From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755268AbcAVWjX (ORCPT ); Fri, 22 Jan 2016 17:39:23 -0500 Received: from mail-pa0-f47.google.com ([209.85.220.47]:34220 "EHLO mail-pa0-f47.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752289AbcAVWjU (ORCPT ); Fri, 22 Jan 2016 17:39:20 -0500 From: Kees Cook To: Andrew Morton Cc: Kees Cook , Al Viro , Richard Weinberger , "Eric W. Biederman" , Andy Lutomirski , =?UTF-8?q?Robert=20=C5=9Awi=C4=99cki?= , Dmitry Vyukov , David Howells , Miklos Szeredi , Kostya Serebryany , Alexander Potapenko , Eric Dumazet , Sasha Levin , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Subject: [PATCH 0/2] sysctl: allow CLONE_NEWUSER to be disabled Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2016 14:39:03 -0800 Message-Id: <1453502345-30416-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.6.3 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org There continues to be unexpected side-effects and security exposures via CLONE_NEWUSER. For many end-users running distro kernels with CONFIG_USER_NS enabled, there is no way to disable this feature when desired. As such, this creates a sysctl to restrict CLONE_NEWUSER so admins not running containers or Chrome can avoid the risks of this feature. -Kees