From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932951AbcBZLIn (ORCPT ); Fri, 26 Feb 2016 06:08:43 -0500 Received: from youngberry.canonical.com ([91.189.89.112]:45677 "EHLO youngberry.canonical.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751555AbcBZKVz (ORCPT ); Fri, 26 Feb 2016 05:21:55 -0500 From: Luis Henriques To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@lists.ubuntu.com Cc: Ryan Ware , Mimi Zohar , James Morris , Moritz Muehlenhoff , Luis Henriques Subject: [PATCH 3.16.y-ckt 009/129] EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons Date: Fri, 26 Feb 2016 10:19:40 +0000 Message-Id: <1456482100-4667-10-git-send-email-luis.henriques@canonical.com> In-Reply-To: <1456482100-4667-1-git-send-email-luis.henriques@canonical.com> References: <1456482100-4667-1-git-send-email-luis.henriques@canonical.com> X-Extended-Stable: 3.16 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 3.16.7-ckt25 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ---8<------------------------------------------------------------ From: Ryan Ware commit 613317bd212c585c20796c10afe5daaa95d4b0a1 upstream. This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085. The problem exists because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp(). Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12. This patch changes the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq(). Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: James Morris Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques --- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 41f32259437c..c9db5ab63ad2 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "evm.h" int evm_initialized; @@ -148,7 +149,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, xattr_value_len, calc.digest); if (rc) break; - rc = memcmp(xattr_data->digest, calc.digest, + rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->digest, calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest)); if (rc) rc = -EINVAL;