[PATCH 4/4] keys, trusted: seal/unseal with TPM 2.0 chips

[Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>]

Call tpm_seal_trusted() and tpm_unseal_trusted() for TPM 2.0 chips.

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c |  6 +-----
 include/linux/tpm_command.h |  1 -
 security/keys/trusted.c     | 18 ++++++++++++++----
 security/keys/trusted.h     |  7 +++++++
 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index d404e5f..d2bcf79 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -406,21 +406,17 @@ static int tpm2_load(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 	if (private_len > (payload->blob_len - 2))
 		return -E2BIG;
 
-	pr_info("private_len=%u\n", private_len);
-
 	public_len = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *) &payload->blob[2 + private_len]);
 	blob_len = private_len + public_len + 4;
 	if (blob_len > payload->blob_len)
 		return -E2BIG;
 
-	pr_info("public_len=%u\n", public_len);
-
 	tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD);
 	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->keyhandle);
 	tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW, NULL /* nonce */, 0,
 			     0 /* session_attributes */, NULL /* hmac */, 0);
 
-	tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->blob, payload->blob_len);
+	tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->blob, blob_len);
 
 	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, TPM_BUF_SIZE, "loading blob");
 	if (!rc)
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm_command.h b/include/linux/tpm_command.h
index 727512e..d7b0f82 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm_command.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm_command.h
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@
 #define TPM_ORD_UNSEAL                  24
 
 /* Other constants */
-#define SRKHANDLE                       0x40000000
 #define TPM_NONCE_SIZE                  20
 
 #endif
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index c0594cb..f6557b1 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -601,7 +601,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
 	}
 
 	ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
-	keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE);
+	keyhndl = htonl(TPM1_SRKHANDLE);
 	ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
 	if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) {
 		pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
@@ -867,7 +867,11 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
 	if (options) {
 		/* set any non-zero defaults */
 		options->keytype = SRK_keytype;
-		options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE;
+
+		if (tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM))
+			options->keyhandle = TPM2_SRKHANDLE;
+		else
+			options->keyhandle = TPM1_SRKHANDLE;
 	}
 	return options;
 }
@@ -937,7 +941,10 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
 
 	switch (key_cmd) {
 	case Opt_load:
-		ret = key_unseal(payload, options);
+		if (tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM))
+			ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload, options);
+		else
+			ret = key_unseal(payload, options);
 		dump_payload(payload);
 		dump_options(options);
 		if (ret < 0)
@@ -950,7 +957,10 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
 			pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
 			goto out;
 		}
-		ret = key_seal(payload, options);
+		if (tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM))
+			ret = tpm_seal_trusted(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload, options);
+		else
+			ret = key_seal(payload, options);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
 		break;
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.h b/security/keys/trusted.h
index ff001a5..fc32c47 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.h
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.h
@@ -12,6 +12,13 @@
 #define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET		6
 #define TPM_DATA_OFFSET			10
 
+/* Transient object handles start from 0x80000000 in TPM 2.0, which makes it
+ * a sane default.
+ */
+
+#define TPM1_SRKHANDLE	0x40000000
+#define TPM2_SRKHANDLE	0x80000000
+
 #define LOAD32(buffer, offset)	(ntohl(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]))
 #define LOAD32N(buffer, offset)	(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])
 #define LOAD16(buffer, offset)	(ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset]))
-- 
2.1.4