From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically [ver #2]
Date: Mon, 07 Mar 2016 21:05:35 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1457402735.5321.14.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160304150142.17121.56666.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
On Fri, 2016-03-04 at 15:01 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to by root whilst the
> system is running - provided the key being added is vouched for by a key
> built into the kernel or already added to the secondary keyring.
>
> Rename .system_keyring to .builtin_trusted_keys to distinguish it more
> obviously from the new keyring (called .secondary_trusted_keys).
Renaming of the system_trusted_keyring to builtin_trusted_keys is fine,
but we're left with a lot of references to "system_trusted" (eg.
restrict_link_to_system_trusted, depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING, the
subsequent patch description and Kconfig use "system trusted keyrings",
etc). Without changing these references, I'm not convinced this is an
improvement.
Mimi
> The new keyring needs to be enabled with CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING.
>
> If the secondary keyring is enabled, a link is created from that to
> .builtin_trusted_keys so that the the latter will automatically be searched
> too if the secondary keyring is searched.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-03-08 2:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-03-04 15:00 [RFC PATCH 00/12] KEYS: Restrict additions to 'trusted' keyrings " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:00 ` [RFC PATCH 01/12] KEYS: Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:00 ` [RFC PATCH 02/12] PKCS#7: Make trust determination dependent on contents of trust keyring " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:00 ` [RFC PATCH 03/12] KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:00 ` [RFC PATCH 04/12] KEYS: Move x509_request_asymmetric_key() to asymmetric_type.c " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:00 ` [RFC PATCH 05/12] KEYS: Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key() " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:01 ` [RFC PATCH 06/12] X.509: Use verify_signature() if we have a struct key * to use " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:01 ` [RFC PATCH 07/12] X.509: Move the trust validation code out to its own file " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:01 ` [RFC PATCH 08/12] KEYS: Make the system trusted keyring depend on the asymmetric key type " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:01 ` [RFC PATCH 09/12] KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link() " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:01 ` [RFC PATCH 10/12] KEYS: Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED " David Howells
2016-03-04 15:01 ` [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically " David Howells
2016-03-08 2:05 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2016-03-08 13:13 ` David Howells
2016-03-08 14:06 ` Petko Manolov
2016-03-08 14:31 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-03-08 14:43 ` David Howells
2016-03-08 15:09 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-03-08 15:32 ` David Howells
2016-03-08 16:15 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-03-04 15:01 ` [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok " David Howells
2016-03-08 2:26 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-03-08 13:08 ` David Howells
2016-03-08 14:12 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-03-08 14:14 ` Petko Manolov
2016-03-08 14:38 ` Mimi Zohar
2016-03-08 14:44 ` David Howells
2016-03-08 15:48 ` Petko Manolov
2016-03-08 16:07 ` David Howells
2016-03-08 16:37 ` Petko Manolov
2016-03-08 22:05 ` Mimi Zohar
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