, and so
- * that we can do debugging checks at __fput()
- */
- if ((mode & FMODE_WRITE) && !special_file(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) {
- file_take_write(file);
- WARN_ON(mnt_clone_write(path->mnt));
+ if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
+ error = get_write_access(path->dentry->d_inode);
+ if (error) {
+ put_filp(file);
+ return ERR_PTR(error);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * These mounts don't really matter in practice
+ * for r/o bind mounts. They aren't userspace-
+ * visible. We do this for consistency, and so
+ * that we can do debugging checks at __fput()
+ */
+ if (!special_file(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) {
+ file_take_write(file);
+ WARN_ON(mnt_clone_write(path->mnt));
+ }
}
if ((mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
i_readcount_inc(path->dentry->d_inode);
--
1.9.0
next reply other threads:[~2014-03-03 15:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-03-03 15:16 David Herrmann [this message]
2014-03-11 19:05 ` Linus Torvalds
2014-03-12 18:19 ` Al Viro
2014-03-12 22:30 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-13 0:37 ` Al Viro
2014-03-13 11:03 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 11:13 ` David Herrmann
2014-03-13 4:08 ` NeilBrown
2014-03-13 4:29 ` Al Viro
2014-03-13 5:55 ` NeilBrown
2014-03-14 4:51 ` Al Viro
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