From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
keyrings <keyrings@linux-nfs.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6 2/6] KEYS: verify a certificate is signed by a 'trusted' key
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 10:40:48 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1403620852-16476-3-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1403620852-16476-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Only public keys, with certificates signed by an existing
'trusted' key on the system trusted keyring, should be added
to a trusted keyring. This patch adds support for verifying
a certificate's signature.
This is derived from David Howells pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key() patch.
Changelog v6:
- on error free key - Dmitry
- validate trust only for not already trusted keys - Dmitry
- formatting cleanup
Changelog:
- define get_system_trusted_keyring() to fix kbuild issues
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 87 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
include/keys/system_keyring.h | 10 +++-
2 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 382ef0d..436fbd8 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -18,12 +18,62 @@
#include <linux/asn1_decoder.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
+#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include "asymmetric_keys.h"
#include "public_key.h"
#include "x509_parser.h"
/*
+ * Find a key in the given keyring by issuer and authority.
+ */
+static struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
+ const char *signer,
+ size_t signer_len,
+ const char *authority,
+ size_t auth_len)
+{
+ key_ref_t key;
+ char *id;
+
+ /* Construct an identifier. */
+ id = kmalloc(signer_len + 2 + auth_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!id)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ memcpy(id, signer, signer_len);
+ id[signer_len + 0] = ':';
+ id[signer_len + 1] = ' ';
+ memcpy(id + signer_len + 2, authority, auth_len);
+ id[signer_len + 2 + auth_len] = 0;
+
+ pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
+
+ key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
+ &key_type_asymmetric, id);
+ if (IS_ERR(key))
+ pr_debug("Request for module key '%s' err %ld\n",
+ id, PTR_ERR(key));
+ kfree(id);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(key)) {
+ switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
+ /* Hide some search errors */
+ case -EACCES:
+ case -ENOTDIR:
+ case -EAGAIN:
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+ default:
+ return ERR_CAST(key);
+ }
+ }
+
+ pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__,
+ key_serial(key_ref_to_ptr(key)));
+ return key_ref_to_ptr(key);
+}
+
+/*
* Set up the signature parameters in an X.509 certificate. This involves
* digesting the signed data and extracting the signature.
*/
@@ -103,6 +153,37 @@ int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_check_signature);
/*
+ * Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring. If one of
+ * those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the
+ * new certificate as being trusted.
+ *
+ * Return 0 if the new certificate was successfully validated, 1 if we couldn't
+ * find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list and an error if there
+ * is a matching certificate but the signature check fails.
+ */
+static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
+ struct key *trust_keyring)
+{
+ const struct public_key *pk;
+ struct key *key;
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ if (!trust_keyring)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+ cert->issuer, strlen(cert->issuer),
+ cert->authority,
+ strlen(cert->authority));
+ if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
+ pk = key->payload.data;
+ ret = x509_check_signature(pk, cert);
+ key_put(key);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
* Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as an X509 certificate.
*/
static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
@@ -155,9 +236,13 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
/* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */
if (!cert->authority ||
strcmp(cert->fingerprint, cert->authority) == 0) {
- ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert);
+ ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); /* self-signed */
if (ret < 0)
goto error_free_cert;
+ } else if (!prep->trusted) {
+ ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, get_system_trusted_keyring());
+ if (!ret)
+ prep->trusted = 1;
}
/* Propose a description */
diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
index 8dabc39..72665eb 100644
--- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h
+++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
@@ -17,7 +17,15 @@
#include <linux/key.h>
extern struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
-
+static inline struct key *get_system_trusted_keyring(void)
+{
+ return system_trusted_keyring;
+}
+#else
+static inline struct key *get_system_trusted_keyring(void)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
#endif
#endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */
--
1.8.1.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-06-24 14:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-06-24 14:40 [PATCH v6 0/6] ima: extending secure boot certificate chain of trust Mimi Zohar
2014-06-24 14:40 ` [PATCH v6 1/6] KEYS: special dot prefixed keyring name bug fix Mimi Zohar
2014-06-24 14:40 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2014-06-24 14:40 ` [PATCH v6 3/6] KEYS: make partial key id matching as a dedicated function Mimi Zohar
2014-06-24 14:40 ` [PATCH v6 4/6] KEYS: validate certificate trust only with selected owner key Mimi Zohar
2014-06-24 14:40 ` [PATCH v6 5/6] KEYS: validate certificate trust only with builtin keys Mimi Zohar
2014-06-24 14:40 ` [PATCH v6 6/6] ima: define '.ima' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring Mimi Zohar
2014-06-27 13:24 ` [PATCH v6 1/6] KEYS: special dot prefixed keyring name bug fix David Howells
2014-06-27 13:38 ` [PATCH v6 3/6] KEYS: make partial key id matching as a dedicated function David Howells
2014-06-30 13:14 ` Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-06-30 19:20 ` Mimi Zohar
2014-06-27 13:54 ` [PATCH v6 5/6] KEYS: validate certificate trust only with builtin keys David Howells
2014-06-27 17:50 ` Mimi Zohar
2014-06-27 13:55 ` [PATCH v6 4/6] KEYS: validate certificate trust only with selected owner key David Howells
2014-06-27 17:44 ` Mimi Zohar
2014-06-30 13:47 ` Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-06-30 13:57 ` Mimi Zohar
2014-06-27 14:17 ` [PATCH v6 6/6] ima: define '.ima' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring David Howells
2014-07-09 15:31 ` [PATCH v6 0/6] ima: extending secure boot certificate chain of trust David Howells
2014-07-09 16:40 ` Mimi Zohar
2014-07-09 18:56 ` David Howells
2014-07-09 21:29 ` Mimi Zohar
2014-07-10 14:47 ` Dmitry Kasatkin
2014-07-13 21:06 ` David Howells
2014-07-16 13:15 ` Mimi Zohar
2014-07-17 19:43 ` David Howells
2014-07-17 20:07 ` Mimi Zohar
2014-07-17 20:37 ` David Howells
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