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From: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
To: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	"Serge H. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 4/5] fuse: Support privileged xattrs only with a mount option
Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 16:25:55 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1413296756-25071-5-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1413296756-25071-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com>

Allowing unprivileged users to provide arbitrary xattrs via fuse
mounts bypasses the normal restrictions on setting xattrs. Such
mounts should be restricted to reading and writing xattrs in the
user.* namespace.

It's difficult though to tell whether a mount is being performed
on behalf of an unprivileged user since fuse mounts are ususally
done via a suid root helper. Thus a new mount option,
privileged_xattrs, is added to indicated that xattrs from other
namespaces are allowed. This option can only be supplied by
system-wide root; supplying the option as an unprivileged user
will cause the mount to fail.

Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge H. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
---
 fs/fuse/dir.c    |  9 +++++++++
 fs/fuse/fuse_i.h |  5 +++++
 fs/fuse/inode.c  | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c
index e3123bfbc711..1bb378aa9175 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/dir.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
 
 static bool fuse_use_readdirplus(struct inode *dir, struct dir_context *ctx)
 {
@@ -1882,6 +1883,10 @@ static int fuse_setxattr(struct dentry *entry, const char *name,
 	if (fc->no_setxattr)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
+	if (!(fc->flags & FUSE_PRIVILEGED_XATTRS) &&
+	    strncmp(name, XATTR_USER_PREFIX, XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN) != 0)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
 	req = fuse_get_req_nopages(fc);
 	if (IS_ERR(req))
 		return PTR_ERR(req);
@@ -1925,6 +1930,10 @@ static ssize_t fuse_getxattr(struct dentry *entry, const char *name,
 	if (fc->no_getxattr)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
+	if (!(fc->flags & FUSE_PRIVILEGED_XATTRS) &&
+	    strncmp(name, XATTR_USER_PREFIX, XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN) != 0)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
 	req = fuse_get_req_nopages(fc);
 	if (IS_ERR(req))
 		return PTR_ERR(req);
diff --git a/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h b/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h
index 81187ba04e4a..3ea4b4db9a79 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h
+++ b/fs/fuse/fuse_i.h
@@ -46,6 +46,11 @@
     doing the mount will be allowed to access the filesystem */
 #define FUSE_ALLOW_OTHER         (1 << 1)
 
+/** If the FUSE_PRIV_XATTRS flag is given, then xattrs outside the
+    user.* namespace are allowed. This option is only allowed for
+    system root. */
+#define FUSE_PRIVILEGED_XATTRS   (1 << 2)
+
 /** Number of page pointers embedded in fuse_req */
 #define FUSE_REQ_INLINE_PAGES 1
 
diff --git a/fs/fuse/inode.c b/fs/fuse/inode.c
index b88b5a780228..5e00a6a76049 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/inode.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/inode.c
@@ -493,6 +493,7 @@ enum {
 	OPT_ALLOW_OTHER,
 	OPT_MAX_READ,
 	OPT_BLKSIZE,
+	OPT_PRIVILEGED_XATTRS,
 	OPT_ERR
 };
 
@@ -505,6 +506,7 @@ static const match_table_t tokens = {
 	{OPT_ALLOW_OTHER,		"allow_other"},
 	{OPT_MAX_READ,			"max_read=%u"},
 	{OPT_BLKSIZE,			"blksize=%u"},
+	{OPT_PRIVILEGED_XATTRS,		"privileged_xattrs"},
 	{OPT_ERR,			NULL}
 };
 
@@ -540,35 +542,35 @@ static int parse_fuse_opt(char *opt, struct fuse_mount_data *d, int is_bdev)
 		switch (token) {
 		case OPT_FD:
 			if (match_int(&args[0], &value))
-				return 0;
+				return -EINVAL;
 			d->fd = value;
 			d->fd_present = 1;
 			break;
 
 		case OPT_ROOTMODE:
 			if (match_octal(&args[0], &value))
-				return 0;
+				return -EINVAL;
 			if (!fuse_valid_type(value))
-				return 0;
+				return -EINVAL;
 			d->rootmode = value;
 			d->rootmode_present = 1;
 			break;
 
 		case OPT_USER_ID:
 			if (fuse_match_uint(&args[0], &uv))
-				return 0;
+				return -EINVAL;
 			d->user_id = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), uv);
 			if (!uid_valid(d->user_id))
-				return 0;
+				return -EINVAL;
 			d->user_id_present = 1;
 			break;
 
 		case OPT_GROUP_ID:
 			if (fuse_match_uint(&args[0], &uv))
-				return 0;
+				return -EINVAL;
 			d->group_id = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), uv);
 			if (!gid_valid(d->group_id))
-				return 0;
+				return -EINVAL;
 			d->group_id_present = 1;
 			break;
 
@@ -582,26 +584,32 @@ static int parse_fuse_opt(char *opt, struct fuse_mount_data *d, int is_bdev)
 
 		case OPT_MAX_READ:
 			if (match_int(&args[0], &value))
-				return 0;
+				return -EINVAL;
 			d->max_read = value;
 			break;
 
 		case OPT_BLKSIZE:
 			if (!is_bdev || match_int(&args[0], &value))
-				return 0;
+				return -EINVAL;
 			d->blksize = value;
 			break;
 
+		case OPT_PRIVILEGED_XATTRS:
+			if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+				return -EPERM;
+			d->flags |= FUSE_PRIVILEGED_XATTRS;
+			break;
+
 		default:
-			return 0;
+			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 	}
 
 	if (!d->fd_present || !d->rootmode_present ||
 	    !d->user_id_present || !d->group_id_present)
-		return 0;
+		return -EINVAL;
 
-	return 1;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int fuse_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *root)
@@ -617,6 +625,8 @@ static int fuse_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *root)
 		seq_puts(m, ",default_permissions");
 	if (fc->flags & FUSE_ALLOW_OTHER)
 		seq_puts(m, ",allow_other");
+	if (fc->flags & FUSE_PRIVILEGED_XATTRS)
+		seq_puts(m, ",privileged_xattrs");
 	if (fc->max_read != ~0)
 		seq_printf(m, ",max_read=%u", fc->max_read);
 	if (sb->s_bdev && sb->s_blocksize != FUSE_DEFAULT_BLKSIZE)
@@ -1058,7 +1068,8 @@ static int fuse_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 
 	sb->s_flags &= ~(MS_NOSEC | MS_I_VERSION);
 
-	if (!parse_fuse_opt(data, &d, is_bdev))
+	err = parse_fuse_opt(data, &d, is_bdev);
+	if (err)
 		goto err;
 
 	if (is_bdev) {
-- 
2.1.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-10-14 14:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-10-14 14:25 [PATCH v4 0/5] fuse: Add support for mounts from pid/user namespaces Seth Forshee
2014-10-14 14:25 ` [PATCH v4 1/5] fuse: Add support for pid namespaces Seth Forshee
2014-10-14 14:25 ` [PATCH v4 2/5] fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns Seth Forshee
2014-10-15 14:49   ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-15 15:05     ` Seth Forshee
2014-10-15 17:05       ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-15 22:59         ` Seth Forshee
2014-10-15 23:07           ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-15 23:24             ` Seth Forshee
2014-10-14 14:25 ` [PATCH v4 3/5] fuse: Restrict allow_other to uids already controlled by the user Seth Forshee
2014-10-15 14:58   ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-15 15:11     ` Seth Forshee
2014-10-14 14:25 ` Seth Forshee [this message]
2014-10-14 18:12   ` [fuse-devel] [PATCH v4 4/5] fuse: Support privileged xattrs only with a mount option Michael j Theall
2014-10-14 20:01     ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-10-14 20:59       ` Seth Forshee
2014-10-14 21:13         ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-10-14 21:19           ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-14 21:29             ` Eric W. Biederman
2014-10-15  7:39             ` Seth Forshee
2014-10-15 14:37               ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-21 21:21                 ` Seth Forshee
2014-10-21 21:27                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-21 21:34                     ` Michael j Theall
2014-10-21 21:44                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-22  4:58                     ` Seth Forshee
2014-10-23 18:32                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-23 21:24                         ` Seth Forshee
2014-10-14 14:25 ` [PATCH v4 5/5] fuse: Allow user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
2014-10-15 14:58   ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-15 15:20     ` Seth Forshee
2014-10-15 23:08       ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-10-15 23:07     ` Seth Forshee

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