From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1757433AbcBCXrf (ORCPT ); Wed, 3 Feb 2016 18:47:35 -0500 Received: from youngberry.canonical.com ([91.189.89.112]:46632 "EHLO youngberry.canonical.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1757141AbcBCWf2 (ORCPT ); Wed, 3 Feb 2016 17:35:28 -0500 From: Luis Henriques To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@lists.ubuntu.com Cc: Al Viro , Trond Myklebust , Luis Henriques Subject: [PATCH 3.16.y-ckt 058/180] NFSv4: Don't perform cached access checks before we've OPENed the file Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2016 22:31:04 +0000 Message-Id: <1454538786-12215-59-git-send-email-luis.henriques@canonical.com> In-Reply-To: <1454538786-12215-1-git-send-email-luis.henriques@canonical.com> References: <1454538786-12215-1-git-send-email-luis.henriques@canonical.com> X-Extended-Stable: 3.16 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 3.16.7-ckt24 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ---8<------------------------------------------------------------ From: Trond Myklebust commit 762674f86d0328d5dc923c966e209e1ee59663f2 upstream. Donald Buczek reports that a nfs4 client incorrectly denies execute access based on outdated file mode (missing 'x' bit). After the mode on the server is 'fixed' (chmod +x) further execution attempts continue to fail, because the nfs ACCESS call updates the access parameter but not the mode parameter or the mode in the inode. The root cause is ultimately that the VFS is calling may_open() before the NFS client has a chance to OPEN the file and hence revalidate the access and attribute caches. Al Viro suggests: >>> Make nfs_permission() relax the checks when it sees MAY_OPEN, if you know >>> that things will be caught by server anyway? >> >> That can work as long as we're guaranteed that everything that calls >> inode_permission() with MAY_OPEN on a regular file will also follow up >> with a vfs_open() or dentry_open() on success. Is this always the >> case? > > 1) in do_tmpfile(), followed by do_dentry_open() (not reachable by NFS since > it doesn't have ->tmpfile() instance anyway) > > 2) in atomic_open(), after the call of ->atomic_open() has succeeded. > > 3) in do_last(), followed on success by vfs_open() > > That's all. All calls of inode_permission() that get MAY_OPEN come from > may_open(), and there's no other callers of that puppy. Reported-by: Donald Buczek Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=109771 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1451046656-26319-1-git-send-email-buczek@molgen.mpg.de Cc: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques --- fs/nfs/dir.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/nfs/dir.c b/fs/nfs/dir.c index 4a3d4ef76127..82253864acf7 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/nfs/dir.c @@ -2336,6 +2336,9 @@ int nfs_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) case S_IFLNK: goto out; case S_IFREG: + if ((mask & MAY_OPEN) && + nfs_server_capable(inode, NFS_CAP_ATOMIC_OPEN)) + return 0; break; case S_IFDIR: /*