From: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Meredydd Luff <meredydd@senatehouse.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH 01/11] fs: add O_BENEATH_ONLY flag to openat(2)
Date: Mon, 30 Jun 2014 11:28:01 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1404124096-21445-2-git-send-email-drysdale@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1404124096-21445-1-git-send-email-drysdale@google.com>
Add a new O_BENEATH_ONLY flag for openat(2) which restricts the
provided path, rejecting (with -EACCES) paths that are not beneath
the provided dfd. In particular, reject:
- paths that contain .. components
- paths that begin with /
- symlinks that have paths as above.
Signed-off-by: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
---
arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/fcntl.h | 1 +
arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/fcntl.h | 1 +
arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/fcntl.h | 1 +
fs/fcntl.c | 5 +++--
fs/namei.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
fs/open.c | 4 +++-
include/linux/namei.h | 1 +
include/uapi/asm-generic/fcntl.h | 4 ++++
8 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/fcntl.h b/arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/fcntl.h
index 09f49a6b87d1..b3e0b00ff9ed 100644
--- a/arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/fcntl.h
+++ b/arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/fcntl.h
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#define O_PATH 040000000
#define __O_TMPFILE 0100000000
+#define O_BENEATH_ONLY 0200000000 /* no / or .. in openat path */
#define F_GETLK 7
#define F_SETLK 8
diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/fcntl.h b/arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/fcntl.h
index 34a46cbc76ed..da4447775f87 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/fcntl.h
+++ b/arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/fcntl.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#define O_PATH 020000000
#define __O_TMPFILE 040000000
+#define O_BENEATH_ONLY 080000000 /* no / or .. in openat path */
#define F_GETLK64 8
#define F_SETLK64 9
diff --git a/arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/fcntl.h b/arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/fcntl.h
index 7e8ace5bf760..9f2635197cf0 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/fcntl.h
+++ b/arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/fcntl.h
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
#define O_PATH 0x1000000
#define __O_TMPFILE 0x2000000
+#define O_BENEATH_ONLY 0x4000000 /* no / or .. in openat path */
#define F_GETOWN 5 /* for sockets. */
#define F_SETOWN 6 /* for sockets. */
diff --git a/fs/fcntl.c b/fs/fcntl.c
index 72c82f69b01b..79f9b09fa46b 100644
--- a/fs/fcntl.c
+++ b/fs/fcntl.c
@@ -742,14 +742,15 @@ static int __init fcntl_init(void)
* Exceptions: O_NONBLOCK is a two bit define on parisc; O_NDELAY
* is defined as O_NONBLOCK on some platforms and not on others.
*/
- BUILD_BUG_ON(20 - 1 /* for O_RDONLY being 0 */ != HWEIGHT32(
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(21 - 1 /* for O_RDONLY being 0 */ != HWEIGHT32(
O_RDONLY | O_WRONLY | O_RDWR |
O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_NOCTTY |
O_TRUNC | O_APPEND | /* O_NONBLOCK | */
__O_SYNC | O_DSYNC | FASYNC |
O_DIRECT | O_LARGEFILE | O_DIRECTORY |
O_NOFOLLOW | O_NOATIME | O_CLOEXEC |
- __FMODE_EXEC | O_PATH | __O_TMPFILE
+ __FMODE_EXEC | O_PATH | __O_TMPFILE |
+ O_BENEATH_ONLY
));
fasync_cache = kmem_cache_create("fasync_cache",
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 80168273396b..e6b72531dfc7 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ static __always_inline void set_root(struct nameidata *nd)
get_fs_root(current->fs, &nd->root);
}
-static int link_path_walk(const char *, struct nameidata *);
+static int link_path_walk(const char *, struct nameidata *, unsigned int);
static __always_inline void set_root_rcu(struct nameidata *nd)
{
@@ -819,7 +819,8 @@ static int may_linkat(struct path *link)
}
static __always_inline int
-follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd, void **p)
+follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd, unsigned int flags,
+ void **p)
{
struct dentry *dentry = link->dentry;
int error;
@@ -866,7 +867,7 @@ follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd, void **p)
nd->flags |= LOOKUP_JUMPED;
}
nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
- error = link_path_walk(s, nd);
+ error = link_path_walk(s, nd, flags);
if (unlikely(error))
put_link(nd, link, *p);
}
@@ -1573,7 +1574,8 @@ out_err:
* Without that kind of total limit, nasty chains of consecutive
* symlinks can cause almost arbitrarily long lookups.
*/
-static inline int nested_symlink(struct path *path, struct nameidata *nd)
+static inline int nested_symlink(struct path *path, struct nameidata *nd,
+ unsigned int flags)
{
int res;
@@ -1591,7 +1593,7 @@ static inline int nested_symlink(struct path *path, struct nameidata *nd)
struct path link = *path;
void *cookie;
- res = follow_link(&link, nd, &cookie);
+ res = follow_link(&link, nd, flags, &cookie);
if (res)
break;
res = walk_component(nd, path, LOOKUP_FOLLOW);
@@ -1730,13 +1732,19 @@ static inline unsigned long hash_name(const char *name, unsigned int *hashp)
* Returns 0 and nd will have valid dentry and mnt on success.
* Returns error and drops reference to input namei data on failure.
*/
-static int link_path_walk(const char *name, struct nameidata *nd)
+static int link_path_walk(const char *name, struct nameidata *nd,
+ unsigned int flags)
{
struct path next;
int err;
- while (*name=='/')
+ while (*name == '/') {
+ if (flags & LOOKUP_BENEATH_ONLY) {
+ err = -EACCES;
+ goto exit;
+ }
name++;
+ }
if (!*name)
return 0;
@@ -1758,6 +1766,10 @@ static int link_path_walk(const char *name, struct nameidata *nd)
if (name[0] == '.') switch (len) {
case 2:
if (name[1] == '.') {
+ if (flags & LOOKUP_BENEATH_ONLY) {
+ err = -EACCES;
+ goto exit;
+ }
type = LAST_DOTDOT;
nd->flags |= LOOKUP_JUMPED;
}
@@ -1797,7 +1809,7 @@ static int link_path_walk(const char *name, struct nameidata *nd)
return err;
if (err) {
- err = nested_symlink(&next, nd);
+ err = nested_symlink(&next, nd, flags);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -1806,6 +1818,7 @@ static int link_path_walk(const char *name, struct nameidata *nd)
break;
}
}
+exit:
terminate_walk(nd);
return err;
}
@@ -1844,6 +1857,8 @@ static int path_init(int dfd, const char *name, unsigned int flags,
nd->m_seq = read_seqbegin(&mount_lock);
if (*name=='/') {
+ if (flags & LOOKUP_BENEATH_ONLY)
+ return -EACCES;
if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
rcu_read_lock();
set_root_rcu(nd);
@@ -1937,7 +1952,7 @@ static int path_lookupat(int dfd, const char *name,
return err;
current->total_link_count = 0;
- err = link_path_walk(name, nd);
+ err = link_path_walk(name, nd, flags);
if (!err && !(flags & LOOKUP_PARENT)) {
err = lookup_last(nd, &path);
@@ -1948,7 +1963,7 @@ static int path_lookupat(int dfd, const char *name,
if (unlikely(err))
break;
nd->flags |= LOOKUP_PARENT;
- err = follow_link(&link, nd, &cookie);
+ err = follow_link(&link, nd, flags, &cookie);
if (err)
break;
err = lookup_last(nd, &path);
@@ -2287,7 +2302,7 @@ path_mountpoint(int dfd, const char *name, struct path *path, unsigned int flags
return err;
current->total_link_count = 0;
- err = link_path_walk(name, &nd);
+ err = link_path_walk(name, &nd, flags);
if (err)
goto out;
@@ -2299,7 +2314,7 @@ path_mountpoint(int dfd, const char *name, struct path *path, unsigned int flags
if (unlikely(err))
break;
nd.flags |= LOOKUP_PARENT;
- err = follow_link(&link, &nd, &cookie);
+ err = follow_link(&link, &nd, flags, &cookie);
if (err)
break;
err = mountpoint_last(&nd, path);
@@ -3185,7 +3200,7 @@ static struct file *path_openat(int dfd, struct filename *pathname,
goto out;
current->total_link_count = 0;
- error = link_path_walk(pathname->name, nd);
+ error = link_path_walk(pathname->name, nd, flags);
if (unlikely(error))
goto out;
@@ -3204,7 +3219,7 @@ static struct file *path_openat(int dfd, struct filename *pathname,
break;
nd->flags |= LOOKUP_PARENT;
nd->flags &= ~(LOOKUP_OPEN|LOOKUP_CREATE|LOOKUP_EXCL);
- error = follow_link(&link, nd, &cookie);
+ error = follow_link(&link, nd, flags, &cookie);
if (unlikely(error))
break;
error = do_last(nd, &path, file, op, &opened, pathname);
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index 9d64679cec73..f26c492f3698 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -869,7 +869,7 @@ static inline int build_open_flags(int flags, umode_t mode, struct open_flags *o
* If we have O_PATH in the open flag. Then we
* cannot have anything other than the below set of flags
*/
- flags &= O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_PATH;
+ flags &= O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_PATH | O_BENEATH_ONLY;
acc_mode = 0;
} else {
acc_mode = MAY_OPEN | ACC_MODE(flags);
@@ -900,6 +900,8 @@ static inline int build_open_flags(int flags, umode_t mode, struct open_flags *o
lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_DIRECTORY;
if (!(flags & O_NOFOLLOW))
lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
+ if (flags & O_BENEATH_ONLY)
+ lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_BENEATH_ONLY;
op->lookup_flags = lookup_flags;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/namei.h b/include/linux/namei.h
index 492de72560fa..cd56c50109fc 100644
--- a/include/linux/namei.h
+++ b/include/linux/namei.h
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ enum {LAST_NORM, LAST_ROOT, LAST_DOT, LAST_DOTDOT, LAST_BIND};
#define LOOKUP_FOLLOW 0x0001
#define LOOKUP_DIRECTORY 0x0002
#define LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT 0x0004
+#define LOOKUP_BENEATH_ONLY 0x0008
#define LOOKUP_PARENT 0x0010
#define LOOKUP_REVAL 0x0020
diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/fcntl.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/fcntl.h
index 7543b3e51331..e662821c4bc2 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/fcntl.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/fcntl.h
@@ -92,6 +92,10 @@
#define O_TMPFILE (__O_TMPFILE | O_DIRECTORY)
#define O_TMPFILE_MASK (__O_TMPFILE | O_DIRECTORY | O_CREAT)
+#ifndef O_BENEATH_ONLY
+#define O_BENEATH_ONLY 040000000 /* no / or .. in openat path */
+#endif
+
#ifndef O_NDELAY
#define O_NDELAY O_NONBLOCK
#endif
--
2.0.0.526.g5318336
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-06-30 10:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-06-30 10:28 [RFC PATCH 00/11] Adding FreeBSD's Capsicum security framework (part 1) David Drysdale
2014-06-30 10:28 ` David Drysdale [this message]
2014-06-30 14:49 ` [PATCH 01/11] fs: add O_BENEATH_ONLY flag to openat(2) Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-30 15:49 ` David Drysdale
2014-06-30 15:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-08 12:07 ` Christoph Hellwig
2014-07-08 12:48 ` Meredydd Luff
2014-07-08 12:51 ` Christoph Hellwig
2014-07-08 13:04 ` Meredydd Luff
2014-07-08 13:12 ` Christoph Hellwig
2014-06-30 20:40 ` Andi Kleen
2014-06-30 21:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-01 9:53 ` David Drysdale
2014-07-01 18:58 ` Loganaden Velvindron
2014-07-08 12:03 ` Christoph Hellwig
2014-07-08 16:54 ` David Drysdale
2014-07-09 8:48 ` Christoph Hellwig
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 02/11] selftests: Add test of O_BENEATH_ONLY & openat(2) David Drysdale
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 03/11] capsicum: rights values and structure definitions David Drysdale
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 04/11] capsicum: implement fgetr() and friends David Drysdale
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 05/11] capsicum: convert callers to use fgetr() etc David Drysdale
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 06/11] capsicum: implement sockfd_lookupr() David Drysdale
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 07/11] capsicum: convert callers to use sockfd_lookupr() etc David Drysdale
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 08/11] capsicum: add new LSM hooks on FD/file conversion David Drysdale
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 09/11] capsicum: implementations of new LSM hooks David Drysdale
2014-06-30 16:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-02 13:49 ` Paul Moore
2014-07-02 17:09 ` David Drysdale
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 10/11] capsicum: invocation " David Drysdale
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 11/11] capsicum: add syscalls to limit FD rights David Drysdale
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 1/5] man-pages: open.2: describe O_BENEATH_ONLY flag David Drysdale
2014-06-30 22:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 2/5] man-pages: capsicum.7: describe Capsicum capability framework David Drysdale
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 3/5] man-pages: rights.7: Describe Capsicum primary rights David Drysdale
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 4/5] man-pages: cap_rights_limit.2: limit FD rights for Capsicum David Drysdale
2014-06-30 14:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-30 15:35 ` David Drysdale
2014-06-30 16:06 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-30 16:32 ` David Drysdale
2014-06-30 10:28 ` [PATCH 5/5] man-pages: cap_rights_get: retrieve Capsicum fd rights David Drysdale
2014-06-30 22:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-01 9:19 ` David Drysdale
2014-07-01 14:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-03 9:12 ` [RFC PATCH 00/11] Adding FreeBSD's Capsicum security framework (part 1) Paolo Bonzini
2014-07-03 10:01 ` Loganaden Velvindron
2014-07-03 18:39 ` David Drysdale
2014-07-04 7:03 ` Paolo Bonzini
2014-07-07 10:29 ` David Drysdale
2014-07-07 12:20 ` Paolo Bonzini
2014-07-07 14:11 ` David Drysdale
2014-07-07 22:33 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2014-07-08 14:58 ` Kees Cook
2014-08-16 15:41 ` Pavel Machek
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