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From: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 05/24] SECURITY: remove nameidata arg from inode_follow_link.
Date: Mon, 20 Apr 2015 19:12:49 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1429553588-24764-5-git-send-email-viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150420181222.GK889@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>

From: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>

No ->inode_follow_link() methods use the nameidata arg, and
it is about to become private to namei.c.
So remove from all inode_follow_link() functions.

Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
 fs/namei.c               | 2 +-
 include/linux/security.h | 9 +++------
 security/capability.c    | 3 +--
 security/security.c      | 4 ++--
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
 5 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 3b52954..981080c 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -889,7 +889,7 @@ follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd, void **p)
 	touch_atime(link);
 	nd_set_link(nd, NULL);
 
-	error = security_inode_follow_link(link->dentry, nd);
+	error = security_inode_follow_link(link->dentry);
 	if (error)
 		goto out_put_nd_path;
 
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 18264ea..62a6620 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ struct file;
 struct vfsmount;
 struct path;
 struct qstr;
-struct nameidata;
 struct iattr;
 struct fown_struct;
 struct file_operations;
@@ -477,7 +476,6 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  * @inode_follow_link:
  *	Check permission to follow a symbolic link when looking up a pathname.
  *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for the link.
- *	@nd contains the nameidata structure for the parent directory.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @inode_permission:
  *	Check permission before accessing an inode.  This hook is called by the
@@ -1553,7 +1551,7 @@ struct security_operations {
 	int (*inode_rename) (struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 			     struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
 	int (*inode_readlink) (struct dentry *dentry);
-	int (*inode_follow_link) (struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd);
+	int (*inode_follow_link) (struct dentry *dentry);
 	int (*inode_permission) (struct inode *inode, int mask);
 	int (*inode_setattr)	(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
 	int (*inode_getattr) (const struct path *path);
@@ -1839,7 +1837,7 @@ int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 			  struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
 			  unsigned int flags);
 int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry);
-int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd);
+int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry);
 int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask);
 int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
 int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path);
@@ -2241,8 +2239,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry,
-					      struct nameidata *nd)
+static inline int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 0d03fcc..fae99db 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -209,8 +209,7 @@ static int cap_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int cap_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry,
-				 struct nameidata *nameidata)
+static int cap_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 8e9b1f4..d7c30b0 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -581,11 +581,11 @@ int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return security_ops->inode_readlink(dentry);
 }
 
-int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
+int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nd);
+	return security_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry);
 }
 
 int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 7dade28..8016229 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2861,7 +2861,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
 }
 
-static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
+static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 
-- 
2.1.4


  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-04-20 18:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-04-20 18:12 [RFC][PATCHSET] non-recursive link_path_walk() and reducing stack footprint Al Viro
2015-04-20 18:12 ` [PATCH 01/24] lustre: rip the private symlink nesting limit out Al Viro
2015-04-20 19:08   ` Andreas Dilger
2015-04-20 19:22     ` Al Viro
2015-04-20 20:35       ` Al Viro
2015-04-20 18:12 ` [PATCH 02/24] VFS: replace {, total_}link_count in task_struct with pointer to nameidata Al Viro
2015-04-20 18:12 ` [PATCH 03/24] ovl: rearrange ovl_follow_link to it doesn't need to call ->put_link Al Viro
2015-04-20 18:12 ` [PATCH 04/24] VFS: replace nameidata arg to ->put_link with a char* Al Viro
2015-04-20 18:12 ` Al Viro [this message]
2015-04-20 18:12 ` [PATCH 06/24] VFS: remove nameidata args from ->follow_link Al Viro
2015-04-20 18:12 ` [PATCH 07/24] namei: expand nested_symlink() in its only caller Al Viro
2015-04-20 18:12 ` [PATCH 08/24] namei.c: separate the parts of follow_link() that find the link body Al Viro
2015-04-20 18:12 ` [PATCH 09/24] namei: fold follow_link() into link_path_walk() Al Viro
2015-04-20 18:12 ` [PATCH 10/24] link_path_walk: handle get_link() returning ERR_PTR() immediately Al Viro
2015-04-20 18:12 ` [PATCH 11/24] link_path_walk: don't bother with walk_component() after jumping link Al Viro
2015-04-20 18:12 ` [PATCH 12/24] link_path_walk: turn inner loop into explicit goto Al Viro
2015-04-20 18:12 ` [PATCH 13/24] link_path_walk: massage a bit more Al Viro
2015-04-20 18:12 ` [PATCH 14/24] link_path_walk: get rid of duplication Al Viro
2015-04-20 18:12 ` [PATCH 15/24] link_path_walk: final preparations to killing recursion Al Viro
2015-04-20 18:13 ` [PATCH 16/24] link_path_walk: kill the recursion Al Viro
2015-04-20 21:04   ` Linus Torvalds
2015-04-20 21:32     ` Al Viro
2015-04-20 21:39       ` Linus Torvalds
2015-04-20 21:51         ` Al Viro
2015-04-20 21:41       ` Linus Torvalds
2015-04-20 21:42         ` Linus Torvalds
2015-04-20 21:59           ` Al Viro
2015-04-20 21:52         ` Al Viro
2015-04-20 18:13 ` [PATCH 17/24] link_path_walk: split "return from recursive call" path Al Viro
2015-04-20 18:13 ` [PATCH 18/24] link_path_walk: cleanup - turn goto start; into continue; Al Viro
2015-04-20 18:13 ` [PATCH 19/24] namei: fold may_follow_link() into follow_link() Al Viro
2015-04-20 18:13 ` [PATCH 20/24] namei: introduce nameidata->stack Al Viro
2015-04-20 18:13 ` [PATCH 21/24] namei: regularize use of put_link() and follow_link(), trim arguments Al Viro
2015-04-20 18:13 ` [PATCH 22/24] namei: trim the arguments of get_link() Al Viro
2015-04-20 18:13 ` [PATCH 23/24] new ->follow_link() and ->put_link() calling conventions Al Viro
2015-04-20 18:13 ` [PATCH 24/24] uninline walk_component() Al Viro
2015-04-21 14:49 ` [RFC][PATCHSET] non-recursive link_path_walk() and reducing stack footprint Al Viro
2015-04-21 15:04   ` Christoph Hellwig
2015-04-21 15:12     ` Richard Weinberger
2015-04-21 15:45       ` Al Viro
2015-04-21 16:46         ` Boaz Harrosh
2015-04-21 21:20         ` Al Viro
2015-04-22 18:07           ` Al Viro
2015-04-22 20:12             ` Al Viro
2015-04-22 21:05               ` Al Viro
2015-04-23  7:45                 ` NeilBrown
2015-04-23 18:07                   ` Al Viro
2015-04-24  6:35                     ` NeilBrown
2015-04-24 13:42                       ` Al Viro
2015-05-04  5:11                         ` Al Viro
2015-05-04  7:30                           ` NeilBrown
2015-04-23  5:01           ` Al Viro

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