From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCHv3 3/6] evm: enable EVM when X509 certificate is loaded
Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2015 14:31:20 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1445625080.2459.349.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1a64e3ea572fd4b660581ae0362bb777fd38a572.1445539084.git.dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
On Thu, 2015-10-22 at 21:49 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> In order to enable EVM before starting 'init' process,
> evm_initialized needs to be non-zero. Before it was
> indicating that HMAC key is loaded. When EVM loads
> X509 before calling 'init', it is possible to enable
> EVM to start signature based verification.
>
> This patch defines bits to enable EVM if key of any type
> is loaded.
Thanks, Dmitry. There's one comment inline.
> Changes in v2:
> * EVM_STATE_KEY_SET replaced by EVM_INIT_HMAC
> * EVM_STATE_X509_SET replaced by EVM_INIT_X509
>
> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>
> ---
> security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 3 +++
> security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 2 ++
> security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 6 +++++-
> security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 4 ++--
> 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
> index 88bfe77..f5f1272 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
> @@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
>
> #include "../integrity.h"
>
> +#define EVM_INIT_HMAC 0x0001
> +#define EVM_INIT_X509 0x0002
> +
> extern int evm_initialized;
> extern char *evm_hmac;
> extern char *evm_hash;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> index 159ef3e..34e1a6f 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> @@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type)
> struct shash_desc *desc;
>
> if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
> + if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC))
> + return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
init_desc() is called from a couple of different places. In some
instances, like when converting from a signature to an hmac, if
init_desc() fails, the xattr isn't converted to an HMAC. No big deal.
But there are other cases, like when a protected xattr is modified,
failing the write will make the file inaccessible. Does there need to
be an error msg of some sort or an audit msg?
Mimi
> tfm = &hmac_tfm;
> algo = evm_hmac;
> } else {
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> index 519de0a..420d94d 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> @@ -475,7 +475,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_inode_init_security);
> #ifdef CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509
> void __init evm_load_x509(void)
> {
> - integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM, CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH);
> + int rc;
> +
> + rc = integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM, CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH);
> + if (!rc)
> + evm_initialized |= EVM_INIT_X509;
> }
> #endif
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
> index cf12a04..3f775df 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
> @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> char temp[80];
> int i, error;
>
> - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || evm_initialized)
> + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC))
> return -EPERM;
>
> if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
> @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
>
> error = evm_init_key();
> if (!error) {
> - evm_initialized = 1;
> + evm_initialized |= EVM_INIT_HMAC;
> pr_info("initialized\n");
> } else
> pr_err("initialization failed\n");
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-10-23 18:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-10-22 18:49 [PATCHv3 0/6] integrity: few EVM patches Dmitry Kasatkin
2015-10-22 18:49 ` [PATCHv3 1/6] integrity: define '.evm' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring Dmitry Kasatkin
2015-10-23 13:05 ` Petko Manolov
2015-10-23 13:40 ` Dmitry Kasatkin
2015-10-23 18:43 ` Mimi Zohar
2015-10-24 9:35 ` Petko Manolov
2015-10-22 18:49 ` [PATCHv3 2/6] evm: load x509 certificate from the kernel Dmitry Kasatkin
2015-10-22 18:49 ` [PATCHv3 3/6] evm: enable EVM when X509 certificate is loaded Dmitry Kasatkin
2015-10-23 18:31 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2015-10-26 19:18 ` Dmitry Kasatkin
2015-10-22 18:49 ` [PATCHv3 4/6] evm: provide a function to set EVM key from the kernel Dmitry Kasatkin
2015-10-23 18:30 ` Mimi Zohar
2015-10-26 19:18 ` Dmitry Kasatkin
2015-10-22 18:49 ` [PATCHv3 5/6] evm: define EVM key max and min sizes Dmitry Kasatkin
2015-10-22 18:49 ` [PATCHv3 6/6] evm: reset EVM status when file attributes changes Dmitry Kasatkin
2015-11-05 18:35 ` [PATCHv3 0/6] integrity: few EVM patches Mimi Zohar
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