From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S933971AbaLBT5v (ORCPT ); Tue, 2 Dec 2014 14:57:51 -0500 Received: from youngberry.canonical.com ([91.189.89.112]:46503 "EHLO youngberry.canonical.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754387AbaLBTU1 (ORCPT ); Tue, 2 Dec 2014 14:20:27 -0500 From: Kamal Mostafa To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@lists.ubuntu.com Cc: Daniel Borkmann , Vlad Yasevich , "David S. Miller" , Kamal Mostafa Subject: [PATCH 3.13.y-ckt 010/121] net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in af->from_addr_param on malformed packet Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 11:18:09 -0800 Message-Id: <1417548000-1794-11-git-send-email-kamal@canonical.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.9.1 In-Reply-To: <1417548000-1794-1-git-send-email-kamal@canonical.com> References: <1417548000-1794-1-git-send-email-kamal@canonical.com> X-Extended-Stable: 3.13 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 3.13.11-ckt12 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Daniel Borkmann commit e40607cbe270a9e8360907cb1e62ddf0736e4864 upstream. An SCTP server doing ASCONF will panic on malformed INIT ping-of-death in the form of: ------------ INIT[PARAM: SET_PRIMARY_IP] ------------> While the INIT chunk parameter verification dissects through many things in order to detect malformed input, it misses to actually check parameters inside of parameters. E.g. RFC5061, section 4.2.4 proposes a 'set primary IP address' parameter in ASCONF, which has as a subparameter an address parameter. So an attacker may send a parameter type other than SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS or SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS, param_type2af() will subsequently return 0 and thus sctp_get_af_specific() returns NULL, too, which we then happily dereference unconditionally through af->from_addr_param(). The trace for the log: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000078 IP: [] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp] PGD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [...] Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-504.el6.x86_64 #1 Bochs Bochs RIP: 0010:[] [] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp] [...] Call Trace: [] ? sctp_bind_addr_copy+0x5d/0xe0 [sctp] [] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x21b/0x340 [sctp] [] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp] [] ? sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc+0xc9/0xf0 [sctp] [] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x116/0x230 [sctp] [] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp] [] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp] [] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter] [] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [...] A minimal way to address this is to check for NULL as we do on all other such occasions where we know sctp_get_af_specific() could possibly return with NULL. Fixes: d6de3097592b ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Cc: Vlad Yasevich Acked-by: Neil Horman Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Reference: CVE-2014-7841 Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa --- net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c index e45212e..ca22389 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c @@ -2609,6 +2609,9 @@ do_addr_param: addr_param = param.v + sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t); af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(param.p->type)); + if (af == NULL) + break; + af->from_addr_param(&addr, addr_param, htons(asoc->peer.port), 0); -- 1.9.1